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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is guided by three research questions. First, how does host 
market corruption impact the equity-based market entry strategies implemented by 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) with respect to their foreign subsidiary investments? 
Second, does host market corruption increase the likelihood of market exit? Third, can 
MNEs implement strategies which reduce the likelihood of market exit under conditions 
of more pervasive host market corruption? 
 In the first essay, I synthesize insights from institutional theory and integrative 
social contracts theory to disaggregate the concept of government corruption into two 
dimensions (grand and petty). My theory pertaining to informal institutional pluralism 
suggests that discrete institutions (such as government corruption) within a host market 
can be conceptualized as pluralistic phenomena constituted by distinct dimensions which 
exert a disparate impact on the foreign entry strategy of MNEs. The results support 
aspects of this theory. 
 In the second essay, I build on the concept of informal institutional pluralism, 
categorizing corruption into two dimensions (public and private) to study its impact on 
the structure of equity-based foreign subsidiary investments. My theory proposes that the 
primary mechanism that drives the distinct approaches to foreign entry is the firm’s 
anticipated reliance on different sources of bargaining power to reduce information 
asymmetries that it expects to encounter in the host market. 
 In the third essay, I study the relationship between host market corruption 
pervasiveness, the subsidiary localization strategies implemented by MNEs and the 
likelihood of host market exit. In this context, the strategic insights proffered by resource 
dependence theory (RDT) and institutional theory (IT) are characterized by distinct 
spatial orientations. While RDT predicts that subsidiaries will implement proximal (or, 
host market-oriented) localization strategies, IT suggests that distal (or, home market-
oriented) localization strategies are better-suited to reducing the likelihood of exit from 
increasingly corrupt host market environments. I find that a proximally-oriented 
partnering strategy heightens the likelihood of market exit under conditions of more 
pervasive host market public corruption, but not more pervasive private corruption. 
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Conversely, a distally-oriented expatriate strategy increases the likelihood of market exit 
under conditions of both more pervasive public corruption and private corruption.  
Taken as a whole, this dissertation introduces new theory, constructs and insights 
into the relationship between host market corruption and the equity-based foreign entry 
strategies of MNEs. 
 
 
Keywords: Corruption; Government Corruption; Grand Corruption; Petty Corruption; 
Public Corruption; Private Corruption; Foreign Direct Investment; Market Entry 
Strategy; Ownership Structure; Emerging Markets; Developed Markets; Institutional 
Pluralism; Informal Institutional Pluralism; Institutional Theory; Integrative Social 
Contracts Theory; Resource Dependence Theory; Bargaining Power Theory; Binary 
Logistic Regression; Multinomial Logistic Regression; Event History Analysis. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In July 2000, the United Nations launched the Global Compact, an initiative 
designed to promote the adoption of socially responsible and sustainable business 
practices by corporations. The Compact’s framework was originally constituted by nine 
principles that were organized under three broad categories - human rights, labor and the 
environment. However, in an effort to garner greater transparency in both the public and 
private sector, academics, non-governmental organizations and industry executives began 
to petition for the recognition of “the missing tenth principle”, in reference to the 
institution of corruption (Waddock, 2004: 318). Their concerns were well-founded. 
Research by the World Bank estimated that global expenditures on bribery totaled 
approximately one trillion dollars per year, an amount equal to roughly three percent of 
global gross domestic product (Svensson, 2005). Consequently, by 2004, advocacy 
efforts culminated in the creation of the tenth canon of the Global Compact – Businesses 
should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery. 
 Subsequent to the expansion of the Global Compact’s purview, institutional 
scholars have directed their attention towards the development of theory that could be 
used to facilitate corruption-based inquiry (Lambsdorff, Taube, & Schramm, 2005). 
Moreover, international business strategy researchers have also emphasized the need to 
develop theory, frameworks, measures and methods within the domain of corruption-
oriented international business scholarship (Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman, & Eden, 2006). 
Notwithstanding the overlap between these research agendas, we continue to lack a 
comprehensive, theoretically-grounded and empirically-validated understanding of how 
host market corruption affects the subsidiary-level strategic behavior of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) in foreign markets. I contend that two factors have precipitated this 
theoretical impasse. First, the literature pertaining to the relationship between MNE 
strategy and host market corruption has focused primarily on the interrelationship 
between global foreign direct investment flows and the degree of perceived corruption in 
host markets. Second, researchers that have focused on the impact of host market 
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corruption on subsidiary-level strategy have adopted an overly broad conceptualization of 
the corruption phenomenon.  
The resultant theoretical deficiency has important practical consequences from the 
perspectives of both international strategy scholars and international business ethicists. 
Absent sufficiently precise theory, scholars are not able to formulate theoretically-
grounded predictions with respect to the strategic behavior of MNEs under conditions of 
heightened host market corruption, nor are they able to recommend strategic 
configurations that will enhance the likelihood of achieving positive investment 
outcomes. Moreover, without a theoretically-based understanding of the interrelationship 
between host market corruption and subsidiary-level strategy in foreign markets, it 
becomes more difficult to prescribe how MNEs can effectively integrate the Global 
Compact’s tenth principle into the business strategies, operations and structures of their 
foreign subsidiaries. Notably, in developing a framework designed to secure corporate 
commitment to the Global Compact’s principles, the United Nations has suggested that 
the engagement of worldwide subsidiary operations is one of the most important avenues 
through which MNEs can scale-up corporate responsibility efforts (Kell, 2012).   
As such, this dissertation is guided by three broad research questions. First, how 
does host market corruption impact the equity-based market entry strategies implemented 
by MNEs with respect to their foreign subsidiary investments? Second, does host market 
corruption increase the likelihood of market exit? Third, can MNEs implement strategies 
which reduce the likelihood of market exit under conditions of more pervasive host 
market corruption? As an international business scholar, my dissertation research is 
principally motivated by my commitment to bolstering MNEs’ comprehension of the 
strategic impact of corruption in foreign markets. Nonetheless, my efforts to advance 
understanding with respect to the phenomenon of host market corruption do not preclude 
the possibility that normative insights might also emerge from this work. More 
specifically, it is  anticipated that the theory and empirical findings associated with this 
dissertation will also be of interest to policy makers and business ethicists, particularly 
given that “understanding corruption…is vital to any effort to limit corruption” 
(Rodriguez et al., 2006: 739). 
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This chapter proceeds with a review of the extant literature pertaining to the 
relationship between MNE strategy and national corruption, before providing an 
overview of the manner in which corruption has been conceptualized by management 
scholars. It also briefly discusses the author’s rationale for employing institutional theory 
as the core theoretical foundation that informs this dissertation research. This chapter 
concludes with an outline of each essay in order to provide an overview of the research 
that constitutes the dissertation. 
 
The Strategic Responses of Multinational Enterprises to Corruption 
Historically, the corruption-oriented international business strategy research 
agenda has been primarily constituted by a rich body of macro-level studies that have 
focused on the role of host market corruption as a factor influencing the international 
flow of foreign direct investment (FDI). Two of the earliest studies yielded contradictory 
findings. While Mauro (1995) found that higher levels of corruption resulted in lower 
levels of FDI, Hines Jr. (1995) concluded that the level of corruption did not predict 
inward FDI, but he also found that FDI from the United States into more corrupt host 
countries decreased after the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was enacted in 1977. More 
consistent with Mauro’s (1995) work, subsequent studies have determined that MNEs 
invest less in countries that have higher levels of corruption (Smarzynska & Wei, 2000) 
and that an increase in the absolute difference in the level of corruption between an 
MNE’s home and host markets negatively impacts upon the FDI decisions of MNEs 
(Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). Focusing more specifically on emerging markets, which Luo 
(2011) contends are more prone to corruption, Voyer and Beamish (2004) extended prior 
corruption-FDI studies when they found that heightened levels of corruption in emerging 
market countries predicted lower levels of FDI. While many of these prior studies 
measured the level of perceived host market corruption based upon the opinions of 
foreign executives situated in the host markets, subsequent research has found that the 
prevailing attitude towards corruption in the MNE’s home market also impacts upon an 
MNE’s FDI decisions. Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) found that MNEs that are headquartered in 
countries with higher levels of corruption tend to invest more in countries where 
corruption is more prevalent. He also concluded that MNEs headquartered in countries 
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that were signatories to the OECD convention that combats bribery in foreign markets 
were less likely to invest in markets characterized by greater corruption. Subsequent 
research has suggested that this is because laws against foreign bribery have made it more 
costly for MNEs to invest in countries characterized by higher levels of corruption 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008).  
While the insights garnered by studies pertaining to the relationship between the 
FDI decisions of MNEs and host market corruption have advanced comprehension of the 
phenomenon, more recently, international strategy scholars have begun to focus attention 
on the impact of host market corruption on subsidiary-level strategies. This smaller body 
of work serves as the starting point for this dissertation and it informs the associated 
theory-building efforts at the phenomenological level.  
MNEs have been found to prefer joint equity investments in markets 
characterized by higher levels of corruption, unless the MNE is more technologically 
advanced, in which case the MNE will be less likely to engage in a joint venture 
(Smarzynska & Wei, 2000). In another study on the relationship between corruption and 
firm strategy that was based on a sample of emerging market-based subsidiary 
investments, Meschi (2009) found that government corruption is significantly related to 
the likelihood of foreign partners terminating an international joint venture (IJV). Further, 
Meschi determined that the country experience of foreign partners moderates the 
relationship between government corruption and changes in the equity stakes of foreign 
partners in emerging market-based IJVs. 
Subsequent conceptual work by Rodriguez et al. (2005: 385) has characterized 
corruption in terms of its pervasiveness or, “the likelihood of encountering corruption in 
normal interactions with state officials.” In testing this theory, Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) 
found that as the pervasiveness of corruption increases, foreign investing firms are more 
likely to prefer nonequity modes of entry over equity modes (JV or WOS). This 
observation has been supported by Luo (2011) who found that an increase in the 
pervasiveness of host market corruption decreased the likelihood that MNEs would 
engage in subsidiary investments in emerging markets and increased the likelihood that 
they would adopt an export market orientation.  
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However, while an increase in the pervasiveness of host market corruption has 
been found to precipitate a preference among internationalizing MNEs for nonequity 
modes over equity modes of entry, the pervasiveness of host market corruption has not 
been found to be a significant predictor of the entry mode (JV versus WOS) employed by 
MNEs that engaged in equity-based foreign investments (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Given 
the ample evidence supporting the relationship between the pervasiveness of host market 
corruption and MNEs’ preference for nonequity approaches to investing in foreign 
markets characterized by more pervasive corruption, it is surprising that the 
pervasiveness of host market corruption does not significantly predict the equity-based 
entry mode decisions of foreign-investing MNEs, particularly given the recent results of 
Spencer and Gomez (2011). They find that a positive relationship exists between the level 
of host country corruption and the pressure that foreign subsidiaries face to engage in 
host market bribery. Further, they observe that MNEs from less corrupt home countries 
report less pressure to engage in corrupt local practices when they do not partner with 
locals in foreign markets.  
Rodriguez et al.’s (2005) conceptual work has provided a strong theoretical 
foundation for scholars to advance corruption-oriented international business strategy 
research. However, the qualified empirical support for its propositions suggests the need 
for further conceptual effort in order to refine the theory’s precepts. Consistent with this 
position, Uhlenbruck et al. (2006: 411) have suggested that “…there may be underlying 
constructs behind pervasiveness that have conflicting effects on the firm’s choice 
between joint venture and wholly-owned subsidiary. Further exploration of the 
institutional underpinnings of the pervasiveness of corruption is an important next step 
for corruption researchers.” 
 In this dissertation, I contend that the traditionally-employed conceptualization of 
corruption is overly broad and, as a consequence, it has inhibited progress in advancing 
comprehension of the relationship between host market corruption and the subsidiary-
level strategies of foreign-investing MNEs. In this regard, my work draws from 
Rodriguez et al. (2006: 739) who argue that the domain of corruption-based research 
would benefit from more attention being given to defining and conceptualizing the 
phenomenon. 
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Defining and Conceptualizing Corruption 
Settling upon a comprehensive definition of corruption has proven to be a 
challenging exercise for academics, policy-makers and business executives alike. While 
Argandoña (2003: 255) has acknowledged that corruption is “a varied and shifting 
phenomenon that is difficult to define in terms that are clear”, the chair of Transparency 
International’s Board of Directors recently lamented that “(The boundaries) of corruption 
are becoming harder to define, despite the best efforts of high profile international treaties 
and initiatives” (Labelle, 2010: 109). An extensive tradition of corruption research exists 
in the academic fields of law, political science and economics. While legal theorists have 
defined corruption as “the misuse of public office for private gain by an elected official” 
(Rose-Ackerman, 1996: 83), political scientists have framed corruption as “the exchange 
of money or favor for a benefit disbursed by a government official” (Oldenburg, 1987: 
512). Similarly, economists have characterized corruption as “an arrangement contracted 
between a private individual and public official, (in which) the payment for, or the 
counterpart of the arrangement may be political patronage, tutelage or some other type of 
barter” (Macrae, 1982: 678). 
These early efforts to conceptualize corruption have informed the more recent 
work of international business strategy scholars. As examples, in the leading conceptual 
and empirical work on the phenomenon, both Rodriguez et. al. (2005: 383) and 
Uhlenbruck et al. (2006: 402) define corruption as “the abuse of public power for private 
benefit.” In this dissertation, I contend that that there are two important limitations 
associated with this extant conceptualization of the phenomenon. First, the definition has 
encouraged scholars to focus only upon public sector corruption to the exclusion of 
private sector corruption. Second, it has prompted scholars to adopt an overly broad 
conceptualization of public sector corruption. As a consequence, the current 
conceptualization of host market corruption risks the possibility of muting the effects of 
the phenomenon upon the strategy of foreign-investing MNEs (Milliken, 1987).  
This dissertation builds on Rodriguez et al.’s (2005: 385) extant conceptualization 
of host market corruption in terms of its pervasiveness or, “the likelihood of encountering 
corruption in normal interactions with state officials.” I propose that the concept of 
pervasiveness provides an appropriate foundation upon which to construct more robust 
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and theoretically-rich conceptualizations of the phenomenon. My work further 
dimensionalizes the phenomenon according to the host market sector within which it 
occurs (public versus private), and according to the origins of the norms that permit or 
prohibit the existence of corrupt transactions in the public sector of foreign markets 
(grand versus petty). In doing so, my theoretically-grounded efforts extend the scope of 
the pervasiveness construct, as well as establishing boundary conditions within and 
around the government corruption pervasiveness construct developed by Rodriguez et al. 
(2005). Ultimately, my efforts are consistent with the work of both Mezias and Mezias 
(2010: 284) which calls for “future research on the dimensionality and meaning of 
multiple measures of corruption”, and Uhlenbruck et al. (2006: 411) which proposes that 
“…there may be underlying constructs behind pervasiveness that have conflicting effects 
on the firm’s choice between joint venture and wholly-owned subsidiary.”  
Notably, in addition to the theoretical relevance of the new dimensions that are 
proposed in this dissertation, a review of executive surveys pertaining to corruption and 
international legal compacts that have been designed to combat corruption, reveals that 
these dimensions are also relevant in practice. Accordingly, my dissertation employs 
these more nuanced conceptualizations of the phenomenon in order to investigate the 
impact of host market corruption upon several strategies, including foreign entry strategy 
(the choice between nonequity entry and equity entry), equity entry strategy (the choice 
between a joint venture and a wholly-owned subsidiary) and partnering strategy (the 
choice between a traditional joint venture and a crossnational joint venture), as well as 
exploring the longer-term implications of corruption upon the subsidiary’s continued 
existence. 
 
Institutional Theory 
Despite the extensive tradition of management scholarship grounded upon 
institutional theory, the use of institutional theory in international business strategy 
research is more recent (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000). Scott (2008) recently 
identified two important developments that have made institutional theory more pertinent 
to strategic management scholarship. First, Oliver’s (1991) efforts to incorporate the role 
of agency within institutional theory have challenged researchers to investigate the active 
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responses of firms and managers to the pressures precipitated by institutional 
environments. Second, the theory has evolved from one in which institutional phenomena 
were “restricted to realms lacking competitive processes” to one in which institutions are 
regarded as providing the boundaries for strategic action (2008: 437). 
Institutional theory is employed as the base theoretical foundation in this 
dissertation for a combination of practical and philosophical reasons. First, the conceptual 
work upon which I build my theoretical contributions is broadly grounded in institutional 
theory (cf. Doh, Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, Collins, & Eden, 2003; Lambsdorff et al., 2005; 
Lambsdorff, 2007; Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Second, embedded in 
my research is a belief in the power of institutional theory to predict and provide 
explanations for the behavior of foreign-investing MNEs. This commitment traces its 
roots to my background as a lawyer and my ten years of executive-level experience in 
industry. My extensive involvement in both domestic and cross-border business activity 
has made me acutely aware of the routine impact of institutions upon strategic and 
operational decision-making.  
Corruption is inherently difficult to study because “…the parties involved have 
every reason to keep the data hidden” (Klitgaard, 1991: 30). This challenge has grown 
even more imposing. In fact, Webster (2008: 807) notes that “Ten years ago, corruption 
was considered incidental to doing business internationally and, for better or worse, an 
inescapable reality. Today, corruption is considered to be…an enemy that must be 
defeated. Accordingly, the international community is focused, like never before, on 
efforts to reduce corruption.”  
Notwithstanding the obstacles associated with pursuing scholarship pertaining to 
the phenomenon of corruption, institutional scholars have made considerable advances. 
Notably, both institutional economists and institutional sociologists have contributed to 
this research imperative. Accordingly, this dissertation leverages tenets from both of 
these theoretical perspectives, an approach advocated by Lambsdorf (2005: 1-3) who 
suggests that “the task is too complex to rely on a single theoretical tradition…only an 
interdisciplinary approach is likely to be successful…approaching corruption from an 
institutional economic perspective, as well as from a sociological one, can enrich our 
understanding.”    
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Dissertation Overview 
 Building on Uhlenbruck et al.’s (2006: 411 ) proposition that “there may be 
underlying constructs behind pervasiveness”, this dissertation is organized as a collection 
of integrated essays. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the dissertation, detailing the 
theoretical foundations underpinning each essay, along with the contributions that link 
the essays together. Essay 1 theoretically disaggregates government (public) corruption 
within host markets into grand corruption and petty corruption, in addition to building on 
early theory with respect to institutional pluralism to develop theory pertaining to the 
pluralistic nature of distinct informal institutions such as host market government 
corruption. Essay 2 builds on the theory elaborated in Essay 1 to develop a theoretically-
grounded distinction between public sector corruption and private sector corruption, as 
well as drawing upon bargaining power theory to detail the theoretical mechanisms that 
link each type of host market corruption (public and private) to the foreign entry strategy 
of MNEs.  Finally, Essay 3 investigates whether host market corruption increases the 
likelihood of market exit and whether MNEs can implement strategies which reduce the 
likelihood of market exit. Essay 3 theoretically categorizes the choice of strategies that 
MNEs implement as being either proximal (host market-oriented) or distal (home 
market-oriented). 
 
Essay 1  
The first essay (Chapter 2) is entitled Institutional pluralism: Host market 
government corruption and the equity-based foreign entry strategies of multinational 
enterprises. It focuses specifically on two distinct manifestations of government 
corruption in the host market environment – petty corruption and grand corruption. This 
essay is motivated by both a theoretical question (Can host market institutions, that have 
traditionally been regarded as discrete institutions, be conceptualized as pluralistic 
phenomena?) and, an empirical question pertaining more specifically to the phenomenon 
of host market government corruption (Do the different dimensions of government 
corruption (grand corruption versus petty corruption) each exert a distinct impact upon 
the equity-based foreign entry strategies of MNEs?). While extant theory proposes that 
the pervasiveness of host market corruption will influence the equity
10 
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AOM 2013 (International Management division). 
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ownership decisions of MNEs (Rodriguez et al., 2005), subsequent research has not 
found a statistically significant relationship that empirically validates these propositions 
(Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). These results are surprising, particularly given the substantial 
evidence that has been garnered which suggests that host market corruption influences 
both the global location of foreign direct investment (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008) and an 
MNE’s preference for non-equity involvement in markets characterized by heightened 
corruption (Luo, 2011; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). In this Essay, I incorporate insights from 
integrative social contracts theory (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994, 1999; Spicer, 2009) to 
argue that host market informal institutions, such as government corruption, should be 
conceptualized as pluralistic phenomena.  
Building on conceptual work that draws a distinction between globally-oriented 
hyper norms (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1995) and locally-oriented behavioral norms (Spicer, 
2009), I theoretically distinguish between petty corruption and grand corruption to 
develop hypotheses pertaining to the relationship between each dimension of corruption 
and the foreign entry decisions undertaken by MNEs. Trust and learning provide the 
bases for the central mechanisms upon which the hypotheses are developed in Essay 1. It 
contributes to the specification of theoretical boundary conditions within and around the 
government corruption pervasiveness construct developed by Rodriguez et al. (2005). It 
builds on recent international business-oriented business ethics research which has called 
for the active integration of the theoretical and conceptual traditions of international 
business strategy scholars and business ethicists, particularly when the research is 
grounded in the institutional theoretical tradition (Doh, Husted, Matten, & Santoro, 
2010). Taken together, the empirical findings and the associated theory in Essay 1 
facilitate the linkage between the concept of informal institutions and the notion of 
pluralism. In this regard, my work is consistent with prior conceptual work that has 
advocated efforts to pursue theoretical contributions that could emerge from the 
investigation of pluralistic phenomena, notwithstanding scholars’ general preference for 
parsimony and generalizability in theory-construction (Glynn, Barr, & Dacin, 2000).  
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Essay 2  
The second essay (Chapter 3) is entitled Public corruption, private corruption and 
the structure of equity-based foreign subsidiary investments in emerging markets. It 
examines the relationship between the pervasiveness of host market corruption 
(Rodriguez et al., 2005) and the strategies that MNEs implement with respect to their 
foreign subsidiary investments.  This Essay adopts the more comprehensive definition of 
corruption (the abuse of authority for personal gain) that has been proposed by Aguilera 
and Vadera (2008). In doing so, it extends the scope of corruption-based inquiry to 
include aspects of both public sector corruption and private sector corruption through the 
introduction of new constructs that categorize the phenomenon of host market corruption 
into two dimensions – public corruption pervasiveness and private corruption 
pervasiveness. This Essay seeks to answer the question, How do public sector corruption 
and private sector corruption impact upon the foreign-entry strategies of multinational 
enterprises?  
 
Essay 3 
The third essay (Chapter 4) is entitled Corruption pervasiveness, subsidiary 
localization strategy and host market exit. It focuses on the MNE’s pursuit of external 
legitimacy and the survival implications associated with various strategic initiatives that 
are implemented at the subsidiary level to secure legitimacy in increasingly corrupt host 
market environments. In this context, the strategic insights proffered by resource 
dependence theory (RDT) and institutional theory are characterized by distinct spatial 
orientations. RDT predicts that subsidiaries will implement proximal (host market-
oriented) localization strategies in which local (host country) partners and employees are 
hypothesized to be best-suited to efforts to enhance the subsidiary’s legitimacy and 
reduce its likelihood of exit from the host country market. Conversely, institutional 
theory suggests that distal (home market-oriented) localization strategies, in which 
subsidiaries prefer to engage home country partners and employees in the subsidiary 
investment, are better-suited to reducing the likelihood of subsidiary exit from 
increasingly corrupt host country market environments. A set of competing hypotheses 
based on RDT and institutional theory are developed in Essay 3 in order to examine the 
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relationship between host market corruption levels, MNE strategy and the likelihood of 
subsidiary exit. The results reveal the relative efficacy of home versus host market-based 
localization strategies that are designed to facilitate the survival of subsidiaries in 
increasingly corrupt foreign markets. 
 
Conclusion 
 Collectively, this dissertation research makes the following conceptual and 
empirical contributions: 
1. Provides empirical and theoretical support for the foundational theory of host market 
corruption in international business strategy research (Rodriguez et al., 2005);  
 
2. Extends the conceptualization of host market corruption in terms of its origins (grand 
versus petty) and in terms of its sector of origin (public versus private);  
 
3. Advances theory with respect to the relationship between host market corruption and 
the subsidiary-level strategies of MNEs;  
 
4. Contributes new tenets to institutional theory by introducing the concepts of informal 
institutional pluralism (conceptualizing informal institutions as pluralistic 
phenomena), proximal (host market-oriented) localization and distal (home market-
oriented) localization;  
 
5. Investigates whether MNEs can implement strategies which reduce the likelihood of 
market exit under conditions of more pervasive host market corruption. 
 
Dissertation-Related Presentations 
 Prior to the submission of this dissertation for final examination, the theory, 
constructs and empirical analyses presented within these three essays have evolved 
through extensive developmental feedback received from my doctoral supervisor, and 
through the presentation of the dissertation’s constituent essays in multiple public forums. 
These presentation forums have included doctoral consortiums, academic conferences 
and invited scholarly presentations. Following my dissertation proposal’s defense in 
April 2013, an overview of my dissertation proposal was presented in Istanbul, Turkey at 
the Academy of International Business Annual Meeting in July 2013 where it was 
recognized first among 41 other submitted dissertation proposals and awarded the AIB-
Sheth Doctoral Dissertation Proposal Award. Additionally, my dissertation proposal was 
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also presented at the Academy of Management Annual Meeting’s doctoral consortium 
(International Management division) in Orlando, U.S.A. during August 2013.  
With respect to Essay 1 (Chapter 2 of this dissertation), earlier versions have been 
presented at the Canadian Business Ethics Research Network’s (CBERN) Winter Ph.D. 
Meeting convened at York University in Toronto, Canada during March 2013; at the 
Academy of International Business Annual Meeting in a competitive session convened by 
the Institutions, Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility interest track in 
Istanbul, Turkey during July 2013; at the Strategic Management Society Annual 
International Conference in a paper session convened by the Global Strategy track in 
Atlanta, U.S.A. during October 2013; at the Institutional Capacity and Corruption 
Symposium co-convened by the Darla Moore School of Business and the School of Law 
at the University of South Carolina through the Rule of Law Collaborative during April 
2014; and, the Essay has recently been accepted for presentation at the Academy of 
Management Annual Meeting in a paper session being convened by the International 
Management division in Philadelphia, U.S.A. during August 2014.  
An earlier version of Essay 2 (Chapter 3 of this dissertation) was presented at the 
Academy of International Business Annual Meeting in a competitive session convened by 
the Institutions, Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility interest track in 
Nagoya, Japan during July 2011.  
Finally, an earlier version of Essay 3 (Chapter 4 of this dissertation) has been 
presented at the Academy of International Business Annual Meeting in a competitive 
session convened by the Institutions, Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility 
interest track in Washington, D.C. during July 2012. More recently, the Essay has been 
accepted for presentation at the Academy of Management Annual Meeting in a paper 
session being convened by the International Management division in Philadelphia, 
U.S.A. during August 2014. 
 
Grammatical Style and References 
 While Chapters 1 and 5 of this dissertation have been written using first person 
singular pronouns (“I”, “my”), Chapters 2, 3 and 4 have been written using first person 
plural pronouns (“we”, “our”). This difference in grammatical style was implemented as 
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a matter of convenience for myself, as I anticipate that it is likely that I will pursue 
publication of these essays in peer-reviewed academic journals with one or more co-
authors in the future. This difference in grammatical style should not be taken to imply 
anything other than this entire dissertation being my own work. I am the sole author of 
this thesis. Consistent with this, each of the presentations listed under the Dissertation-
Related Presentations section of this chapter were presentations of single-authored 
manuscripts. 
 This dissertation has been prepared using the Integrated-Article format specified 
by the School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies (SGPS) at Western University, rather 
than using the Monograph format. In this regard, the Chapters are integrated through 
theory, empirics, concepts and materials that provide logical connections between the 
chapters. Consistent with SGPS’ Thesis Regulation 8.3 which allows thesis chapters to 
include unpublished work, in Chapter 3, I have cited the research that I present in Chapter 
2. Similarly, in Chapter 4, I have cited the research that I present in both Chapters 2 and 
3.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Institutional Pluralism: Host Market Government Corruption and the Equity-
Based Foreign Entry Strategies of Multinational Enterprises  
 
 
The question of how firms…manage when faced with public sector 
corruption continues to be among the most important and elusive 
research areas. (Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman, & Eden, 2006: 736) 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The macroeconomic consequences of corruption are widely documented in the 
academic literature. Corruption has been found to adversely impact the flow of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) into global markets that are perceived to be more corrupt (Habib 
& Zurawicki, 2002). Further, while Mauro (1995) determined that corruption impaired 
national development and undermined economic growth, Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-
Terme (2002) concluded that it also distorts the distribution of national income and 
perpetuates poverty. Notwithstanding these advances regarding the detrimental effects of 
corruption at the national level, less is known about the relationship between corruption 
and multinational enterprise (MNE) strategy.  
While extant theory has used the terms government corruption and public sector 
corruption interchangeably (Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005; Uhlenbruck, 
Rodriguez, Doh, & Eden, 2006), in the interest of consistency, we adopt the term 
government corruption in our work. We investigate the impact of host market 
government corruption on the strategic foreign entry decisions of MNEs. Rodriguez et al. 
(2005) proposed that more pervasive government corruption in host markets will shape 
the equity-based ownership decisions of foreign-investing MNEs. However, efforts to 
empirically validate this proposition through the analysis of an MNE’s foreign entry 
mode (joint venture (JV) versus wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS)) did not find a 
statistically significant relationship between the pervasiveness of host market corruption 
and an MNE’s equity-based foreign entry strategy (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). These 
results are surprising when juxtaposed against subsequent work which determined that 
host market corruption influences the investment behavior of MNEs (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
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2008b), and exacerbates the pressure on foreign subsidiaries to engage in host market 
bribery (Spencer & Gomez, 2011). In an effort to reconcile their non-significant 
empirical results with the foundational theory advanced by Rodriguez et al. (2005), 
Uhlenbruck et al. (2006: 411) conjectured that “…there may be underlying constructs 
behind pervasiveness that have conflicting effects on the firm’s choice between joint 
venture and wholly-owned subsidiary. Further exploration of the institutional 
underpinnings of the pervasiveness of corruption is an important next step for corruption 
researchers.” Building on this proposition, we develop more fine-grained theory to extend 
the conceptualization of corruption pervasiveness and employ it to test the 
aforementioned theory developed by Rodriguez et al. (2005) with respect to the 
relationship between host market government corruption and the equity-based entry 
strategies of foreign-investing MNEs. 
Institutional theory holds that institutions include both the written rules and the 
norms of behavior that evolve in order to reduce uncertainty (North, 1990). While strong 
institutions attenuate uncertainty and facilitate efficient exchange, weak formal 
institutions in a host market precipitate the formation of institutional voids (North, 1990) 
which may be filled by informal institutions such as corruption (Puffer, McCarthy, & 
Boisot, 2010). In this respect, institutions can be a source of uncertainty and risk for 
internationalizing MNEs. Scholars have routinely formulated theory pertaining to MNE 
strategies under conditions of heightened institutional uncertainty by employing two 
constructs (North, 1990). Formal institutions are written rules, regulations and laws. 
Informal institutions are norms of behavior, values, practices, conventions and codes of 
conduct. Given the manifold regulatory regimes and systems of behavioral norms that 
MNEs encounter, international business strategy scholars frequently enlist the notion of 
institutional pluralism or, “the situation faced by an organization that operates within 
multiple institutional spheres” (Kraatz & Block, 2008: 243). However, this body of work 
has primarily concentrated on institutional pluralism across geographic space, 
highlighting the institutional diversity that exists between countries (Chan & Makino, 
2007), between regions (Arregle, Miller, Hitt, & Beamish, 2013) or between the MNE 
and its global network of subsidiaries (Kostova & Roth, 2002). We extend this research 
tradition by focusing further on the concept of institutional pluralism, placing particular 
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emphasis upon the institutional diversity that exists within individual institutions that 
prevail in the host country market. A central premise of our work is that host market 
institutions that have been traditionally recognized as discrete institutions (such as 
“government corruption”) in the academic literature (Rodriguez et al., 2005) and the 
business press (The Economist, 2006, 2008), can be conceptualized as pluralistic 
institutional phenomena constituted by distinct dimensions which are disparate both in 
their origin and their impact on the foreign entry strategy of MNEs.   
 Our theory synthesizes insights from institutional theory and integrative social 
contracts theory, building on conceptual work by Doh, Husted, Matten and Santoro 
(2010). Institutional theory (IT) suggests that the uncertainty precipitated by informal 
institutions such as corruption in the host market environment will compel MNEs to 
implement strategic foreign entry decisions that are designed to attenuate the perceived 
level of uncertainty that the MNE encounters in the foreign market (Sartor & Beamish, 
2014). Integrative social contracts theory (ISCT) proposes that a hierarchy of norms 
should be used by managers to guide their ethical decision-making. More specifically, 
ISCT has distinguished between globally-oriented hyper norms (Donaldson & Dunfee, 
1994; Spicer, Dunfee, & Bailey, 2004) and locally-oriented behavioral norms (Spicer, 
2009). We leverage this hierarchy of norms framework to inform our institutionally-
oriented research. While scholars have traditionally conceptualized and operationalized 
government corruption as a broad, uniform construct (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006), we 
contend that this comprehensiveness might be masking more nuanced relationships 
between host market corruption and the equity-based entry strategies of MNEs. 
Consistent with this perspective, surveys of industry executives have revealed a more 
multifaceted conceptualization of the construct, drawing a distinction between grand and 
petty forms of corruption (Hardoon & Heinrich, 2011). We believe that this distinction is 
highly relevant to the work of scholars who are endeavoring to enhance our 
understanding of the relationship between corruption and firm strategy. 
 As such, our work is motivated by both: (1) a theoretical question: Can discrete 
host market institutions be conceptualized as pluralistic phenomena?; and, (2) an 
empirical question pertaining more specifically to the phenomenon of host market 
government corruption: Do the different dimensions of government corruption (grand 
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corruption versus petty corruption) each exert a distinct impact upon the equity-based 
foreign entry strategies of MNEs? Our work is developed in two stages. First, we 
theoretically distinguish between grand corruption and petty corruption in order to 
formulate hypotheses pertaining to the relationship between each dimension of 
government corruption and three strategic entry decisions that confront an MNE – 
namely, its foreign entry strategy (nonequity-based entry versus equity-based entry), its 
equity entry strategy (JV versus WOS) and its partnering strategy (traditional JV versus 
crossnational JV). Second, we test these hypotheses with a sample of 727 subsidiaries 
established in 32 host countries. We find that the results lend general support to our 
theory that host market institutions can be conceptualized as pluralistic phenomena 
characterized by distinct dimensions that exert differential impacts on various aspects of 
an MNE’s foreign entry strategy.  
Our research makes both theoretical and empirical contributions. Principal among 
these is our extension of the conceptual domain of institutional pluralism. More 
specifically, while prior work has focused on the strategic relevance of institutional 
pluralism precipitated by geographic space, we develop theory which proposes that 
discrete institutions within a host market can themselves be characterized as pluralistic 
institutional phenomena, constituted by distinct dimensions that each exert a unique 
impact upon the strategies of foreign-investing MNEs. Empirically, we independently 
replicate an important component of Uhlenbruck et al.’s (2006) findings, providing 
further support for the theory which proposed that MNEs would be more likely to favor 
nonequity-based entry over equity-based entry under conditions of more pervasive host 
market government corruption. However, we also present new theory that disaggregates 
the concept of government corruption pervasiveness into two distinct dimensions (grand 
corruption pervasiveness and petty corruption pervasiveness). Employing this refined 
conceptualization, we shed new light on the relationship between the equity-based foreign 
entry strategy of MNEs and the pervasiveness of government corruption, presenting three 
new insights. First, we find that more pervasive grand corruption increases the likelihood 
that foreign-investing MNEs will engage in JV investments with host country partners. 
Second, an increase in the pervasiveness of petty corruption was found to prompt the 
opposite outcome. Namely, under conditions of more pervasive petty corruption, firms 
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that chose to invest through a JV were found to be more likely to engage a partner from 
the foreign-investing MNE’s home country. Third, an increase in the pervasiveness of 
petty corruption was found to attenuate the hypothesized increase in the likelihood that 
MNEs would invest in JVs with host country (local) partners under conditions of more 
pronounced grand corruption pervasiveness. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Dimensions of Government Corruption  
In order to advance understanding with respect to the relevance of host market 
corruption to the strategy of foreign-investing MNEs, scholars have routinely employed 
the theoretical paradigm which conceptualizes host market government corruption in 
terms of its pervasiveness, or the likelihood of encountering corruption in normal 
interactions with state officials (Rodriguez et al., 2005: 385). Leveraging this theory, 
firms have been found to pay larger bribes to government officials in host markets 
plagued by more pervasive corruption (Lee, Oh, & Eden, 2010). In turn, MNEs have 
learned to expect heightened costs in markets characterized by more pervasive corruption 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008a) because corruption has become a regular part of business 
practices in those countries (Kwok & Tadesse, 2006). As previously indicated, efforts to 
empirically validate Rodriguez et al.’s (2005) theoretical framework found that an 
increase in the pervasiveness of host market corruption heightens the likelihood that 
foreign-entering MNEs will choose nonequity modes (arm’s-length or contract-based 
modes of internationalization, such as management contracts and turnkey projects) over 
equity modes of entry (JV and WOS) (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). However, the 
pervasiveness of host market corruption has not been found to be a significant predictor 
of the entry mode (JV versus WOS) executed by MNEs that engaged in equity-based 
foreign investments (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Motivated by their equivocal empirical 
results, we endeavor to build on Uhlenbruck et al.’s (2006: 411) concluding proposition 
that “…there may be underlying constructs behind pervasiveness that have conflicting 
effects on the firm’s choice between joint venture and wholly-owned subsidiary.”  
Consistent with this perspective, Mezias and Mezias (2010: 284) have argued that 
acknowledging the dimensionality of corruption is required “to enhance understanding of 
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how firms adapt to global institutional realities.” We use the general definition of 
government corruption (the abuse of public power or public office for private benefit) 
that has emerged from research in the adjacent fields of economics, law and political 
science (Bardhan, 1997; Oldenburg, 1987; Treisman, 2000). Among the early studies that 
encouraged scholars to employ a multidimensional approach in efforts to build on this 
definition of government corruption, Husted (1999) suggested distinguishing between 
different instances of corruption based upon factors including, among others, the 
monetary amount involved in corrupt transactions, and the social or occupational status 
of the transactions’ recipients. This recommendation is consistent with the language 
employed by industry executives, non-governmental organizations, governments, 
parliamentarians and the media when describing government corruption. More 
specifically, in developing a dictionary of terms used by these diverse public and private 
sector stakeholders to describe “corruption”, among the principal criteria used by 
Transparency International to classify the multiple manifestations of government 
corruption have been “the amount of money lost and…where it occurs” (2009: 14). 
Accordingly, our work incorporates a consideration of the dimensionality of corruption 
pervasiveness that is based on the distinction between grand corruption and petty 
corruption. To do so, we employ Hardoon & Heinrich’s (2011: 18) definitions of grand 
corruption (improper contributions made to political parties or to high-ranking officials 
and politicians to achieve influence), and petty corruption (improper payments to low-
level officials to facilitate or speed up administrative processes).   
Economists, legal theorists and business ethicists have generally embraced this 
dichotomization of government corruption (grand versus petty) in their research.  Aidt, 
Dutta and Sena (2008) have found that in countries characterized by stronger political 
institutions, grand corruption has a more pronounced negative impact on growth than in 
countries with weaker political institutions. Similarly, Rose-Ackerman (2002) observed 
that grand corruption produces serious distortions and undermines productive 
efficiencies such that the national competitiveness of more corrupt countries is reduced 
substantially. In the case of petty corruption, scholars have focused on the adverse 
corporate effects associated with allowing small disbursements to public officials. 
Facilitating payments create a culture of corruption in the firm, damage the company’s 
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reputation and foster the misperception among employees that sustainable competitive 
advantages can be secured through continued payments to low-level officials 
(Argandoña, 2005). Moreover, while a facilitation payment is typically small in quantum, 
in aggregate, petty corruption can be costly to firms (Jordan, 2010). In addition to the 
costs associated with navigating a complex international web of legislation and 
conventions, some of which prohibit facilitation payments (or, petty bribes) and some of 
which permit these disbursements, companies that pay petty bribes often become a target 
for industrious bribe-takers who escalate the frequency and amount of their demands for 
payment (Argandoña, 2005). 
While extant literature supports our two-dimensional conceptual extension of the 
corruption pervasiveness construct, our expectation that each dimension will exert a 
disparate impact on the equity-based strategy of foreign-investing MNEs is based upon 
the belief that unique mechanisms underpin the relationship between each dimension of 
government corruption and MNE strategy. In turn, the uncommon nature of these 
mechanisms can be attributed to the distinct origins associated with each dimension of 
corruption pervasiveness (grand and petty). To explicate these distinct origins, we 
leverage theoretical insights from ISCT pertaining to the existence of a hierarchy of 
norms (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994, 1999). In doing so, our efforts build upon conceptual 
work by Doh et al. (2010) who advocate constructive engagement between the 
international business and business ethics literatures, as well as the active integration of 
the disciplines’ conceptual and theoretical traditions. Given the growing prominence of 
the institutional context in international business strategy scholarship, they propose that 
ISCT is particularly well-suited to enriching our understanding with respect to the 
strategic relevance of phenomena such as government corruption.   
 
Integrative Social Contracts Theory: The Hierarchy of Norms 
 Scholars maintain that ISCT can be theoretically distinguished from strategy-
oriented research on the grounds that ISCT is a normative theory, rather than a predictive 
theory (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1995). Nonetheless, we believe that the tenets of ICST 
pertaining to the origins of norms (Donaldson & Dunfee, 2000) or, the hierarchy of 
norms (hyper norms and behavioral norms), can be leveraged to structure new theory that 
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facilitates the execution of more fine-grained analyses with respect to the relationship 
between the foreign-entry strategies of MNEs and host market corruption. Our 
epistemological perspective is consistent with recent conceptual work by Donaldson 
(2012) who proposed that predictive management theories can be developed by 
integrating principles derived from both positivist and normative traditions. In this 
regard, while ISCT may not be directly useful to our efforts to predict or explain strategic 
corporate behavior, the theory does offer the potential to enhance our understanding of 
the context within which host market corruption and MNE foreign entry strategies 
intersect.  
ISCT is concerned with “economic ethics” or principles that delineate the 
boundaries governing proper behavior in the context of production and exchange 
(Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999). The theory endeavors to explain the origins of norms, 
values, behaviors and standards that prevail in communities (Nichols, 2009). According 
to the precepts of ISCT, host market countries can be assumed to enjoy moral free space 
or, the freedom to establish moral rules applicable to the constituents in the host market. 
Donaldson and Dunfee (1999: 38) contend that the moral rules adopted by a community 
“reflect the community’s particular goals, environments, resources, experiences 
and…specify boundaries for economic behavior, while reflecting the moral preferences 
of the members of the community.”    
 Norms that are generated within a host market’s moral free space are known as 
authentic norms. An authentic norm exists when a community garners a strong consensus 
with respect to the ethicality of a particular behavior, as well as a strong expectation that 
community members will act according to the specified behavior (Donaldson & Dunfee, 
1999; Spicer, 2009). Locally-oriented authentic norms permit particular behaviors or 
standards to persist in the community. However, ISCT scholars have struggled to 
reconcile the notion that patently negative behaviors could be characterized as authentic, 
such as when certain acts of corruption become “normalized” in a community (Ashforth 
& Anand, 2003). Consequently, ISCT theorists have refined the conceptualization of 
authentic norms and introduced the concept of behavioral norms. Spicer (2009: 836) has 
suggested that behavioral norms exist when “community members have strong collective 
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expectations that a certain type of behavior is likely to be displayed, even if there is little 
consensus that such behavior is ethically desirable.”   
It is important to note that the moral free space that communities enjoy is not 
unbounded. ISCT introduces an important qualification to the notion of moral free space 
and a community’s authority to generate behavioral norms that permit the persistence of 
particular moral standards or behaviors in the community (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994). 
More specifically, globally-oriented hyper norms exist to establish boundaries that 
operate as ethical constraints around a community’s moral free space (Donaldson & 
Dunfee, 1999). Hyper norms are fundamental principles that constitute the standards by 
which behavioral norms are to be judged (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999). In this regard, 
hyper norms represent a global convergence of beliefs and values (Dunfee & Donaldson, 
2002). Hyper norms that prohibit specified behaviors effectively preclude the existence of 
any behavioral norms that are formulated in an effort to permit or legitimize behaviors 
that are prohibited by hyper norms (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994, 1999). 
 
Grand Corruption and Petty Corruption: Hyper Norms or Behavioral Norms?; 
Permissive or Prohibitive? 
 
In support of our theory-building efforts, we engage in a more rigorous analysis of 
our two-dimensional conceptualization of the government corruption pervasiveness 
phenomenon using the ISCT theoretical prism. To reiterate, the tenets of ISCT hold that 
both hyper norms and behavioral norms can operate to either prohibit or permit the 
legitimization of specified behaviors in a host market. However, the existence of a 
prohibitive hyper norm precludes the existence of a permissive behavioral norm that 
could conflict with the prohibitive hyper norm (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994, 1999). Prior 
conceptual work by ISCT scholars who study corruption has concluded that a global 
hyper norm prohibiting grand corruption does exist (Dunfee & Donaldson, 2002; 
Fritzsche et al., 1995; Nichols, 1996). Conversely, no global hyper norm exists which 
proactively permits grand corruption in host countries (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999), nor 
does a global hyper norm exist that permits petty corruption in host countries (Donaldson 
& Dunfee, 1999). Finally, an application of the core precepts of ISCT suggests that the 
existence of the aforementioned global hyper norm prohibiting grand corruption 
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precludes the existence of any local behavioral norms that can be relied upon to permit or 
to legitimize grand corruption in host country markets (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994, 
1999). Table 1 summarizes extant theory with respect to the existence or absence of 
global hyper norms or local behavioral norms that either prohibit or permit grand 
corruption and petty corruption in host markets.  
Table 1 also illustrates that, notwithstanding the considerable theoretical insights 
proffered by this prior work, four key questions remain unresolved in the corruption-
oriented ISCT literature to date (Dunfee & Donaldson, 2002). First, does a global hyper 
norm exist to prohibit petty corruption? Second, absent this, do local behavioral norms 
exist to prohibit petty corruption in host markets? Third, do local behavioral norms exist 
to permit petty corruption in host markets? Fourth, to what extent do local behavioral 
norms prohibiting grand corruption exist to reinforce the global hyper norm prohibiting 
grand corruption? These four unanswered questions are denoted in Table 1 as 
“unresolved.” 
   
TABLE 1 
 
Summary of the Tenets of ISCT with Respect to the Existence or Absence of 
Global Hyper Norms or Local Behavioral Norms that Either Prohibit or Permit 
Grand Corruption and Petty Corruption in Host Markets 
Grand corruption Petty corruption
Prohibitive
Yes                                     
(Fritzsche et al., 1995; Nichols, 1996; Dunfee & 
Donaldson, 2002 )
Unresolved
Permissive No                                      (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999 )
No                                      
(Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999 )
Prohibitive Unresolved Unresolved
Permissive No                                      (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994; 1999 ) Unresolved
Local behavioral 
norms
Global hyper 
norms
 
To address these four questions, we are mindful that “the debate over what 
constitutes a hyper norm has impeded the application of ISCT in real-world empirical 
settings” (Doh et al., 2010: 488). Despite the inherent challenge that this poses to the 
work of ISCT theorists, Frederick’s (1991) study is methodologically instructive in 
28 
 
guiding researchers’ efforts to determine whether other global hyper norms and local 
behavioral norms exist. To ascertain the existence of a global hyper norm pertaining to 
employee health and safety standards, Frederick (1991) scrutinized the written content of 
intergovernmental conventions and compacts. Notably, extant theory explicitly supports 
this practice of surveying the formal institutional environment (i.e., written rules, laws 
and regulations) to garner insights into the informal institutions (i.e., norms of behavior, 
values, practices) that prevail in a host market. More specifically, the core precepts of 
institutional theory hold that norms and values (or, informal institutions) are 
manifestations or elaborations of formal written laws and regulations (North, 1990: 40). 
Similarly, Ralston’s (2008) crossvergence theory of values evolution in societies 
proposes that the formal legal system is one of the key drivers of the values and business 
ideologies that prevail in host markets. Accordingly, we expect that the content of 
existing national legislative provisions and international conventions will provide an 
indication of the norms that can be expected to prevail in host markets. As such, 
leveraging Frederick’s (1991) methodology, we reviewed both national legislation and 
international conventions that establish formal rules and laws with respect to corrupt 
transactions in order to ascertain whether it is plausible to assume either the existence or 
absence of the global hyper norms and local behavioral norms that are unconfirmed in 
the four quadrants of Table 1 (namely, a global hyper norm prohibiting petty corruption, 
as well as local behavioral norms permitting petty corruption, prohibiting petty 
corruption and prohibiting grand corruption). 
Appendix A lists the legislative standards that prevail in the 32 countries included 
in our study, as well as two intergovernmental conventions governing the execution of 
corrupt transactions. Consistent with the theory of Dunfee and Donaldson (2002), 
Fritzsche et al. (1995) and Nichols (1996), Appendix A provides general support for the 
prior recognition of a global hyper norm prohibiting grand corruption, as well as 
supporting Donaldson and Dunfee’s (1994, 1999) theory that the existence of this global 
hyper norm precludes the existence of any local behavioral norms that permit or 
legitimize grand corruption. Nearly all of the host markets listed in Appendix A have 
enacted some form of local legislation that expressly prohibits all acts of grand 
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corruption. By deduction, the existence of these national standards also lends support to 
the widespread existence of local behavioral norms that prohibit grand corruption. 
Conversely, the contents of Appendix A also suggest that there does not appear to 
be a global hyper norm prohibiting petty corruption. However, it could be argued that 
local behavioral norms that either prohibit or permit petty corruption do exist among the 
32 countries that we study. While our legislative review determined that laws exist in 
22% of these countries which could be expected to permit petty corruption in foreign 
markets, 16% of the 32 have not enacted any relevant legislation, while the balance have 
formally prohibited petty corruption. The intergovernmental conventions listed in 
Appendix A also offer modest support for the existence of local behavioral norms that 
permit petty corruption. Our conclusions are consistent with recent conceptual work by 
Spicer (2009) who has suggested that the anecdotal observation of wide-spread, low-level 
bribery in some host markets might reflect the existence of behavioral norms permitting 
these transactions. In our effort to propose answers to the four unresolved theoretical 
questions, we present Table 2 which extends the summary of extant theory that we 
presented in Table 1, by incorporating the findings that emerged from our legislative 
review for the 32 countries. 
 
TABLE 2 
 
Proposed Extensions to the Tenets of ISCT with Respect to the Existence or Absence 
of Global Hyper Norms or Local Behavioral Norms that Either Prohibit or Permit  
Grand Corruption and Petty Corruption in Host Markets 
 
Grand corruption Petty corruption
Prohibitive
Yes                                     
(Fritzsche et al., 1995; Nichols, 1996; Dunfee & 
Donaldson, 2002 )
No
Permissive No                                      (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999 )
No                                      
(Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999 )
Prohibitive Yes Yes                                      
Permissive No                                      (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994; 1999 )
Yes                                     
(Spicer, 2009 )
Global hyper 
norms
Local behavioral 
norms
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
While institutional theorists maintain that institutions are intended to bring order 
and efficiency to economic exchange (North, 2005), weak institutions heighten 
uncertainty for MNEs and increase the costs associated with transacting in foreign 
markets that lack a strong institutional foundation (Murrell, 2005). Consequently, MNEs 
will endeavor to execute strategies that are designed to attenuate this institutional 
uncertainty (Santangelo & Meyer, 2011). However, weak institutions do not exert a 
uniform impact upon the strategy of foreign-investing MNEs. In fact, the specific type of 
uncertainty garnered by informal institutions such as corruption is an important 
determinant of an MNE’s strategic foreign entry decisions (Sartor & Beamish, 2014). 
North (1990: 43) has indicated that scholars should leverage the tenets of transaction cost 
theory (TCT) in order to more fully comprehend informal institutions because “informal 
institutions are not directly observable.” TCT postulates the existence of two central 
types of uncertainty. While behavioral uncertainty is conceptualized as uncertainty 
related to the behavior of transaction partners (Griffith, Harmancioglu, & Droge, 2009), 
environmental uncertainty is the inability to predict the external environment within 
which the MNE and its subsidiaries are situated. One type of environmental uncertainty 
that is especially relevant to our research context, response uncertainty, is “the inability 
to predict the likely consequences of a response choice” and is expected to be particularly 
salient “when there is a perceived need to act because a pending event or change is 
perceived to pose a threat or to provide some unique opportunity to the organization” 
(Milliken, 1987: 137). While an increase in behavioral uncertainty has been found to 
prompt firms to prefer vertical integration, under conditions of heightened environmental 
uncertainty, firms will choose hybrids (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006).      
Our literature review pertaining to the dimensionality of government corruption 
has suggested that grand and petty corruption can be distinguished qualitatively on the 
basis of the substantiveness of corrupt transaction payments and the social or 
occupational status of a transaction’s recipient. The two dimensions can also be 
substantiated theoretically. Our ISCT-motivated legislative review suggests that the 
origin of the norms that either permit or prohibit grand corruption and petty corruption in 
host markets are distinct. In fact, Table 2 reveals that the origin of the overarching 
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attitude towards grand corruption is predominantly global in its orientation, while 
attitudes and values toward petty corruption vary more widely across countries. As such, 
two key assumptions emerge from Table 2. First, a global hyper norm prohibiting 
corruption does exist. Second, local behavioral norms exist which both permit and 
prohibit petty corruption, depending upon the country under consideration.  
This theoretical distinction operates as the foundation for the mechanisms 
(Bromiley & Johnson, 2005; Davis & Marquis, 2005) through which we expect that the 
equity-based strategies of foreign-investing MNEs will differ under conditions of more 
pervasive grand corruption versus more pervasive petty corruption. Uncertainty in the 
context of corruption is a complex and multifaceted construct (Søreide, 2009). To briefly 
summarize our theory, we propose that the distinct origins of the norms pertaining to 
grand corruption and petty corruption effectively precipitate different types of 
uncertainty (environmental and behavioral) for foreign-investing MNEs which, in turn, 
motivate MNEs to vary their equity-based entry strategies. More precisely, under 
conditions of more pervasive grand corruption, we expect that the primary source of 
uncertainty will be environmental (response) uncertainty, while behavioral uncertainty 
will predominate under conditions of heighted petty corruption pervasiveness. As such, 
we theorize that the relationship between petty corruption pervasiveness and equity-based 
foreign entry strategy will be grounded in trust-based mechanisms due to the fact that 
petty corruption garners more pronounced behavioral uncertainty in the host market. 
Conversely, in the case of grand corruption, learning-based mechanisms will govern 
because grand corruption generates heightened environmental (response) uncertainty. 
Figure 3 provides an illustrative overview of our theory, which we present in comparison 
to our depiction of extant theory in Figure 2. 
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FIGURE 2 
 
Extant Conceptualization of Host Market Institutions  
(Using the Example of Government Corruption) 
 
Uniform origin of host 
market institutions
Uniform strategic impact
Host market
government corruption 
(precipitates 
institutional 
uncertainty)
Host market 
norms and values
Strategic foreign-
entry decisions
• Entry strategy (equity or nonequity): 
Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) find that foreign-investing 
MNEs are more likely to engage in nonequity entry 
when corruption is more pervasive in foreign 
markets.
• Equity entry strategy (JV or WOS): Uhlenbruck 
et al. (2006) find no significant relationship.
 
 
FIGURE 3 
 
Conceptualizing Host Market Institutions as Pluralistic Phenomena  
(Using the Example of Government Corruption) 
 
   Trust-based mechanism
  Learning-based mechanism
Pluralistic origin of 
host market 
institutions
Pluralistic strategic impact
Petty corruption 
(precipitates 
behavioral 
uncertainty)
Grand corruption
(precipitates
environmental 
(response) uncertainty)
Host market 
government
corruption
Globally-oriented 
norms and values 
(hyper norms)
Locally-oriented 
norms and values 
(behavioral norms)
• Entry strategy (equity or nonequity): 
Preference for nonequity investment hypothesized 
when petty corruption interacts with grand 
corruption.
• Equity entry strategy (JV or WOS): Preference
for WOS hypothesized.
• Partnering strategy (home or host counrty 
partner): Preference for crossnational (home 
country) JV partner hypothesized.
Strategic foreign-
entry decisions
Strategic foreign 
entry decisions
• Entry strategy (equity or nonequity): Preference 
for nonequity investment hypothesized when grand
corruption interacts with petty corruption.
• Equity entry strategy (JV or WOS): Preference
for JV hypothesized.
• Partnering strategy (home or host counrty 
partner): Preference for traditional (host country) 
JV partner hypothesized.
 
 
 
Grand Corruption, Petty Corruption and Foreign Entry Strategy (Equity Entry 
Versus Nonequity Entry) 
 
Before we present our theory with respect to the impact of grand corruption and 
petty corruption upon the equity-based entry strategies of foreign-investing MNEs, we 
endeavor to ensure that our conceptual disaggregation of the corruption pervasiveness 
construct is theoretically congruent with prior research that motivates our work 
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(Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). While we are not aware of any 
theoretical basis upon which it could be expected that either grand corruption 
pervasiveness or petty corruption pervasiveness would exert a distinct impact upon an 
MNE’s choice between nonequity-based foreign market entry and equity-based foreign 
market entry, prior findings within this research domain implicitly suggest that the 
interaction between grand corruption and petty corruption should precipitate a preference 
for nonequity-based entry among internationalizing MNEs. Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) 
found that under conditions of more pervasive government corruption in foreign markets, 
MNEs were more likely to choose nonequity entry over equity entry. Notably, 
Uhlenbruck et al.’s (2006) measurement of government corruption was constituted by 
items which we would characterize as providing an indication of both grand corruption 
and petty corruption. They argue that whereas equity-based entry exposes the MNE to 
more frequent and longer-term interaction with potentially corrupt government officials 
and bureaucrats, nonequity-based entry provides the firm with three things - greater 
flexibility in more corrupt countries, the opportunity to minimize interaction with corrupt 
foreign governments and lower exit barriers from these markets when corruption levels 
are perceived to be too costly. Accordingly, we hypothesize that, 
 
Hypothesis 1: The interaction of grand corruption pervasiveness and petty 
corruption pervasiveness increases the likelihood that a foreign entrant 
will engage in nonequity entry. 
 
Grand Corruption and Equity Entry Strategy (JV Versus WOS) 
We have assumed that the worldwide moral, ethical and legal proscription against 
engaging in grand corruption is buttressed by the globally-oriented hyper norm that 
prohibits acts of grand corruption. When subsidiaries either receive or extend overtures 
to engage in grand corruption in foreign markets, the parent MNE can expect exposure to 
a number of positive and negative outcomes. In addition to the increased likelihood of 
access to potentially lucrative business opportunities and commercial benefits such as 
monopoly rights or exclusive supplier agreements (Søreide, 2009), another possible result 
is that a wide range of negative repercussions and sanctions, including adverse 
reputational effects (Metzger, Dalton, & Hill, 1993), civil penalties and criminal 
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liabilities may be levied against the firm and its executives (Koehler, 2012). In short, 
given that grand corruption is associated with a wide range of potentially positive and 
negative results, these transactions are characterized by substantial outcome uncertainty 
(Søreide, 2009). As such, we expect that foreign entrants into host markets characterized 
by more pervasive grand corruption will perceive more pronounced environmental 
(response) uncertainty which will complicate strategic decision-making and increase the 
costs of transacting in more corrupt host markets. While this uncertainty can make 
investing abroad difficult for MNEs, learning how to minimize the likelihood of exposure 
to the negative repercussions of grand corruption and learning how to handle grand 
corruption properly (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002) can contribute to attenuating this 
uncertainty. Foreign subsidiaries become compelled to learn in order to improve their 
performance (March, 1991) under conditions of more pronounced grand corruption 
pervasiveness. JV partners are an important source of learning and knowledge for MNEs 
that choose to enter foreign markets (Inkpen, 2000). Intermediaries such as equity 
partners who are experienced with grand corruption provide the MNE with valuable 
opportunities to learn how to execute these high risk transactions and to increase the 
probability of achieving positive outcomes. This learning improves the subsidiary’s 
competence with respect to engaging in these acts of corruption (Ashforth & Anand, 
2003; Rodriguez et al., 2005). Further, these intermediaries offer the added benefits of 
enhancing the enforceability and efficiency of these more costly corrupt transactions, as 
well as providing the MNE with a degree of exculpability (Lambsdorff, 2013). 
Accordingly, we hypothesize that,   
 
Hypothesis 2: A foreign-investing MNE is more likely to engage in joint 
ownership (JV) of a foreign subsidiary investment under conditions of 
more pervasive grand corruption. 
 
  
Grand Corruption and Partnering Strategy (Home Country Partner Versus Host 
Country Partner) 
 
Given the hypothesized willingness of MNEs to share ownership under conditions 
of more pervasive grand corruption, foreign MNEs have at least two options with respect 
to their choice of partner - a host country (local) partner or a home country partner 
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(Makino & Beamish, 1998). Based on our theory, we anticipate that MNEs will be more 
likely to select a local partner because a local partner is expected to offer the MNE a 
better opportunity to attenuate the risks associated with the heightened environmental 
(response) uncertainty precipitated by more pronounced grand corruption pervasiveness. 
Observing local partners engage in corruption contributes to vicarious learning within the 
foreign subsidiary (Mezias & Mezias, 2010). Local partners are deeply embedded in local 
social and business networks, in addition to being more intimately familiar with 
government officials (Meschi, 2009). Consequently, local partners are a particularly 
potent source of learning for the foreign subsidiary and they may be able to shield foreign 
subsidiaries from more arbitrary acts of grand corruption (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). As 
such, we expect that foreign-investing MNEs will prefer to engage local partners in order 
to gain access to local resources that are needed to navigate the web of host market grand 
corruption more effectively and efficiently (Doh, Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, Collins, & 
Eden, 2003) and to overcome the liability of foreignness attendant with these transactions 
(Eden & Miller, 2004). The network ties or reputation of local equity partners can 
constitute intangible strategic assets for the subsidiary (Chen & Hennart, 2002). Foreign 
MNEs can employ these assets to comply with corrupt norms, while at the same time 
reducing the costs associated with the liability of foreignness which generally increases 
when government corruption is more pervasive (Doh et al., 2003; Meschi, 2009). 
Accordingly, we hypothesize that, 
 
Hypothesis 3: A foreign-investing MNE is more likely to engage a host 
country (local) partner, rather than a home country partner, in a foreign 
subsidiary investment under conditions of more pervasive grand 
corruption. 
 
 
Petty Corruption and Equity Entry Strategy (JV Versus WOS) 
We have assumed that, unlike the global hyper norm that prohibits grand 
corruption in host markets, local behavioral norms that either prohibit or permit petty 
corruption vary widely across countries. Local behavioral norms that contribute to the 
persistence of petty corruption in host markets permit these transactions to become 
institutionalized and a regular part of commercial activity (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 
2004). This precipitates substantial institutional uncertainty for foreign-investing MNEs. 
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Host markets characterized by more pervasive levels of petty corruption endure 
significantly lower levels of trust in government institutions (Doig & Theobald, 1999). In 
addition to exerting a corrosive impact on trust in administrative procedures (Argandoña, 
2005), when petty corruption is a common practice in a host market, it causes transaction 
costs to increase in an unpredictable manner (Kaufman & Wei, 1999) and undermines the 
efficiency of the business environment. As an example of the cost and inefficiency bred 
by more pervasive petty corruption in foreign markets, British-based multinational 
alcohol conglomerate Diageo was recently reported as having one of its Guinness 
delivery trucks stopped at “roadblocks” 47 times during a 500 kilometer trip in the 
African country of Cameroon (The Economist, 2012). 
Behavioral uncertainty prevails when lower levels of trust exist in host markets 
(Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003). Trust has been identified as an important consideration 
for firms when formulating their market-entry strategies (Beamish & Banks, 1987; 
Buckley & Casson, 1998). Among the many strategic decisions facing MNEs that 
establish subsidiaries in foreign markets, the choice of entry mode is contingent upon the 
level of trust, with an increase in trust precipitating an increase in the use of JVs 
(Erramilli, 1996). Trust fosters greater certainty with respect to a prospective partner’s 
anticipated behavior (Madhok, 1995). The existence of trust can attenuate the need for 
formal controls as a means to enhancing confidence in a partner’s behavior (Das & Teng, 
1998). However, behaviorally-based control mechanisms such as trust take time to 
develop and the effectiveness of these informal control mechanisms may be reduced 
when cultural differences are more pronounced (Woodcock, Beamish, & Makino, 1994). 
Similarly, the costs associated with formally monitoring and enforcing property rights in 
the context of shared governance are significant, particularly when institutions such as 
those prohibiting petty corruption are routinely violated (Reuer & Tong, 2005). 
Consequently, absent the ability to trust local partners, MNEs will prefer to retain full 
ownership (Dikova & van Witteloostuijn, 2007). Accordingly, we hypothesize that, 
 
Hypothesis 4: A foreign-investing MNE is more likely to engage in a 
wholly-owned foreign subsidiary (WOS) investment under conditions of 
more pervasive petty corruption. 
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Petty Corruption and Partnering Strategy (Home Country Partner Versus Host 
Country Partner) 
 
Notwithstanding an MNE’s hypothesized preference for retaining full ownership 
under conditions of more pervasive petty corruption, some MNEs might still choose to 
engage a partner in the foreign subsidiary investment. As such, the MNE must select an 
acceptable partner. We have theorized that trust-based mechanisms undergird the 
relationship between the pervasiveness of petty corruption in the host market and the 
equity-based entry strategies of foreign-investing MNEs. Consistent with political 
scientists’ conceptualization of trust as being “ultimately dependent on certain 
characteristics of the (individual or group being) trusted” (Nannestad, 2008: 415), 
theorists have distinguished between generalized trust and particularized trust. While 
particularized trust or, in-group trust, is “trust only in people like yourself” (Uslaner, 
2005: 77), generalized trust or, “trust in people one does not know” (Nannestad, 2008: 
418) refers to a broader social trust that includes out-group members.  
Trustworthiness has been found to decline when partners hail from different 
nationalities or races (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000). Moreover, Li and 
Wu (2010) have concluded that as the level of corruption in a country increases, 
generalized trust declines and particularized trust becomes paramount. Taken together, 
we would expect that when MNEs invest through JVs in foreign markets under 
conditions of more pervasive petty corruption, a home country partner will be preferred 
over a host country (local) partner. This strategy seems well advised. JV partners have 
been found to be more opportunistic when host market institutions are weaker (Luo, 
2007). Further, heightened levels of corruption in host markets have been found to 
amplify the pressure that foreign subsidiaries face to engage in host market bribery, 
particularly when the parent MNE invests with a local partner (Spencer & Gomez, 2011). 
As such, we hypothesize that, 
 
Hypothesis 5: A foreign-investing MNE is more likely to engage a home 
country partner, rather than a host country (local) partner, in a foreign 
subsidiary investment under conditions of more pervasive petty 
corruption. 
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The Interaction Between Grand Corruption Pervasiveness and Petty Corruption 
Pervasiveness 
 
 The allocation of organizational attention between competing institutions has 
become a fertile area of debate for management scholars who research the plurality of 
institutions (Dunn & Jones, 2010; Molina, 2012). While this discourse has sometimes 
revolved around an assessment of the relative primacy of competing institutional logics, 
our theory pertaining to institutional pluralism in the context of increasingly corrupt host 
foreign market environments is couched in the tradition of transaction cost (TC) 
scholarship. While TC theory has traditionally been more concerned with the 
organizational structure that results from the interaction between asset specificity and 
uncertainty (Williamson, 1985), more recently, scholars have advocated the need to 
develop theory and investigate the interaction effects that result from different types of 
uncertainty (Cuypers & Martin, 2009; Miller, 1993). In examining the equity-based entry 
strategies (or, organizational control decisions) of MNEs that engaged in innovation 
offshoring, Sartor & Beamish (2014) found that weak informal institutions which 
precipitate behavioral uncertainty effectively moderate the impact of weak informal 
institutions that induce environmental (demand) uncertainty on the foreign entry 
strategies of MNEs. We have proposed that while an increase in the pervasiveness of 
grand corruption in the host market precipitates more pronounced environmental 
(response) uncertainty for foreign-investing firms, an increase in petty corruption 
pervasiveness heightens behavioral uncertainty. As such, applying the theory of Sartor & 
Beamish (2014), we would expect that the effects of petty corruption would predominate 
over those of grand corruption when the two dimensions of corruption interact. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize that,   
 
Hypothesis 6: The positive relationship between grand corruption 
pervasiveness and the likelihood that a foreign-investing MNE will engage 
in joint ownership (JV) of a foreign subsidiary investment is weakened as 
petty corruption pervasiveness increases.   
 
Hypothesis 7: The positive relationship between grand corruption 
pervasiveness and the likelihood that foreign-investing MNEs will invest 
through a JV with a host country (local) partner is weakened as petty 
corruption pervasiveness increases. 
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METHODS 
Data Sources and Key Variables 
We tested our hypotheses using a sample of 727 subsidiaries established in 32 
countries1 between 2004 and 2007. Our study period was determined by the availability 
of country data pertaining to the pervasiveness of petty corruption and grand corruption 
in the host foreign markets. Information pertaining to the foreign subsidiary investments 
was gathered from the 2004-2007 editions of the Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran, a 
compendium of Japanese global FDI that has been shown to be close to the population of 
foreign affiliates of public and private Japanese companies (Hennart, 1991; Yamawaki, 
1991). Observations pertaining to the dependent variables in our study were lagged by 
one year relative to the observations pertaining to the measures of petty corruption and 
grand corruption. 
 Building on Rodriguez et al.’s (2005: 385) extant conceptualization of host 
market corruption in terms of its pervasiveness or, “the likelihood of encountering 
corruption in normal interactions with state officials”, we have proposed that the concept 
of government corruption should be disaggregated according to the extensiveness of the 
payment and the status of the recipient. In order to develop measures for both grand 
corruption (improper contributions made to political parties or to high-ranking officials 
and politicians to achieve influence), and petty corruption (improper payments to low-
level officials to facilitate or speed up administrative processes) (Hardoon & Heinrich, 
2011: 18), we selected items from the Global Competitiveness Reports (GCR). The GCR 
collects executive opinion survey data to gauge the perceptions of international business 
executives with respect to the prevailing economic and business environment in host 
markets around the world. Based on our theory, data pertaining to five different 
indicators of the pervasiveness of host market government corruption were taken from 
the GCR surveys and subjected to factor analysis. We executed a principal components 
analysis with an orthogonal (varimax) rotation which suggested a two factor solution 
                                                 
1 The number of subsidiary investments in each country is in brackets: Argentina (2), Australia (4), 
Austria (1), Belgium (9), Brazil (5), Canada (2), China (348), Czech Republic (7), France (8), Germany 
(12), Hong Kong (22), Hungary (2), India (20), Indonesia (13), Italy (2), Korea (38), Luxembourg (1), 
Malaysia (6), Mexico (8), Netherlands (13), New Zealand (2), Philippines (9), Poland (7), Russia (8),  
Singapore (18), South Africa (2), Spain (3), Switzerland (1), Taiwan (21), Thailand (58), United Kingdom 
(11), United States (64). 
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(using an eigenvalue cutoff of 1), the results of which are presented in Table 3. 
Consistent with our theory, three items (irregular payments in public utilities; irregular 
payments in loan applications; and, irregular payments in tax collection) were found to 
load in a manner that reflected our adopted definition of petty corruption (improper 
payments to low-level officials to facilitate or speed up administrative processes). Only 
one item (the prevalence of illegal political donations) was found to be related to the 
definition of grand corruption (improper contributions made to political parties or to 
high-ranking officials and politicians to achieve influence). The fifth and final item in our 
factor analysis (irregular payments in government policymaking) exhibited a high cross-
loading on both the factor indicating petty corruption (0.75) and on the grand corruption 
factor (0.62). Given the high cross-loading, we dropped the item from the composition of 
the petty corruption latent construct. However, given the definition of grand corruption 
that we adopted (improper contributions made to political parties or to high-ranking 
officials and politicians to achieve influence), we reasoned that the item which 
demonstrated a high cross-loading (irregular payments in government policymaking) 
exhibited a degree of face validity which made it plausible that the item could be an 
indicator of grand corruption. As such, we developed two measures to operationalize 
grand corruption in our regression models. First, grand corruption was constituted as a 
dual-item latent construct (incorporating both the prevalence of illegal political 
donations, and irregular payments in government policymaking). Second, we also 
operationalized grand corruption as a single-item construct (using the prevalence of 
illegal political donations indicator alone). Although both the single-item construct and 
the dual-item construct were developed to operationalize grand corruption in our 
regression models, to avoid any confusion, we refer to the dual-item construct as grand 
corruption, while the single-item construct is referred to as illegal political donations. 
One benefit associated with constituting the grand corruption variable both as a single-
item latent construct, and also as dual-item construct, is that it provides a built-in 
robustness check of our regression estimations with respect to grand corruption. The 
Cronbach’s alpha for petty corruption (0.97) and the dual-item measure of grand 
corruption (0.75) both exceeded the 0.70 cutoff specified by Nunnally & Bernstein 
(1994). 
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TABLE 3 
 
Factor Analysis Results 
Factor loading
Petty corruption pervasiveness: Cronbach's alpha: 0.97
Grand corruption pervasiveness: Cronbach's alpha: 0.75
0.94
Construct and associated items
How common are illegal donations to 
political parties in your country? (l = 
common, 7 = never occurs). 
Prevalence of illegal political donations
In your industry, how commonly would 
you estimate that firms make 
undocumented extra payments or bribes 
connected with influencing laws and 
policies, regulations, or decrees to favor 
selected business interests? (1 = common, 
7 = never occurs).
Irregular payments in government 
policymaking
0.99
0.62
0.97
0.97
Irregular payments in public utilities
Irregular payments in loan applications
Irregular payments in tax collection
In your industry, how commonly would 
you estimate that firms make 
undocumented extra payments or bribes 
when getting connected to public utilities 
(eg, telephone or electricity)? (1 = 
common, 7 = never occurs).
In your industry, how commonly would 
you estimate that firms make 
undocumented extra payments or bribes 
connected with loan applications? (1 = 
common, 7 = never occurs).
In your industry, how commonly would 
you estimate that firms make 
undocumented extra payments or bribes 
connected with annual tax payments? (1 
= common, 7 = never occurs).
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Given that the petty corruption and grand corruption constructs were based upon 
raw data in which higher scores indicate lower levels of corruption, to enhance the ease 
of interpreting our results, we reverse-coded the raw data so that more pervasive petty 
corruption and grand corruption would be indicated by higher scores. Furthermore, our 
measures of petty corruption and grand corruption provide an indication of the absolute 
level of each type of corruption in the host market, consistent with leading conceptual 
and empirical strategy work pertaining to corruption (Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck 
et al., 2006). 
 
Dependent Variables 
 We tested the impact of more pervasive host market petty corruption and grand 
corruption upon three strategic decisions executed by MNEs with respect to their 
subsidiary investments – foreign entry strategy, equity entry strategy and partnering 
strategy.  
Foreign Entry Strategy. Foreign entry strategy captures the MNE’s choice 
between nonequity-based foreign market entry and equity-based foreign market entry (JV 
or, WOS). While nonequity foreign market entry has been recognized in the literature as 
including transactions such as exporting, licensing and franchising, the measurement of 
nonequity entry is made more difficult by the shortage of statistical data pertaining to 
nonequity transactions (UNCTAD, 2011). In addition to the lack of data, the 
measurement of nonequity entry is also complicated by the fact that “…the web of 
directly-owned, partially-owned, contract-based and arm’s-length forms of international 
operation…is tangled and some of the distinctions between the different modes are 
blurred” (UNCTAD, 2011: 130). In the absence of the relevant statistics needed to 
measure nonequity entry, UNCTAD (2011) has advocated the use of estimates pertaining 
to the scale and scope of nonequity transactions. Pan & Tse (2000: 539) have noted that 
equity entry can be distinguished from nonequity entry on the basis of “resource 
commitment, risk, return, (and) control.” Similarly, Uhlenbruck et al. (2006: 404) suggest 
that equity entry, unlike nonequity entry, can be evidenced by a degree of “ownership and 
control involving a long-term commitment to the country.” 
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In order to gauge the degree of ownership and control that an MNE exercises with 
respect to a foreign subsidiary investment, extant research has employed measures 
pertaining to the MNE’s commitment of equity capital (Malhotra & Gaur, 2014) and 
human capital to the investment (Caligiuri & Stroh, 1995; Shay & Baack, 2004). When a 
MNE retains less than 5% of the equity in a foreign corporate entity, researchers have 
routinely regarded this more nominal commitment of equity capital as a portfolio 
investment by the MNE, rather than as an equity-based foreign subsidiary investment 
(Brouthers, 2002; Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004). Similarly, subsidiaries which employ 
fewer than twenty individuals are more likely to be sales offices or sales agencies 
designed to facilitate export sales, and are less likely to be equity-based foreign 
subsidiary investments (Beamish & Inkpen, 1998). Building on Uhlenbruck et al.’s 
(2006) conceptualization of equity entry as including foreign investments characterized 
by a degree of ownership and control that indicates a long-term commitment to the host 
country, in addition to the body of work that has specified threshold levels of equity 
capital and human capital that are pertinent to the distinction between equity entry and 
nonequity entry, we operationalized nonequity entry as those foreign entries in which the 
focal MNE owned less than 5% of the equity and fewer than twenty employees were 
enlisted to staff the overseas office associated with the investment. Based on this 
operationalization, 74 (10.2%) of the 727 entry events in our sample were categorized as 
nonequity entries, while 653 (89.8%) were equity entries.  
Equity Entry Strategy. Equity entry strategy captures the MNE’s choice between 
a JV and a WOS when making an equity-based foreign investment. This distinction was 
defined according to two conventions employed in the literature. We estimated models 
using both an 80 percent equity ownership cutoff and a 95 percent equity ownership 
cutoff to distinguish JVs from WOSs (Yiu & Makino, 2002). Employing both definitions 
in our estimations provided us with an opportunity to test the robustness of our results. 
While the regression models that we report in the regression tables employ the dependent 
variable that is based on the 80 percent equity ownership cutoff, we also report the results 
using the 95 percent cutoff in the footnotes at the end of the Results section. Utilizing the 
80 percent equity ownership cutoff to distinguish between JVs and WOSs, 432 (66.2%) 
of the 653 equity entries were categorized as WOSs and 221 (33.8%) were JVs 
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(compared to 397 (60.8%) and 256 (39.2%) respectively using the 95 percent cutoff). We 
integrated the measurement of both of the aforementioned strategic decisions (foreign 
entry strategy and equity entry strategy) by employing a trichotomous dependent variable 
which included nonequity, joint venture and wholly-owned subsidiary as the three 
possible outcomes. 
 Partnering Strategy. The taxonomy of JV partnerships developed by Makino and 
Beamish (1998) was utilized to measure the partnering strategy employed by firms that 
organized their foreign entry through a JV ownership structure. As such, each JV in our 
sample was categorized as either a cross-national JV (a JV in which the MNE engages a 
home country equity partner) or a traditional JV (in which the MNE engages a host 
country equity partner). Makino and Beamish’s (1998) taxonomy includes a third 
category of JV - trinational JV (a JV in which the MNE engages a partner from a foreign 
country other than the MNE’s home country). Consistent with their observation that the 
trinational JV occurs less frequently (constituting only 2.4% of the JVs in their study), 
only 4.5% of the JVs in our sample were trinational JVs (10 investments). As such, our 
models with respect to the partnering strategy dependent variable focused on the 
distinction between traditional JVs and cross-national JVs. Employing the 80 percent 
cutoff, 171 (81.1%) of the remaining 211 JVs were categorized as traditional JVs and 40 
(18.9%) were categorized as crossnational JVs, while 193 (78.5%) and 53 (21.5%) were 
categorized as traditional JVs and crossnational JVs respectively using the 95 percent 
cutoff.  
 
Control Variables  
 We included variables in our study to control for country, regional, temporal, 
industry, parent MNE and subsidiary-level effects. We controlled for subsidiary size and 
subsidiary capitalization using data pertaining to, respectively, the total number of 
employees in the subsidiary and the subsidiary’s total capitalization. Several parent 
MNE-level variables, including firm size (Boyacigiller, 1990; Stopford & Wells, 1972), 
leverage (Reuer & Ragozzino, 2006), profitability and international experience (Johanson 
& Vahlne, 1977; Makino & Delios, 1996), have also been found to influence the 
decisions of MNEs with respect to elements of firm strategy such as entry strategy and 
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partner choice. Size was measured using the parent’s total sales while leverage was 
measured using the difference between total assets and total debt as a percentage of total 
assets to control for slack financial resources (Reuer & Ragozzino, 2006). We controlled 
for profitability using the parent’s return on assets. We measured experience in terms of 
the number of subsidiary years of prior experience in the same host market. Given that a 
firm’s status as a service industry constituent has been found to predict its foreign entry 
strategies (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Erramilli & Rao, 1993), we employed a dummy 
variable to control for industry effects by categorizing firms as either service or non-
service entities. Annual exchange rates for Japanese currency (JPY/USD) were used to 
control for temporal effects (Klein & Rosengren, 1994). We controlled for regional 
effects (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004) using a dummy variable which we used to distinguish 
subsidiaries hosted in Asian countries from subsidiaries established in other regions. Prior 
studies have also revealed that the economic, institutional and cultural environment 
impacts MNEs’ strategic entry decisions. Host market size was measured using a host 
country’s total gross domestic product (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). FDI restrictions in the 
host market (Gomes-Casseres, 1990) were measured using data from the Heritage 
Foundation’s Investment Freedom Index where a higher score indicates a less restrictive 
investment regime. The degree of infrastructure development (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006), 
in the host country was based on data from IMD’s World Competitiveness Yearbooks. 
The dependent variable was lagged by one year relative to the annual observations with 
respect to these covariates. Cultural distance was calculated between Japan and the host 
countries using Hofstede’s scores (2001) and Kogut & Singh’s (1988) cultural distance 
measure. Skewed control variables (subsidiary size, subsidiary capitalization, parent size 
and host market size) were log transformed before we tested our hypotheses (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2007). 
 
Estimation Methods 
To investigate the effects of grand corruption pervasiveness and petty corruption 
pervasiveness on a MNE’s foreign entry strategy (nonequity entry versus equity entry), 
we executed multinomial logistic regression models in which nonequity entry was 
designated as the reference group that was compared to two other possible outcomes in 
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the dependent variable (JV or, WOS). The hypotheses pertaining to an MNE’s equity 
entry strategy (JV versus WOS) and partnering strategy (traditional JV partnership 
versus crossnational JV partnership) were tested using binary logistic regression. While 
the regression models in Table 5 test Hypothesis 1 which predicts that MNEs will be 
more likely to engage in nonequity entry under the combined effect of more pervasive 
grand corruption and petty corruption, the models in Table 6 test Hypotheses 2, 4 and 6 
pertaining to both the main effects and interaction effect of grand and petty corruption on 
a firm’s equity entry strategy (JV or, WOS). Finally, Table 7 presents the results of the 
regression models that were executed to test Hypotheses 3, 5 and 7 with respect to the 
main and interaction effects associated with the two dimensions of host market corruption 
on an MNE’s partnering strategy. Before investigating the effects of any of the 
interaction terms in our models, the focal independent variables (petty corruption and 
grand corruption) were centered about the mean (Aiken & West, 1991). 
 
RESULTS 
 Descriptive statistics for our sample are presented in Table 4. Tables 5, 6 and 7 
present the results of the regression estimations conducted in order to test our hypotheses. 
Our conclusion that multicollinearity was not a concern in our models is supported by the 
fact that all of the variance inflation factor (VIF) scores reported for our models in Tables 
5-7 are less than the maximum VIF (10) that is prescribed in global strategy research for 
regression analyses (Reuer & Leiblein, 2000). Further, none of the correlations for 
variables in the same models exceed the recommended cutoff of 0.70 (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007).  
 In each of Tables 5-7, we first present a base model which excludes the effects of 
the focal corruption variables, along with models that introduce the effects associated 
with grand and petty corruption.2 Table 5 illustrates the results of the multinomial 
logistic regression models that were executed to test Hypothesis 1 pertaining to foreign  
                                                 
2 The regression results reported in Tables 5-7 employ the 80 percent cutoff convention used to distinguish 
between JVs and WOSs. The results using the 95 percent cutoff (Yiu & Makino, 2002) were largely 
similar, with the primary exceptions being that the interaction effect in Model 1F, the main effect of grand 
corruption in Model 3 and the main effect of petty corruption in Model 3C and 3E became non-significant. 
In all cases, the focal independent variables became only marginally non-significant. Further, the signs of 
each of these coefficients continued to be consistent with our theory. 
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TABLE 4  
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Foreign entry strategy a - -
2 Partnering strategy b - - 0.91
3 Subsidiary size (log) 1.13 0.70 0.32 0.31
4 Subsidiary capitalization (log) 2.29 1.00 0.12 0.11 0.14
5 Parent size (log) 5.23 0.91 0.16 0.11 0.27 0.12
6 Parent profitability (ROA) 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.05 0.02
7 Parent leverage 0.83 0.12 -0.09 -0.08 -0.11 -0.06 -0.45 0.26
8 Parent experience 173.94 499.02 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.03 0.58 -0.05 -0.46
9 Industry dummy - - -0.05 -0.07 -0.11 0.00 0.05 -0.03 -0.25 0.12
10 Exchange rate 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.01
11 Region dummy - - 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.17 -0.05 -0.02 0.03 -0.10 0.03
12 Host market size (log) 3.05 0.55 -0.06 0.01 0.02 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 0.07 0.04
13 Infrastructure development 5.42 1.43 -0.14 -0.10 -0.18 -0.15 -0.13 -0.02 0.07 -0.01 -0.06
14 FDI restrictions 5.19 2.57 -0.11 -0.13 -0.20 -0.16 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.09
15 Cultural distance 2.69 0.61 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.06 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.10
16 Petty corruption 1.92 0.76 0.17 0.17 0.25 0.17 0.09 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 0.08
17 Grand corruption 2.33 0.77 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.16 0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.02
18 Illegal political donations 2.36 1.01 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01
19 Petty corruption x grand corruption 0.30 0.81 -0.13 -0.09 -0.13 -0.04 0.06 0.00 -0.04 0.06 0.04
20 Petty corruption x illegal political donations 0.18 0.91 -0.10 -0.07 -0.10 0.00 0.08 0.00 -0.06 0.06 0.06
Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
11 Region dummy 0.04
12 Host market size (log) 0.03 -0.25
13 Infrastructure development 0.15 -0.11 -0.02
14 FDI restrictions -0.02 -0.43 -0.29 0.40
15 Cultural distance 0.04 0.00 -0.08 0.19 -0.20
16 Petty corruption -0.05 0.55 0.09 -0.69 -0.59 -0.10
17 Grand corruption -0.08 0.08 -0.24 -0.61 0.16 -0.35 0.53
18 Illegal political donations -0.05 -0.07 -0.32 -0.45 0.36 -0.38 0.24 0.94
19 Petty corruption x grand corruption -0.04 -0.25 -0.34 0.28 0.14 0.50 -0.40 -0.29 -0.19
20 Petty corruption x illegal political donations -0.07 -0.17 -0.34 0.17 0.09 0.54 -0.25 -0.21 -0.18 0.96
a Trichotomous dependent variable: Non-equity entry , joint venture  or wholly-owned subsidiary .
b Dichotomous dependent variable: Traditional joint venture  or crossnational joint venture .
Correlations with an absolute value greater than 0.08 are statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level. All are two-tailed tests.
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TABLE 5 
 
Results of Regression Analyses of Grand Corruption Pervasiveness and Petty Corruption 
Pervasiveness on Foreign Entry Strategy 
 
Variables
Intercept 2.77 (4.69) 0.83 (5.15) 2.22 (4.75) 1.61 (5.22) 2.25 (4.74) 1.46 (5.22)
Subsidiary effects
Subsidiary size (log) 1.03 (0.28) *** 1.69 (0.29) *** 1.03 (0.28) *** 1.68 (0.29) *** 1.04 (0.28) *** 1.68 (0.29) ***
Subsidiary capitalization (log) -0.07 (0.16) 0.13 (0.17) -0.07 (0.16) 0.12 (0.17) -0.07 (0.16) 0.13 (0.17)
Parent effects
Parent size (log) -0.65 (0.21) ** -0.41 (0.23) t -0.64 (0.21) ** -0.38 (0.23) t -0.65 (0.21) ** -0.38 (0.23) t
Parent profitability (ROA) 2.48 (1.54) 2.41 (1.98) 2.45 (1.54) 2.41 (2.01) 2.47 (1.54) 2.42 (2.01)
Parent leverage 0.67 (1.32) -0.38 (1.46) 0.77 (1.34) -0.50 (1.48) 0.76 (1.33) -0.49 (1.47)
Parent experience 0.00 (0.01) t 0.00 (0.01) ** 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) ** 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) **
Industry effects
Industry dummy 0.99 (0.31) ** 0.76 (0.34) * 0.99 (0.31) ** 0.73 (0.35) * 0.99 (0.31) ** 0.74 (0.35) *
Temporal effects
Exchange rate b 0.59 (4.87) 1.03 (5.31) 1.10 (4.91) 0.59 (5.38) 113.37 (493.34) 54.69 (539.7)
Region effects
Region dummy -0.69 (0.36) t -1.37 (0.42) *** -0.77 (0.47) t -1.04 (0.52) * -0.82 (0.46) t -1.09 (0.52) *
Country effects
Host market size (log) -0.23 (0.27) -0.14 (0.31) -0.15 (0.31) -0.42 (0.36) -0.10 (0.31) -0.37 (0.36)
Infrastructure development 0.01 (0.12) -0.23 (0.13) t -0.03 (0.17) -0.22 (0.19) -0.01 (0.17) -0.24 (0.19)
FDI restrictions -0.09 (0.08) 0.02 (0.09) -0.06 (0.09) -0.02 (0.11) -0.08 (0.09) 0.00 (0.1)
Cultural distance 0.39 (0.25) 0.34 (0.28) 0.31 (0.28) 0.59 (0.32) t 0.26 (0.29) 0.56 (0.33) t
Main effects
Petty corruption 0.06 (0.42) -0.10 (0.46) -0.04 (0.35) 0.01 (0.39)
Grand corruption -0.12 (0.35) 0.00 (0.39)
Illegal political donations -0.01 (0.22) -0.01 (0.25)
Interaction effects
Petty corruption x grand corruption 0.12 (0.25) -0.52 (0.28) t
Petty corruption x illegal political donations 0.17 (0.21) -0.39 (0.24) t
Variance inflation factor range
2
R2 (R
a The reference group in the multinomial logistic regression models is non-equity entry which is compared to two other possible outcomes in the foreign entry strategy  dependent 
variable: wholly-owned subsidiary and joint venture .
b Rescaled by a factor of 10-2.
n  = 727.
t p  < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
All are two-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Foreign Entry Strategy a
Model 1F
Joint venture
1.05 - 4.31
190.46 ***
Model 1E
Wholly-owned
Interaction Effect
Wholly-owned Joint venture
Model 1C Model 1D
Base Model
Model 1A Model 1B
Wholly-owned Joint venture
Interaction Effect
0.28 (0.02)
1.04 - 2.28
175.05 ***
0.26
1.05 - 5.94
190.20 ***
0.28 (0.02)
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TABLE 6 
 
Results of Regression Analyses of Grand Corruption Pervasiveness and Petty Corruption 
Pervasiveness on Equity Entry Strategy 
 
Variables
Intercept -3.15 (3.24) -3.27 (3.29) -3.25 (3.29) -1.20 (3.32) -1.40 (3.32)
Subsidiary effects
Subsidiary size (log) 0.63 (0.14) *** 0.63 (0.14) *** 0.63 (0.14) *** 0.62 (0.14) *** 0.61 (0.14) ***
Subsidiary capitalization (log) 0.21 (0.09) * 0.21 (0.09) * 0.21 (0.09) * 0.20 (0.09) * 0.21 (0.09) *
Parent effects
Parent size (log) 0.23 (0.14) t 0.23 (0.14) t 0.23 (0.14) t 0.24 (0.14) t 0.25 (0.14) t
Parent profitability (ROA) -0.06 (1.68) -0.05 (1.68) -0.05 (1.68) 0.02 (1.69) 0.01 (1.69)
Parent leverage -1.03 (0.96) -1.07 (0.97) -1.06 (0.97) -1.27 (0.98) -1.22 (0.97)
Parent experience 0.00 (0.01) t 0.00 (0.01) t 0.00 (0.01) t 0.00 (0.01) t 0.00 (0.01) t
Industry effects
Industry dummy 0.25 (0.23) 0.25 (0.23) 0.25 (0.23) 0.28 (0.24) 0.29 (0.24)
Temporal effects
Exchange rate b 0.46 (3.22) 0.35 (3.23) 0.35 (3.24) -0.75 (3.3) -0.86 (3.31)
Region effects
Region dummy 0.72 (0.31) * 0.74 (0.36) * 0.73 (0.36) * 0.30 (0.38) 0.31 (0.37)
Country effects
Host market size (log) 0.15 (0.23) 0.18 (0.25) 0.18 (0.25) -0.18 (0.27) -0.18 (0.27)
Infrastructure development -0.24 (0.09) ** -0.22 (0.12) t -0.23 (0.12) t -0.20 (0.13) -0.23 (0.13) t
FDI restrictions 0.12 (0.06) * 0.10 (0.08) 0.10 (0.07) 0.05 (0.08) 0.10 (0.07)
Cultural distance -0.02 (0.18) 0.00 (0.19) 0.00 (0.19) 0.30 (0.21) 0.32 (0.21)
Main effects
Petty corruption -0.08 (0.29) -0.04 (0.25) -0.15 (0.29) 0.05 (0.26)
Grand corruption 0.11 (0.25) 0.11 (0.26)
Illegal political donations 0.06 (0.16) -0.01 (0.16)
Interaction effects
Petty corruption x grand corruption -0.64 (0.18) ***
Petty corruption x illegal political donations -0.55 (0.16) ***
Variance inflation factor range
2
R2 (R
a The dependent variable equity entry strategy is coded as follows:  0: wholly-owned subsidiary;  1: joint venture .
b Rescaled by a factor of 10-2.
n  = 653.
t p  < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
All are two-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Equity Entry Strategy a
Main Effects Interaction EffectsBase Model
Model 2A Model 2B Model 2C Model 2D Model 2E
0.19
1.04 - 2.41
96.97 ***
1.05 - 4.24
97.12***
0.19 (0.00)
1.04 - 5.88
97.16***
0.19 (0.00) 0.22 (0.03)
111.83 ***
1.05 - 5.92 1.06 - 4.24
111.94 ***
0.22 (0.03)
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
TABLE 7 
 
Results of Regression Analyses of Grand Corruption Pervasiveness and Petty Corruption 
Pervasiveness on Partnering Strategy 
 
Variables
Intercept -3.68 (7.02) -4.21 (7.53) -4.79 (7.48) -3.66 (7.49) -3.35 (7.45)
Subsidiary effects
Subsidiary size (log) -0.09 (0.29) -0.20 (0.29) -0.20 (0.29) -0.21 (0.29) -0.21 (0.3)
Subsidiary capitalization (log) -0.17 (0.19) -0.20 (0.19) -0.20 (0.19) -0.20 (0.19) -0.20 (0.2)
Parent effects
Parent size (log) -0.34 (0.28) -0.36 (0.31) -0.37 (0.29) -0.36 (0.29) -0.37 (0.3)
Parent profitability (ROA) 1.31 (4.14) 2.27 (4.41) 2.24 (4.39) 2.27 (4.39) 2.26 (4.39)
Parent leverage 1.71 (2.18) 1.80 (2.22) 1.72 (2.21) 1.81 (2.22) 1.83 (2.23)
Parent experience 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Industry effect
Industry dummy -0.40 (0.53) -0.49 (0.56) -0.51 (0.55) -0.49 (0.56) -0.50 (0.55)
Temporal effects
Exchange rate b 0.15 (0.69) 0.21 (0.71) 0.26 (0.71) 0.20 (0.72) 0.21 (0.72)
Region effects
Region dummy -0.81 (0.68) -1.71 (0.89) t -1.74 (0.89) * -1.73 (0.94) t -1.92 (0.93) *
Country effects
Host market size (log) 1.03 (0.55) t 0.77 (0.59) 0.75 (0.59) 0.76 (0.61) 0.69 (0.6)
Infrastructure development 0.01 (0.22) -0.04 (0.28) 0.00 (0.28) -0.05 (0.29) -0.06 (0.3)
FDI restrictions -0.05 (0.13) 0.24 (0.19) 0.18 (0.18) 0.24 (0.19) 0.19 (0.18)
Cultural distance -0.14 (0.48) -0.20 (0.52) -0.22 (0.52) -0.18 (0.56) -0.08 (0.58)
Main effects
Petty corruption 1.83 (0.73) * 1.36 (0.64) * 1.82 (0.73) * 1.39 (0.65) *
Grand corruption -1.31 (0.66) * -1.32 (0.67) *
Illegal political donations -0.72 (0.39) t -0.79 (0.42) t
Interaction effects
Petty corruption x grand corruption -0.05 (0.59)
Petty corruption x illegal political donations -0.32 (0.56)
Variance inflation factor range
2
R2 (R
a The dependent variable partnering strategy is coded as follows:  0: traditional joint venture (with a host country / local partner);  1: crossnational joint venture (with
a home country partner).
b Rescaled by a factor of 10-3.
n  = 211.
t p  < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
All are two-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Partnering Strategy a
Base Model Main Effects Interaction Effects
Model 3A Model 3B Model 3C Model 3D Model 3E
1.06 - 2.85 1.07- 4.42 1.07 - 3.86 1.07 - 4.47 1.08 - 3.87
0.14 0.20 (0.06) 0.19 (0.05) 0.20 (0.06) 0.19 (0.05)
19.60 27.43 * 26.64 ** 27.43 * 27.01 *
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entry strategy. The results of Models 1D and 1F are both consistent with and lend further 
support to the theory and empirical findings of Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) who found that 
MNEs were more likely to engage in nonequity-based foreign entry rather than equity-
based foreign entry under conditions of more pervasive host market government 
corruption. To reiterate, we believe that their broad measure of government corruption 
effectively incorporated indicators pertaining to both petty corruption and grand 
corruption. As such, we replicated Uhlenbruck et al.’s (2006) results by investigating the 
how the interaction between grand corruption and petty corruption impacted upon an 
MNE’s choice between nonequity-based and equity-based entry. Model 1D (χ2 = 190.20, 
p < 0.001, R2 = 0.28) suggests that MNEs are more likely to engage in nonequity entry 
than equity entry via a JV investment when petty corruption interacts with our two-
indicator measure of grand corruption (β = -0.52, p < 0.10). Further, Model 1F (χ2 = 
190.46, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.28) also suggests that interaction effect between grand and 
petty corruption will precipitate an increased likelihood that MNEs will choose 
nonequity- over equity-based entry when grand corruption is measured using only the 
pervasiveness of illegal political donations in the host market (β = -0.39, p < 0.10). 
Notably, the results of Model 1C (β = 0.12, p > 0.05) and Model 1E (β = 0.17, p > 0.05) 
indicate that the interaction between grand and petty corruption does not exert a 
significant effect upon an MNE’s choice between nonequity-based foreign entry and 
equity entry via a WOS. As such, we find partial support for Hypothesis 1. 
Table 6 presents the results of the regression models that were executed to test the 
hypotheses pertaining to an MNE’s equity entry strategy (JV or, WOS). While the signs 
of the coefficients for the main effects of grand and petty corruption in Models 2B and 
2C are consistent with our theory, the results indicate that these main effects do not exert 
a statistically significant impact upon the choice of equity-based foreign entry mode. 
However, the results reported in Model 2D (χ2 = 111.83, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.22) and Model 
2E (χ2 = 111.94, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.22), which introduce the interaction effects, indicate 
that the combined effect of the two dimensions of government corruption in the host 
market is significant. More precisely, the interaction effect in Model 2D (β = -0.64, p < 
0.001), in which grand corruption is operationalized as a two-indicator measure, reveals 
that the increased likelihood of an MNE engaging in a JV under conditions of more 
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pervasive grand corruption is weakened by an increase in the pervasiveness of petty 
corruption in the host market environment. Similar results were observed for Model 2E 
(β = -0.55, p < 0.001), in which grand corruption is measured using only the 
pervasiveness of illegal political donations in the host market. Figure 4 illustrates the 
interaction effect between grand and petty corruption pervasiveness on an MNE’s equity 
entry strategy (Aiken & West, 1991; Dawson, 2014). The Figure suggests that at lower 
levels of petty corruption, MNEs are increasingly likely to engage in a JV in host markets 
under conditions of more pervasive grand corruption. However, this likelihood is 
diminished as petty corruption becomes more pervasive. 
Finally, Table 7 reports the results of our regression analyses with respect to the 
main and interaction effects associated with grand and petty corruption upon an MNE’s 
partnering strategy. While the interaction effects in Model 3D and Model 3E  were not 
significant, the results reported for the main effects of grand and petty corruption 
pervasiveness in Model 3B (Grand: β = -1.31, p < 0.05; Petty: β = 1.83, p < 0.05; R2 = 
0.20), Model 3C (Grand: β = -0.72, p < 0.10; Petty: β = 1.36, p < 0.05; R2 = 0.19), Model 
3D (Grand: β = -1.32, p < 0.05; Petty: β = 1.82, p < 0.05; R2 = 0.20) and Model 3E 
(Grand: β = -0.79, p < 0.10; Petty: β = 1.39, p < 0.05; R2 = 0.19) were all highly 
consistent with our theory. These results support our contention that an increase in the 
pervasiveness of grand corruption bolsters the likelihood that an MNE will engage a host 
country (local) partner in a traditional JV investment, while an increase in petty 
corruption pervasiveness heightens the likelihood that an MNE will engage a home 
country partner through a crossnational JV arrangement (if the MNE chooses to invest 
through a JV). 
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FIGURE 4 
 
Interaction Effect of Grand Corruption Pervasiveness and Petty Corruption 
Pervasiveness on Equity Entry Strategy a 
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a High Petty and Low Petty refer to petty corruption pervasiveness one standard deviation 
above and below the mean for petty corruption pervasiveness. Likewise, High Grand and 
Low Grand refer to grand corruption pervasiveness one standard deviation above and 
below the mean for grand corruption pervasiveness. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Government corruption is a prominent example of an informal institution 
operating within a host market’s borders (Calhoun, 2002; Eden & Miller, 2004). Our 
work has been motivated by both a theoretical question (Can discrete host market 
institutions be conceptualized as pluralistic phenomena?), and an empirical question 
pertaining more specifically to the phenomenon of host market government corruption 
(Do the different dimensions of government corruption (grand corruption versus petty 
corruption) each exert a distinct impact upon the equity-based foreign entry strategies of 
MNEs?). In developing this research, we have responded to the enduring challenge posed 
by Glynn, Barr and Dacin (2000: 726) whose work reminds scholars of the need to 
consciously balance the competing demands of parsimony and accuracy in theory-
building efforts when they observe that “the focus in much…theorizing is to homogenize 
what is essentially a pluralistic world...the result has been to overlook the variety 
embedded in plurality…To capture a more accurate and nuanced view of the 
world…scholars need to incorporate more explicitly diversity…” Consistent with this 
perspective, researchers in the neighboring academic disciplines of economics and law 
have cautioned against the development of theory which suggests that firms respond 
uniformly to all dimensions of corruption and instead, they contend that different types of 
government corruption might have different implications for firm strategy (Søreide, 
2009). To this end, institutional theorists have suggested that whereas some “researchers 
consider corruption to be just another application of preexisting theories without 
sufficiently considering their adequacy...we may fail to understand corruption without 
considering its intrinsic dynamics and logic. Applying old theories then falls short of an 
adequate understanding of the phenomenon” (Lambsdorff, 2007: 1). 
 Our work makes a number of conceptual contributions, both through the 
introduction of new theory and through the validation of prior theory. First, we have 
theorized that discrete informal institutions (such as government corruption) can be 
conceptualized as pluralistic phenomena characterized by distinct dimensions that exert 
differential impacts on various aspects of an MNE’s equity-based foreign entry strategy. 
We have facilitated this extension to IT by synthesizing insights from ISCT which 
advocates the recognition of a hierarchy of norms. Leveraging this theory, we concluded 
55 
 
that the origin of the overarching prohibition against grand corruption is predominantly 
global in its orientation, while attitudes and values toward petty corruption vary more 
widely across countries. Given this, we proposed that the distinct origins of the norms 
pertaining to grand corruption and petty corruption effectively precipitate different types 
of uncertainty (environmental and behavioral) for foreign-investing MNEs which, in 
turn, motivate MNEs to vary their equity-based entry strategies. More precisely, under 
conditions of more pervasive grand corruption, we theorized that the primary source of 
uncertainty will be environmental (response) uncertainty, while behavioral uncertainty 
will predominate under conditions of heightened petty corruption pervasiveness. As such, 
we proposed that the relationship between petty corruption pervasiveness and equity-
based foreign entry strategy would be grounded in trust-based mechanisms due to the fact 
that petty corruption induces more pronounced behavioral uncertainty in the host market. 
Conversely, in the case of grand corruption, learning-based mechanisms should 
predominate because grand corruption generates heightened environmental (response) 
uncertainty. 
 Our results reveal that government corruption is, in fact, more nuanced than has 
been previously recognized in the literature. We found that an increase in the 
pervasiveness of grand corruption and petty corruption precipitated distinctly different 
strategic responses from foreign-investing MNEs. More specifically, while the 
heightened pervasiveness of grand corruption increased the likelihood that foreign-
investing MNEs would engage in JV investments with host country partners, an increase 
in the pervasiveness of petty corruption was found to precipitate the opposite outcome. 
Namely, under conditions of more pervasive petty corruption, firms that chose to invest 
through a JV were found to be more likely to engage a partner from the foreign-investing 
MNE’s home country. Further, an increase in the pervasiveness of petty corruption was 
found to reduce the hypothesized increased likelihood that MNEs would invest in JVs 
under conditions of more pronounced grand corruption pervasiveness. Our conceptual 
disaggregation of the government corruption pervasiveness construct has yielded 
empirical results that are theoretically relevant and cast new light on the relationship 
between the pervasiveness of corruption in the host market and the equity-based entry 
strategies of MNEs. Upon finding that the pervasiveness of government corruption was 
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not a statistically significant predictor of an MNE’s equity-based foreign investment 
strategy, Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) speculated that the government corruption construct 
may be multidimensional. Our work effectively presents evidence in support of their 
proposition’s validity.   
Second, our finding that the interaction between more pervasive levels of grand 
corruption and petty corruption would increase the likelihood that MNEs would choose 
nonequity entry over equity-based (joint venture) entry independently replicates the 
results proffered by Uhlenbruck et al. (2006). They found that MNEs were more likely to 
invest through nonequity modes when government corruption was more pervasive in the 
host market. As such, our work provides further empirical support for the theory of 
Rodriguez et al. (2005) which first introduced the corruption pervasiveness construct.  
Third, while scholars have frequently enlisted the broad notion of institutional 
pluralism, their work has primarily focused upon institutional pluralism across 
geographic space, highlighting the institutional diversity that exists between countries, 
between regions or between the MNE and its expansive subsidiary network. We have 
extended this research tradition by examining the concept of institutional pluralism more 
narrowly, focusing specifically on the institutional diversity that exists within a discrete 
institution that prevails in the host country market. In doing so, we provide the impetus 
for further inquiry into the strategic relevance of pluralistic host market institutions, both 
formal and informal. Our theory suggests that similarly nuanced strategic responses 
might be expected when MNEs encounter equally complex, potentially-pluralistic host 
market institutions such as political power which emanates from the local, provincial and 
national domains of the host market, as one example (Kozhikode & Li, 2012). 
Fourth, by integrating conceptual insights from IT and ISCT to inform our theory-
building efforts, we have not only advanced the corruption-oriented international 
business strategy research agenda, we have also contributed to the business ethics 
research domain. More specifically, in Table 1, we identified four questions that had yet 
to be resolved with respect to the existence or absence of hyper norms and behavioral 
norms pertaining to corruption. Our review of the prevailing legislative standards 
pertaining to acts of corruption in the countries that we studied presented evidence that 
supports the recognition of the existence of local behavioral norms that prohibit grand 
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corruption, as well as local behavioral norms that either permit or prohibit petty 
corruption, depending upon the country under consideration. Further, our legislative 
review also suggested that a global hypernorm prohibiting petty corruption does not 
exist. These findings should be of interest to scholars whose business ethics research 
assumes a global focus, particularly given that approximately 80% of worldwide FDI 
flows during our period of study terminated in either Japan or one of the 32 host countries 
included in our study (UNCTAD, 2004-2007). In this regard, our research supports Doh 
et al.’s (2010: 483) contention that “IB (international business) and its disciplinary 
antecedents may usefully inform BE (business ethics) research.”  
Finally, our work also extends recent theory developed by Sartor and Beamish 
(2014) with respect to informal institutions. In their effort to develop a theoretical 
framework that could be used to enhance scholars’ comprehension of informal 
institutions, they argue that the type of uncertainty precipitated by informal institutions is 
central to understanding the impact of these institutions on the organizational control 
decisions of foreign-investing MNEs. Motivated by their concern that informal 
institutions are frequently aggregated and characterized as being conceptually 
synonymous with culture, they disaggregated the informal institutions construct and 
proposed that informal institutions should be categorized based on the uncertainty that 
they generate – behavioral or environmental (technological or demand). We extend the 
scope of their theory by employing it to disaggregate and identify distinct dimensions 
(grand corruption and petty corruption) within an informal institution that has 
traditionally been recognized as a discrete informal institution (“government 
corruption”). More specifically, in explicating the mechanisms behind the relationships 
that we hypothesized, we proposed that grand corruption and petty corruption would 
generate more pronounced environmental (response) uncertainty and behavioral 
uncertainty respectively. Our empirical findings were broadly supportive of this theory. 
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Notwithstanding the contributions that emanate from our work, we acknowledge 
several limitations. First, our empirics are based on a sample of firms that originate from 
a single home country. Future work should seek to confirm our findings with a sample 
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constituted by MNEs that are headquartered in one or more countries other than Japan. 
Second, while Rodriguez et al.’s (2005) foundational theory with respect to the 
relationship between host market government corruption and the foreign entry strategies 
of MNEs introduced theory pertaining to both the pervasiveness and the arbitrariness of 
host market corruption, we lacked sufficient data to develop and test theory pertaining to 
the arbitrariness of each dimension of corruption that we studied. However, future 
research should seek to build and test theory with respect to grand corruption 
arbitrariness and petty corruption arbitrariness, focusing particularly on the interaction 
between the two constructs, as well as between the pervasiveness and arbitrariness of 
both grand and petty corruption. 
 Our work also poses implications for future research that should be considered 
within the domain of corruption-oriented international business scholarship. Following 
the stock market collapses in 2000 and 2008, parliamentarians, non-governmental 
organizations and business ethicists (Aguilera & Vadera, 2008; Aldrighi, 2009; 
Andriyanto, 2011; Argandoña, 2003; Gopinath, 2008) have all become increasingly 
concerned with another type of corruption that exists without the involvement of 
bureaucrats or government officials – private sector corruption. Notwithstanding the need 
to better understand this phenomenon, the work of international business strategy 
scholars has continued to focus on public sector corruption (or, government corruption) 
to the exclusion of private sector corruption. Our theory pertaining to the pluralistic 
nature of discrete host market informal institutions such as corruption provides the 
theoretical foundation upon which an even more robust conceptualization of “host market 
corruption”, construed more broadly to include private sector corruption, could be 
cultivated. Developing theory pertaining to the impact of host market private corruption 
on the strategic behavior of foreign-investing MNEs would provide an opportunity to 
unpack the corruption pervasiveness concept further. Finally, building on our work 
pertaining to a host market’s informal institutions, researchers should also investigate the 
prevalence of institutional plurality within the domain of a host market’s formal 
institutions. Each of these research endeavors could contribute to ameliorating scholars’ 
concerns that “pluralism, if undefined and unquestioned, will continue to compromise the 
accuracy of organizational theories” (Glynn et al., 2000: 732).   
59 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Aguilera, R. V., & Vadera, A. K. 2008. The dark side of authority: Antecedents, 
mechanisms, and outcomes of organizational corruption. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 77(4): 431-449. 
Aidt, T., Dutta, J., & Sena, V. 2008. Governance regimes, corruption and growth: Theory 
and evidence. Journal of Comparative Economics, 36(2): 195-220. 
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. 1991. Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting 
interactions. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
Aldrighi, D. M. 2009. Corruption inside the enterprise: Corporate fraud and conflicts of 
interest. In Global corruption report: Corruption and the private sector:  13-19. 
Berlin, Germany: Transparency International. 
Anand, V., Ashforth, B. E., & Joshi, M. 2004. Business as usual: The acceptance and 
perpetuation of corruption in organizations. Academy of Management Executive, 
18(2): 39-53. 
Andriyanto, H. 2011. New corruption bill covers private sector. Jakarta Globe. Jakarta, 
Indonesia, (March 16, 2011). 
Argandoña, A. 2003. Private-to-private corruption. Journal of Business Ethics, 47(3): 
253-267. 
Argandoña, A. 2005. Corruption and companies: The use of facilitating payments. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 60(3): 251-264. 
Arregle, J. L., Miller, T. L., Hitt, M. A., & Beamish, P. W. 2013. Do regions matter? An 
integrated institutional and semiglobalization perspective on the 
internationalization of MNEs. Strategic Management Journal, 34(8): 910-934. 
Ashforth, B. E., & Anand, V. 2003. The normalization of corruption in organizations. In 
B.M. Staw & R.M. Kramer (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior: An 
annual series of analytical essays and critical reviews: Vol. 25,  1-52. Greenwich, 
Conn.: Elsevier Ltd. 
Bardhan, P. 1997. Corruption and development: A review of issues. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 35(3): 1320-1346. 
Beamish, P., & Inkpen, A. 1998. Japanese firms and the decline of the Japanese 
expatriate. Journal of World Business, 33(1): 35-50. 
Beamish, P. W., & Banks, J. C. 1987. Equity joint ventures and the theory of the 
multinational enterprise. Journal of International Business Studies, 18(2): 1-16. 
Boyacigiller, N. 1990. The role of expatriates in the management of interdependence, 
complexity and risk in multinational corporations. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 21(3): 357-381. 
Bromiley, P., & Johnson, S. 2005. Mechanisms and empirical research. In D.J. Ketchen 
& D.D. Bergh (Eds.), Research methodology in strategy and management:  15–
29. San Diego, CA: JAI Press. 
Brouthers, K. D. 2002. Institutional, cultural and transaction cost influences on entry 
mode choice and performance. Journal of International Business Studies, 33(2): 
203-221. 
Brouthers, K. D., & Brouthers, L. E. 2003. Why service and manufacturing entry mode 
choices differ: The influence of transaction cost factors, risk and trust. Journal of 
Management Studies, 40(5): 1179-1204. 
60 
 
Buckley, P. J., & Casson, M. C. 1998. Analyzing foreign market entry strategies: 
Extending the internalization approach. Journal of International Business Studies, 
29(3): 539-561. 
Calhoun, M. A. 2002. Unpacking liability of foreignness: Identifying culturally driven 
external and internal sources of liability for the foreign subsidiary. Journal of 
International Management, 8(3): 301-321. 
Caligiuri, P. M., & Stroh, L. K. 1995. Multinational corporation management strategies 
and international human resources practices: Bringing IHRM to the bottom line. 
International Journal of Human Resource Management, 6(3): 494-507. 
Chan, C., & Makino, S. 2007. Legitimacy and multi-level institutional environments: 
Implications for foreign subsidiary ownership structure. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 38(4): 621-638. 
Chen, S. F. S., & Hennart, J. F. 2002. Japanese investors' choice of joint ventures versus 
wholly-owned subsidiaries in the US: The role of market barriers and firm 
capabilities. Journal of International Business Studies, 33(1): 1-19. 
Cuervo-Cazurra, A. 2008a. Better the devil you don't know: Types of corruption and FDI 
in transition economies. Journal of International Management, 14(1): 12-27. 
Cuervo-Cazurra, A. 2008b. The effectiveness of laws against bribery abroad. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 39(4): 634-651. 
Cuypers, I. R., & Martin, X. 2009. What makes and what does not make a real option?: A 
study of equity shares in international joint ventures. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 41(1): 47-69. 
Das, T. K., & Teng, B. S. 1998. Between trust and control: Developing confidence in 
partner cooperation in alliances. Academy of Management Review, 23(3): 491-
512. 
Davis, G. F., & Marquis, C. 2005. Prospects for organization theory in the early twenty-
first century: Institutional fields and mechanisms. Organization Science, 16(4): 
332-343. 
Dawson, J. F. 2014. Moderation in management research: What, why, when and how. 
Journal of Business and Psychology, 29(1): 1-19. 
Dhanaraj, C., & Beamish, P. 2004. Effect of equity ownership on the survival of 
international joint ventures. Strategic Management Journal, 25(3): 295-305. 
Dikova, D., & van Witteloostuijn, A. 2007. Foreign direct investment mode choice: Entry 
and establishment modes in transition economies. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 38(6): 1013-1033. 
Doh, J., Husted, B. W., Matten, D., & Santoro, M. 2010. Ahoy there! Toward greater 
congruence and synergy between international business and business ethics theory 
and research. Business Ethics Quarterly, 20(3): 481-502. 
Doh, J. P., Rodriguez, P., Uhlenbruck, K., Collins, J., & Eden, L. 2003. Coping with 
corruption in foreign markets. Academy of Management Executive, 17(3): 114-
127. 
Doig, A., & Theobald, R. 1999. Why corruption? Commonwealth & Comparative 
Politics, 37(3): 1-12. 
Donaldson, T. 2012. The epistemic fault line in corporate governance. Academy of 
Management Review, 37(2): 256-271. 
61 
 
Donaldson, T., & Dunfee, T. W. 1994. Toward a unified conception of business ethics: 
Integrative social contracts theory. Academy of Management Review, 19(2): 252-
284. 
Donaldson, T., & Dunfee, T. W. 1995. Integrative social contracts theory. Economics and 
Philosophy, 11(1): 85-112. 
Donaldson, T., & Dunfee, T. W. 1999. Ties that bind: A social contracts approach to 
business ethics. Boston: Harvard Business Press. 
Donaldson, T., & Dunfee, T. W. 2000. Precis for Ties that Bind. Business and Society 
Review, 105(4): 436-443. 
Dunfee, T. W., & Donaldson, T. J. 2002. Untangling the corruption knot: Global bribery 
viewed through the lens of integrative social contract theory. In N.E. Bowie (Ed.), 
The Blackwell guide to business ethics:  61-76. Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers Inc. 
Dunn, M. B., & Jones, C. 2010. Institutional logics and institutional pluralism: The 
contestation of care and science logics in medical education, 1967–2005. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 55(1): 114-149. 
Eden, L., & Miller, S. R. 2004. Distance matters: Liability of foreignness, institutional 
distance and ownership strategy. In M.A. Hitt & J.L.C. Cheng (Eds.), The 
evolving theory of the multinational firm (Advances in international 
management): Vol. 16,  187–221. Oxford: Elsevier. 
Erramilli, M. K. 1996. Nationality and subsidiary ownership patterns in multinational 
corporations. Journal of International Business Studies, 27(2): 225-248. 
Erramilli, M. K., & Rao, C. P. 1993. Service firms' international entry-mode choice: A 
modified transaction-cost analysis approach. Journal of Marketing, 57(3): 19-38. 
Frederick, W. C. 1991. The moral authority of transnational corporate codes. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 10(3): 165-177. 
Fritzsche, D. J., Huo, Y. P., Sugai, S., Tsai, S. D. H., Kim, C. S., & Becker, H. 1995. 
Exploring the ethical behavior of managers: A comparative study of four 
countries. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 12(2): 37-61. 
Geyskens, I., Steenkamp, J. B. E. M., & Kumar, N. 2006. Make, buy or ally: A 
transaction cost theory meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 49(3): 
519-543. 
Glaeser, E. L., Laibson, D. I., Scheinkman, J. A., & Soutter, C. L. 2000. Measuring trust. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3): 811-846. 
Glynn, M. A., Barr, P. S., & Dacin, M. T. 2000. Pluralism and the problem of variety. 
Academy of Management Review, 25(4): 726-734. 
Gomes-Casseres, B. 1990. Firm ownership preferences and host government restrictions: 
An integrated approach. Journal of International Business Studies, 21(1): 1-22. 
Gopinath, C. 2008. Recognizing and justifying private corruption. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 82(3): 747-754. 
Griffith, D. A., Harmancioglu, N., & Droge, C. 2009. Governance decisions for the 
offshore outsourcing of new product development in technology intensive 
markets. Journal of World Business, 44(3): 217-224. 
Gupta, S., Davoodi, H., & Alonso-Terme, R. 2002. Does corruption affect income 
inequality and poverty? Economics of Governance, 3(1): 23-45. 
62 
 
Habib, M., & Zurawicki, L. 2002. Corruption and foreign direct investment. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 33(2): 291-308. 
Hardoon, D., & Heinrich, F. 2011. Bribe payers index. Berlin, Germany: Transparency 
International. 
Hennart, J. F. 1991. The transaction costs theory of joint ventures: An empirical study of 
Japanese subsidiaries in the United States. Management Science, 37(4): 483-497. 
Hofstede, G. 2001. Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, 
and organizations across nations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 
Husted, B. W. 1999. Wealth, culture and corruption. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 30(2): 339-360. 
Inkpen, A. C. 2000. Learning through joint ventures: A framework of knowledge 
acquisition. Journal of Management Studies, 37(7): 1019-1044. 
Johanson, J., & Vahlne, J. E. 1977. The internationalization process of the firm-a model 
of knowledge development and increasing foreign market commitments. Journal 
of International Business Studies, 8(1): 23-32. 
Jordan, J. 2010. OECD's call for an end to corrosive facilitation payments and the 
international focus on the facilitation payments exception under the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act. University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law, 
13(1): 881. 
Kaufman, D., & Wei, S. J. 1999. Does "grease money" speed up the wheels of 
commerce? Working paper (7093), Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Klein, M., & Rosengren, E. 1994. The real exchange rate and foreign direct investment in 
the United States: Relative wealth vs. relative wage effects. Journal of 
International Economics, 36(3-4): 373-389. 
Koehler, M. 2012. Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act compliance defense. 
Wisonsin Law Review, 2012(1): 609-660. 
Kogut, B., & Singh, H. 1988. The effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 19(3): 411-432. 
Kostova, T., & Roth, K. 2002. Adoption of an organizational practice by subsidiaries of 
multinational corporations: Institutional and relational effects. Academy of 
Management Journal, 45(1): 215-233. 
Kozhikode, R. K., & Li, J. 2012. Political pluralism, public policies and organizational 
choices: Banking branch expansion in India, 1948–2003. Academy of 
Management Journal, 55(2): 339-359. 
Kraatz, M. S., & Block, E. S. 2008. Organizational implications of institutional pluralism. 
In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin & R. Suddaby (Eds.), The SAGE handbook 
of organizational institutionalism:  243-275. London: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Kwok, C. C., & Tadesse, S. 2006. The MNC as an agent of change for host-country 
institutions: FDI and corruption. Journal of International Business Studies, 37(6): 
767-785. 
Lambsdorff, J. G. 2007. The institutional economics of corruption and reform: Theory, 
evidence and policy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Lambsdorff, J. G. 2013. Corrupt intermediaries in international business transactions: 
Between make, buy and reform. European Journal of Law and Economics, 35(3): 
349-366. 
63 
 
Lee, S.-H., Oh, K., & Eden, L. 2010. Why do firms bribe? Management International 
Review, 50(6): 775-796. 
Li, S., & Wu, J. 2010. Why some countries thrive despite corruption: The role of trust in 
the corruption–efficiency relationship. Review of International Political Economy, 
17(1): 129-154. 
Luo, Y. 2007. Are joint venture partners more opportunistic in a more volatile 
environment? Strategic Management Journal, 28(1): 39-60. 
Madhok, A. 1995. Revisiting multinational firms' tolerance for joint ventures: A trust-
based approach. Journal of International Business Studies, 26(1): 345-369. 
Makino, S., & Beamish, P. W. 1998. Performance and survival of joint ventures with 
non-conventional ownership structures. Journal of International Business Studies, 
29(4): 797-818. 
Makino, S., & Delios, A. 1996. Local knowledge transfer and performance: Implications 
for alliance formation in Asia. Journal of International Business Studies, 27(5): 
905-928. 
Malhotra, S., & Gaur, A. S. 2014. Spatial geography and control in foreign acquisitions. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 45(2): 191-210. 
March, J. 1991. Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organization 
Science, 2(1): 71-87. 
Mauro, P. 1995. Corruption and growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3): 681-
712. 
Meschi, P. X. 2009. Government corruption and foreign stakes in international joint 
ventures in emerging economies. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 26(2): 
241-261. 
Metzger, M., Dalton, D. R., & Hill, J. W. 1993. The organization of ethics and the ethics 
of organizations: The case for expanded organizational ethics audits. Business 
Ethics Quarterly, 3(1): 27-43. 
Mezias, J. M., & Mezias, S. J. 2010. Country level corruption as a liability of 
foreignness: Effects on staffing, incentives and activities. In T. Devinney, T. 
Pedersen & L. Tihanyi (Eds.), The past, present and future of international 
business & management (Advances in international management): Vol. 23,  267-
291. New York: Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
Miller, K. D. 1993. Industry and country effects on managers' perceptions of 
environmental uncertainties. Journal of International Business Studies, 24(4): 
693-714. 
Milliken, F. J. 1987. Three types of perceived uncertainty about the environment: State, 
effect, and response uncertainty. Academy of Management Review, 12(1): 133-
143. 
Molina, C. 2012. Understanding institutional plurality in multinational enterprises: The 
roles of institutional logic and social identification. In L. Tihanyi, T.M. Devinney 
& T. Pedersen (Eds.), Institutional theory in international business and 
management (Advances in International Management): Vol. 25,  399-423. 
Bingley, United Kingdom: Emerald Group Publishing. 
Murrell, P. 2005. Institutions and firms in transition economies. In C. Ménard & M.M. 
Shirley (Eds.), Handbook of new institutional economics:  667-699. Dordrecht, 
The Netherlands: Springer. 
64 
 
Nannestad, P. 2008. What have we learned about generalized trust, if anything? Annual 
Review of Political Science, 11: 413-436. 
Nichols, P. M. 1996. Outlawing transnational bribery through the World Trade 
Organization. Law and Policy in International Business, 28(1): 305-382. 
Nichols, P. M. 2009. Multiple communities and controlling corruption. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 88(4): 805-813. 
North, D. C. 1990. Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
North, D. C. 2005. Understanding the process of economic change. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Nunnally, J., & Bernstein, I. 1994. Psychometric theory. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Oldenburg, P. 1987. Middlemen in third-world corruption: Implications of an Indian 
case. World Politics, 39(4): 508-535. 
Pan, Y., & Tse, D. K. 2000. The hierarchical model of market entry modes. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 31(4): 535-554. 
Puffer, S. M., McCarthy, D. J., & Boisot, M. 2010. Entrepreneurship in Russia and 
China: The impact of formal institutional voids. Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 34(3): 441-467. 
Ralston, D. A. 2008. The crossvergence perspective: Reflections and projections. Journal 
of International Business Studies, 39(1): 27-40. 
Reuer, J. J., & Leiblein, M. J. 2000. Downside risk implications of multinationality and 
international joint ventures. Academy of Management Journal, 43(2): 203-214. 
Reuer, J. J., & Ragozzino, R. 2006. Agency hazards and alliance portfolios. Strategic 
Management Journal, 27(1): 27-43. 
Reuer, J. J., & Tong, T. W. 2005. Real options in international joint ventures. Journal of 
Management, 31(3): 403-423. 
Rodriguez, P., Siegel, D. S., Hillman, A. J., & Eden, L. 2006. Three lenses on the 
multinational enterprise: Politics, corruption, and corporate social responsibility. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 37(6): 733-746. 
Rodriguez, P., Uhlenbruck, K., & Eden, L. 2005. Government corruption and the entry 
strategies of multinationals. Academy of Management Review, 30(2): 383-396. 
Rose-Ackerman, S. 2002. “Grand” corruption and the ethics of global business. Journal 
of Banking & Finance, 26(9): 1889-1918. 
Rugman, A. M., & Verbeke, A. 2004. A perspective on regional and global strategies of 
multinational enterprises. Journal of International Business Studies, 35(1): 3-18. 
Santangelo, G. D., & Meyer, K. E. 2011. Extending the internationalization process 
model: Increases and decreases of MNE commitment in emerging economies. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 42(7): 894-909. 
Sartor, M. A., & Beamish, P. W. 2014. Offshoring innovation to emerging markets: 
Organizational control and informal institutional distance. Journal of 
International Business Studies (forthcoming). 
Shay, J. P., & Baack, S. A. 2004. Expatriate assignment, adjustment and effectiveness: 
An empirical examination of the big picture. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 35(3): 216-232. 
65 
 
Søreide, T. 2009. Too risk averse to stay honest?: Business corruption, uncertainty and 
attitudes toward risk. International Review of Law and Economics, 29(4): 388-
395. 
Spencer, J., & Gomez, C. 2011. MNEs and corruption: The impact of national institutions 
and subsidiary strategy. Strategic Management Journal, 32(3): 280-300. 
Spicer, A. 2009. The normalization of corrupt business practices: Implications for 
integrative social contracts theory. Journal of Business Ethics, 88(4): 833-840. 
Spicer, A., Dunfee, T. W., & Bailey, W. J. 2004. Does national context matter in ethical 
decision making?: An empirical test of integrative social contracts theory. 
Academy of Management Journal, 47(4): 610-620. 
Stopford, J. M., & Wells, L. T. 1972. Managing the multinational enterprise. New York: 
Basic Books. 
Tabachnick, B., & Fidell, L. 2007. Using multivariate statistics (5th ed.). Boston, MA: 
Allyn & Bacon. 
The Economist. 2012. Intoxication: How a new market is producing a wave of innovation 
in an old industry. July 14: 61. 
The Economist. 2006. How to grease a palm. December 23: 131-132. 
The Economist. 2008. Grease my palm. November 29: 122-123. 
Toyo Keizai. Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran. Tokyo, Japan. 
Transparency International. 2009. The anti-corruption plain language guide. Berlin, 
Germany. 
Treisman, D. 2000. The causes of corruption: A cross-national study. Journal of Public 
Economics, 76(3): 399-457. 
Uhlenbruck, K., Rodriguez, P., Doh, J. P., & Eden, L. 2006. The impact of corruption on 
entry strategy: Evidence from telecommunication projects in emerging 
economies. Organization Science, 17(3): 402-414. 
UNCTAD. 2004-2007. World Investment Reports: Lausanne, Switzerland. 
UNCTAD. 2011. Non-equtiy modes of international production and development. 
Lausanne, Switzerland: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
Uslaner, E. M. 2005. Trust and corruption. In J. Lambsdorff, M. Taube & M. Schramm 
(Eds.), The new institutional economics of corruption:  76-92. New York: 
Routledge. 
Williamson, O. E. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism. New York, NY: The 
Free Press. 
Woodcock, C. P., Beamish, P. W., & Makino, S. 1994. Ownership-based entry mode 
strategies and international performance. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 25(2): 253-273. 
Yamawaki, H. 1991. Exports and foreign distributional activities: Evidence of Japanese 
firms in the United States. Review of Economics and Statistics, 73(2): 294-300. 
Yiu, D., & Makino, S. 2002. The choice between joint venture and wholly owned 
subsidiary: An institutional perspective. Organization Science, 13(6): 667-683. 
 
66 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
Summary of National Legislative Provisions and Intergovernmental Conventions Used to Evaluate the Existence or Absence of 
Laws Either Prohibiting or Permitting Grand Corruption or Petty Corruption Towards Public Sector Officials 
 
International OECD Convention a
International
United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption b
Argentina National Penal Code
Australia Criminal Code Act
Austria Criminal Code
Belgium Criminal Code
Brazil Criminal Code
Canada Corruption of Foreign Public 
Officials Act; Criminal Code
China Criminal Law; Foreign Bribery Article
Czech Republic
Criminal Code; Commercial 
Code; Accounting Act; Conflict 
of Interests Act; Capital 
Markets Act
France
Criminal Act; French Penal 
Code; French Code of Criminal 
Procedure
a OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.
b United Nations Convention Against Corruption.
No No No No
No No No No
No No No No
No No No Defers to national laws.
No No No Yes
No No No No
No No No No
No No No No
Grand Corruption Petty Corruption 
Country
Permissible 
Towards Domestic 
Public Officials?
Permissible 
Towards Foreign 
Public Officials?
Relevant Legislation
Permissible 
Towards Domestic 
Public Officials?
Permissible 
Towards Foreign 
Public Officials?
No No No No
No No No Yes
No No No
Yes (but policy 
change pending) 
(Jordan, 2010).
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
 
Germany
Criminal Code; EU Corruption 
Act; International Corruption 
Act
Hong Kong Prevention of Bribery Ordinance; Local bribery laws.
Hungary Criminal Code
India
Prevention of Corruption Act; 
Foreign Contribution Regulation 
Act; Central Vigilance 
Commission Act
Indonesia
Criminal Code; Eradication of 
the Criminal Act of Corruption; 
Anti-Corruption Law 
(forthcoming)
Italy Criminal Code
Japan Penal Code; Unfair Competitition Prevention Act
No No No No
No No No
Only if the payment 
results in illicit gains 
to the official.
No No No Not explcitly prohibited by law.
No No No No
No No No Not explcitly prohibited by law.
No No No No
No No No No
Country
Permissible 
Towards Domestic 
Public Officials?
Permissible 
Towards Foreign 
Public Officials?
Relevant Legislation
Permissible 
Towards Domestic 
Public Officials?
Permissible 
Towards Foreign 
Public Officials?
Grand Corruption Petty Corruption 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
 
Korea
Criminal Code; Specific 
Economic Crimes Act; Anti-
Corruption Act;
Luxembourg Penal Code
Malaysia
Malaysian Anti-Corruption 
Commission Act; Customs Act; 
Anti-Money
Laundering and Anti-Terrorism 
Financing Act
Mexico
Federal Criminal Code; Federal 
Law on Administrative 
Accountability of Public 
Officials
Netherlands Criminal Code
New Zealand Crimes Act; Bribery of Foreign Public Officials Act
Philippines Revised Penal Code; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
Poland Criminal Code
Russia
Criminal Code; Federal Law on 
Counteraction Against 
Corruption
Singapore Penal Code; Prevention of Corruption Act              
No Not explcitly prohibited by law. No No
No Not explcitly prohibited by law. No
Not explcitly 
prohibited by law.
No No No No
No No No Yes
No No No Yes
No No No No
No No No No
No No No Yes
No No No No
Grand Corruption Petty Corruption 
Country
Permissible 
Towards Domestic 
Public Officials?
Permissible 
Towards Foreign 
Public Officials?
Relevant Legislation
Permissible 
Towards Domestic 
Public Officials?
Permissible 
Towards Foreign 
Public Officials?
No No NoNo
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
 
 
South Africa Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act
Spain Criminal Code
Switzerland Penal Code; Unfair Competition Act
Taiwan
Criminal Code; Corruption 
Punishment Statute; Money 
Laundering Control Act; 
Political Donations Act; 
Lobbying Act
Thailand Criminal Code
United Kingdom Bribery Act; Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act
United States
United States Code (Title 18 - 
Federal Crimes); Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act
No No No Yes (facilitation payments)
No No No Law is uncertain.
No No No No
No Not explcitly prohibited by law. No
Not explcitly 
prohibited by law.
No No No No
No No No Yes
No No No No 
Country
Permissible 
Towards Domestic 
Public Officials?
Permissible 
Towards Foreign 
Public Officials?
Relevant Legislation
Permissible 
Towards Domestic 
Public Officials?
Permissible 
Towards Foreign 
Public Officials?
Grand Corruption Petty Corruption 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Public Corruption, Private Corruption and the Structure of  
Equity-Based Foreign Subsidiary Investments in Emerging Markets 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
While corruption has received considerable attention as an imposing force that 
influences the level and global directionality of foreign investment (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2008a; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002), less attention has been given to the impact of 
corruption on multinational enterprise (MNE) strategy (Mezias & Mezias, 2010). We 
investigate the foreign entry strategies of MNEs under conditions of more pervasive host 
market corruption, focusing specifically on the experience of developed market MNEs 
that invest in emerging markets. In 2012, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into 
developing economies exceeded the inflows to developed economies for the first time 
ever (UNCTAD, 2013). Given the growing prominence of emerging markets as a global 
destination for FDI from developed markets (UNCTAD, 2012), and in light of the 
endemic nature of corruption in these host markets presumed by both academics (Khanna 
& Palepu, 2010; Sharma, 2010) and the business media (Barchfield, 2014), a strong 
imperative exists to enhance our comprehension of the impact of corruption upon the 
strategic decisions of MNEs that enter into emerging markets (Rodriguez, Siegel, 
Hillman, & Eden, 2006). 
To date, our understanding of the relationship between corruption and firm 
strategy has been characterized as embryonic (Rodriguez et al., 2006) for two principal 
reasons. First, although theoretically-motivated studies of corruption have primarily 
employed two perspectives - institutional theory (IT) and transaction cost economics 
(TCE), more often, corruption-based studies have used an empirically-driven, atheoretical 
lens (Judge, McNatt, & Xu, 2010). Second, while scholarly efforts to advance the 
conceptualization of corruption have prompted international strategy researchers to focus 
on manifestations of public sector corruption (Doh, Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, Collins, & 
Eden, 2003; Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh, & Eden, 2006), international business ethics 
scholars have increasingly advocated the need to incorporate considerations of private 
sector corruption (Aguilera & Vadera, 2008; Argandoña, 2003; Gopinath, 2008). 
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Coincident with this divergence in the stream of corruption research, Rodriguez et al. 
(2006: 739) have suggested that “scholarship on corruption would benefit from more 
attention to definitions. Corruption is still most commonly defined to preclude private 
corruption.” 
As such, we build on extant MNE theory that conceptualizes host market 
corruption and its impact on MNE strategy in terms of the pervasiveness of corruption 
(Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005) and we introduce two more explicit latent 
constructs – public corruption pervasiveness and private corruption pervasiveness. Our 
conceptual work is grounded in recent research within the domain of corruption-oriented 
international business scholarship (Sartor, 2014) which has built on the notion of 
institutional pluralism or, “the situation faced by an organization that operates within 
multiple institutional spheres” (Kraatz & Block, 2008: 243) While international business 
research has traditionally focused on the strategic relevance of institutional pluralism 
precipitated by the geographic space that exists between countries (Chan & Makino, 
2007), between regions (Arregle, Miller, Hitt, & Beamish, 2013) and even between the 
MNE and its global network of subsidiaries (Kostova & Roth, 2002), more recently, 
researchers have proposed that discrete institutions within a host market can themselves 
be characterized as pluralistic institutional phenomena “constituted by distinct 
dimensions….which are disparate both in their origin and their impact on the foreign 
entry strategy of MNEs” (Sartor, 2014). In finding that an increase in the pervasiveness 
of grand corruption and petty corruption precipitated distinctly different strategic 
responses from foreign-investing MNEs, Sartor (2014) determined that government 
corruption is more nuanced than has been previously recognized in the international 
business strategy literature. His results and the associated theory lend support to the 
proposition advanced by Uhlenbruck et al. (2006: 411) who suggested that their own non-
significant findings with respect to the relationship between government corruption and 
MNE strategy might be attributable to “underlying constructs behind (government 
corruption) pervasiveness that have conflicting effects on the firm’s choice between joint 
venture and wholly-owned subsidiary.” 
Building on this theoretical foundation, and motivated by Uhlenbruck et al.’s 
(2006: 411) suggestion that  “further exploration of the institutional underpinnings of the 
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pervasiveness of corruption is an important…step for corruption researchers”, we 
develop more fine-grained theory to further extend the conceptualization of corruption 
pervasiveness. Moreover, we employ our theory to introduce new insights into the 
relationship between host market corruption (which we conceptualize as including both 
public sector corruption and private sector corruption) and the equity-based entry 
strategies of foreign-investing MNEs. To do so, we focus on explicating the theoretical 
mechanism that substantiates our expectation that each dimension of corruption (public 
and private) will exert a disparate impact on the strategies of foreign-investing MNEs. 
More specifically, we draw upon the research tradition in which a MNE’s foreign market 
entry and ongoing operations have been conceptualized in terms of its bargaining power 
in the host country (Fagre & Wells Jr, 1982; Kobrin, 1987). Subsequent conceptual 
advances in bargaining power theory by joint venture and alliance scholars have extended 
this theory to elaborate two primary types of bargaining power (Ren, Gray, & Kim, 2009; 
Yan & Gray, 2001). While context-based bargaining power focuses on the power that an 
MNE derives from possessing outside alternatives during a negotiation, resource-based 
bargaining power focuses on the power that an MNE obtains from both its financial and 
noncapital resources. When MNEs enter into foreign markets, they routinely engage in 
both public sector transactions (or, transactions with the government) and private sector 
transactions (transactions with private entities, companies and individuals) (Teegen, Doh, 
& Vachani, 2004). We propose that the primary type of bargaining power upon which an 
MNE relies may differ for its public sector transactions and its private sector transactions. 
More precisely, we theorize that an MNE’s reliance on different sources of bargaining 
power functions as the mechanism through which public corruption and private 
corruption impact upon the foreign entry strategy of the MNE. Consequently, despite the 
fact that we anticipate that the two types of corruption will be highly correlated, we 
expect that MNEs will employ different entry strategies under conditions of more 
pronounced public versus private corruption pervasiveness in foreign host markets. 
Employing these two new corruption constructs, we explore the impact of 
heightened host market corruption upon three foreign market entry decisions considered 
by an MNE – its foreign entry strategy, equity entry strategy and partnering strategy. Our 
theory predicts that when public corruption in the host market is more pervasive, MNEs 
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will be more likely to enter through a joint venture (JV) with a host country partner, 
rather than a home country partner. Conversely, heightened private corruption 
pervasiveness will precipitate entry via a wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS). Further, given 
that public and private corruption are widely regarded as existing simultaneously in host 
markets (Rodriguez et al., 2006), we theorize that the interaction effect between both 
types of corruption should result in an MNE’s preference for shared ownership with host 
country partners under conditions of heightened public corruption pervasiveness being 
moderated by an increase in the pervasiveness of private corruption.  
In addition to refining the conception of corruption to incorporate both its public 
and private sector dimensions, our empirical analysis provides support for and extends 
extant theory pertaining to the relationship between host market corruption and firm 
strategy (Rodriguez et al., 2005). Further, by focusing on the role of a firm’s bargaining 
power in shaping its strategic foreign entry decisions under conditions of more pervasive 
host market corruption, our work contributes to efforts to more closely integrate market 
and nonmarket strategy research. More specifically, we draw attention to an important 
theoretical mechanism that could also be used to bridge the institutionally-oriented and 
resource-oriented perspectives that have been advocated by strategy theorists as a means 
to enhance our understanding of the strategic relevance of contemporary nonmarket 
phenomena such as corruption (Doh, Lawton, & Rajwani, 2012). 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Conceptualizing Corruption: Public and Private Corruption Pervasiveness 
Extant research in economics, law and political science (Bardhan, 1997; 
Oldenburg, 1987; Treisman, 2000) has defined corruption as the abuse of public power or 
public office for private benefit. While the received definition of corruption is 
parsimonious, it has limited the scope of strategy-based inquiry to purely public realms 
(Argandoña, 2003; Gopinath, 2008; Husted, 1994). The failure to incorporate 
considerations of private sector corruption into strategy scholarship risks muting the 
more fine-grained insights that can be garnered by corruption-oriented research 
(Milliken, 1987). In this regard, our efforts to theoretically and empirically extend the 
construct to include private sector corruption are motivated, in part, by Kurer (2005) who 
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has lamented the lack of theoretical progress in defining and measuring corruption during 
the past 40 years.  
Given that “corruption involves expropriating what rightfully belongs to others” 
(Uslaner, 2005: 77), we conceptualize corruption as an informal institutional constraint 
that undermines property rights (Eden & Miller, 2004; North, 1990) and heightens the 
degree of uncertainty encountered by internationalizing MNEs (Miller, 1992). Informal 
institutional pluralism is a concept that has been developed to describe the properties of 
informal institutions that have been traditionally recognized as discrete institutions within 
a host market (such as “corruption”). More specifically, pluralistic informal institutions 
are informal institutions in host markets that are constituted by distinct dimensions which 
are disparate both in their origin and their impact on the foreign entry strategy of MNEs 
(Sartor, 2014). Our research focuses on two distinct dimensions of corruption that 
emanate from two disparate sectors in the host market institutional environment – the 
public sector and the private sector.  
We build on Aguilera and Vadera’s (2008) broader conceptualization of 
corruption (the abuse of authority for personal gain) to define public corruption as the 
abuse of public authority or trust for personal gain, and private corruption as the abuse 
of private authority or trust for personal gain. Using these definitions, we extend prior 
theory that conceptualizes host market corruption in terms of its pervasiveness to 
introduce two new latent constructs – public corruption pervasiveness which we define as 
the average firm’s likelihood of encountering corruption in its normal interactions with 
public officials (Rodriguez et al., 2005: 385), and private corruption pervasiveness (the 
average firm’s likelihood of encountering corruption in its normal interactions with 
private entities, companies and individuals).  
In support of our theory’s face validity and to ensure that our theorizing is 
relevant to practice, we align our decomposition of the corruption construct with the 
policy orientation of international legislative initiatives (Argandoña, 2003). The United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) (2004) has encouraged its member 
states to enact national criminal legislation designed to prohibit the most rampant forms 
of both “private sector corruption” and “public sector corruption.” As one example of the 
commitment to the UNCAC’s recognition of the importance of private sector corruption, 
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the United Kingdom’s recently enacted Bribery Act (2010) implicitly prohibits payments 
that induce improper performance by individuals employed in the private sector, in 
addition to prescribing penalties for acts of public sector corruption, including bribing 
either domestic or foreign public officials and government employees. At the same time, 
Transparency International (2009a) has also begun to decompose corruption on a 
sectorial basis. In defining “corruption”, it has recently suggested that corruption should 
be classified on the basis of the sector (public or private) within which it occurs. 
Notably, when compared to the task of defining corruption, measuring the 
institution has proven to be more difficult (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008b) due to the need to 
rely on perceptual measures. While data with respect to the perceived level of public 
sector corruption in host markets is widely available (Svensson, 2005), private sector 
corruption continues to be under-researched by management scholars, primarily due to a 
dearth of information and aggregate data with respect its constituent elements 
(Argandoña, 2003; Faria, Morales, Pineda, & Montesinos, 2012). Despite these 
challenges, in order to study private sector corruption, our research conceptualizes the 
phenomenon in terms of the prevalence of insider trading, tax evasion and organized 
crime or racketeering in host markets. Economists, finance scholars and legal theorists 
have explicitly recognized insider trading (Argandoña, 2003; Mills & Weisberg, 2007), 
tax evasion (Christensen, 2011) and racketeering or organized crime (Rose-Ackerman, 
1999) as manifestations of private sector corruption. Racketeering is a legal term 
encompassing a range of corrupt activities found to occur in the private sector, including 
the payment of bribes to the employees of potential customers to secure contracts 
(“kickbacks”), extortion and the embezzlement of property in the private sector (Beare, 
2007), activities that have been highlighted as some of the most prevalent forms of 
private sector corruption by the UNCAC (2004). Historically, countries have enacted 
anti-racketeering laws to combat the existence of organized crime. However, beginning 
in the 1980s (Bratton & Levitin, 2012), the purview of anti-racketeering laws has been 
extended to encompass a wider range of corrupt activities occurring in the private sector 
(Cove, 1983). As recent examples, racketeering laws have been employed to prosecute 
several publicly-traded MNEs, including a pharmaceutical company for fraudulent 
marketing and an oil and gas corporation for misleading its investors (Coppola & 
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DeMarco, 2012), as well as a global investment bank for manipulating interest rates 
(Scheiner & Broda, 2012). Therefore, despite the data-driven challenges to date 
associated with operationalizing the private sector corruption construct (Argandoña, 
2003; Faria et al., 2012), we contend that the prevalence of racketeering-associated 
activities such as kickbacks and embezzlement, as well as insider trading and tax evasion 
in host markets provide an appropriate indication of the pervasiveness of private 
corruption pervasiveness within a country. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Entering Foreign Markets: Institutions and Bargaining Power 
Strong institutions and legal rules are designed to reduce uncertainty and facilitate 
efficient exchange (North, 1990). Emerging markets have been characterized as having 
relatively weaker institutional environments (Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 
2005). When a host market’s formal institutions are weak, institutional voids form 
(North, 1990) which may be filled by informal institutions such as corruption (Puffer, 
McCarthy, & Boisot, 2010). In fact, corruption is more rampant in emerging markets 
primarily due to ineffective institutional systems (Doh et al., 2003). Our theory is 
impartial with respect to whether MNEs will prefer to partake in, or avoid, acts of public 
corruption and private corruption in host foreign markets. Prior research has advanced 
arguments that favor both perspectives on the propensity and willingness of MNEs to 
initiate or participate in foreign market corruption. While engaging in corruption may be 
strategically advantageous to some MNEs (Boddewyn, 1988; Boddewyn & Brewer, 
1994), potential legal ramifications (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008b), moral apprehension 
(Robertson & Watson, 2004) and adverse financial effects (Wei, 2000) operate as potent 
disincentives to corrupt behavior.  
Either way, heightened levels of corruption operate as an informal institutional 
constraint that exacerbates information asymmetries (Argandoña, 2005; Calhoun, 2002), 
reduces trust (Uslaner, 2008) and undermines legal contract enforcement (Lambsdorff, 
2002b), all of which increase the risks and costs associated with entering into and 
operating within more corrupt host market environments (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & 
Wright, 2000; Williamson, 1985). Despite these heightened risks and costs, MNEs are 
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not always willing or able to defer investment in these countries (Bray, 2005; Doh et al., 
2003). Our theory proposes to explain how the structure of equity-based foreign 
subsidiary investments is impacted by the pervasiveness of public corruption and private 
corruption in host markets. When an MNE enters into a market characterized by higher 
levels of corruption, it can be expected to structure its investment in a manner that is 
designed to attenuate information asymmetries in order to reduce the uncertainty and 
costs associated with its ongoing operations in that country (Brouthers, 2002; Rodriguez 
et al., 2005). An MNE’s ongoing operations in a host country will be constituted by both 
its public sector transactions (or, transactions with the government) and its private sector 
transactions (transactions with private entities, companies and individuals) (Teegen et al., 
2004). The tradition of conceptualizing an MNE’s foreign entry and ongoing operations 
as a negotiation or bargain between the MNE and the host country (Fagre & Wells Jr, 
1982; Kobrin, 1987) has persisted in contemporary international business strategy 
research pertaining to host market corruption. Business ethicists and corruption scholars 
who work at the intersection of IT and TCE in order to advance the anti-corruption 
research agenda have studied the relationship between firms and governments by drawing 
upon elements of bargaining power theory. An MNE’s bargaining power has been found 
to dictate its ability to successfully manage the risks and costs associated with operating 
in increasingly corrupt host markets (Lee, Oh, & Eden, 2010). 
Bargaining power has been defined as the ability of one party to influence a 
negotiation in its own favor (Argyres & Liebskind, 1999). Alliance scholars studying the 
relationship between bargaining power and the distribution of management control in JVs 
have proposed that an MNE’s bargaining power derives from two different sources. 
Context-based bargaining power is a function of the stakes (or, the bargainer’s 
dependence on the outcome of a negotiation), as well as the availability of alternatives 
(or, “other parties with whom to negotiate or, other channels through which to 
accomplish the same mission that is to be achieved”) (Yan & Gray, 1994: 1492). An 
MNE that is less dependent upon the outcome of a bargain and that has more alternatives 
available to it enjoys greater context-based bargaining power, while an MNE that is more 
dependent upon the outcome of a particular negotiation by virtue of a lack of alternatives 
wields less context-based bargaining power (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997). Resource-based 
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bargaining power is a function of both a negotiator’s capital-based bargaining power 
(power attributable to a bargainer’s financial or physical assets) and its noncapital-based 
bargaining power (power attributable to a bargainer’s tacit resources such as local 
knowledge and expertise, political clout or relational networks) (Yan & Gray, 2001). 
Notably, if an MNE experiences a deficiency in its context-based bargaining power, it 
will be more difficult for the firm to achieve its goals and, consequently, the firm will be 
more likely to engage in strategic decisions that are designed to increase its resource-
based bargaining power (Ren et al., 2009). Consistent with this perspective, in order to 
attenuate the costs of opportunism associated with transacting with government officials 
in more corrupt countries, firms have been found to engage in strategies designed to 
enhance the firm’s power (Lambsdorff, 2002a). 
 
Public Corruption Pervasiveness: Equity Entry Strategy (JV or WOS) and 
Partnering Strategy (Home or Host) 
 
MNEs with operations in emerging markets routinely report pressure from 
government officials to engage in corrupt transactions (Spencer & Gomez, 2011). As 
such, when an MNE enters into increasingly corrupt host markets, it will endeavor to 
structure its subsidiary investments in a manner that attenuates the information 
asymmetries that it expects to encounter in its ongoing public sector transactions 
(Brouthers, 2002; Rodriguez et al., 2005). We theorize that under conditions of more 
pervasive public corruption, the firm’s resources are likely to be a more prominent 
source of bargaining power in its public sector transactions, when compared to the 
bargaining power that the firm derives from its context (or, other alternatives). Prior 
research has found that when a host government is involved in a negotiation, an MNE’s 
alternatives can become significantly restricted (Yan & Gray, 1994). Indeed, the tradition 
of conceptualizing an MNE’s foreign entry and ongoing operations as a negotiation or 
bargain between the MNE and the host country’s government has resulted in extensive 
scholarly attention being given to framing an MNE’s resources and capabilities as its 
primary source of bargaining power when negotiating with the government (Moon & 
Lado, 2000). This is because when an MNE enters into a foreign market, it often 
possesses a constrained range of  alternatives with respect to the issues that it needs to 
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resolve or the resources that it needs to secure through transactions and negotiations with 
the government (i.e., procurement contracts, licenses, utilities, customs clearances, tax 
abatements and favorable regulatory rulings or judicial decisions) (Boddewyn, 1988; 
Rose-Ackerman, 1997). In these situations, we would expect that an MNE which is 
motivated to commence operations in the host market will expect to be relatively 
dependent upon the outcome of these ongoing transactions and negotiations. Taken 
together, this suggests that in the case of public sector transactions, an MNE is less likely 
to possess the degree of context-based bargaining power that it needs to reduce more 
pronounced information asymmetries in increasingly corrupt host markets. Consequently, 
the MNE can be expected to engage in efforts to increase its resource-based bargaining 
power (Ren et al., 2009). More precisely, we believe that efforts to augment an MNE’s 
noncapital-based bargaining power through the addition of resources such as local 
knowledge and relational networks represents an important opportunity to reduce the 
heightened information asymmetries that it may encounter during the course of its public 
sector transactions in increasingly corrupt host markets. 
Public corruption can be highly unpredictable, given that government officials 
possess the power to change policies and procedures at any time (Lambsdorff, 2002b). As 
such, an equity partner can enhance the resource-based bargaining power of the MNE and 
assist efforts to lessen the information asymmetries that the MNE encounters in its public 
sector transactions in at least three important ways. First, a partner can reduce or even 
eliminate the need for the MNE to interact with the government directly (Doh et al., 
2003). Second, the MNE can access the partner’s knowledge of the local environment 
(Tsang, 2002). More specifically, an equity partner can teach the MNE how to bargain 
with government agents more effectively (Rodriguez et al., 2005). Finally, a partner can 
provide an MNE with access to local networks (Meyer, Wright, & Pruthi, 2009). 
Inclusion in these networks enhances the bargaining power of the MNE because the 
repeated transactions and reputation that characterize these networks are resources that 
can be leveraged to contain the costs associated with bargaining with government 
officials in more corrupt host markets (Lambsdorff, 2002a). 
In addition to determining whether to structure these subsidiary investments as JVs 
or WOSs, foreign MNEs must also determine whether to invest with host country (local) 
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partners, home country partners or third country partners (Makino & Beamish, 1998). A 
major risk associated with local partners in more corrupt host markets is that they may 
cheat, expose the foreign firm to blackmail or, cause the foreign firm to overpay in 
corrupt transactions (Bray, 2005). However, local partners can also enhance the resource-
based bargaining power of MNEs in ways that foreign partners cannot. Relying on a local 
partner’s knowledge of corrupt institutions prevailing in the host country can position a 
foreign-investing firm to reduce its transaction costs (Meschi, 2009). Local partners can 
help with local knowledge and local access once the MNE enters into the host country, 
both of which are critical factors that contribute to the improved performance of a JV 
(Makino & Beamish, 1998). This is because local partners enjoy a more precise 
knowledge of and intimate familiarity with the host market’s bureaucratic stakeholders 
and business networks (Meschi, 2009). A local partner is more socially embedded in the 
host market’s business culture and, as such, these trusted social relationships can be 
employed to attenuate information asymmetries (Lambsdorff, 2002b). Given that the host 
government and local firms are more culturally similar relative to the degree of cultural 
similarity between the government and foreign firms, host firms enjoy an advantage over 
these foreign firms because they have a better understanding of the nature and culture of 
public corruption in the host market (Calhoun, 2002). As such, given the lower level of 
context-based bargaining power that the MNE is likely to exercise under conditions of 
more pervasive public corruption in the host market, the benefits associated with 
enhancing the firm’s resource-based bargaining power through efforts to engage a local 
JV partner are expected to outweigh the risks of partnering. Accordingly, we hypothesize 
that, 
 
Hypothesis 1: A foreign-investing MNE is more likely to invest through a 
JV with a host country (local) partner under conditions of heightened 
public corruption pervasiveness. 
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Private Corruption Pervasiveness: Equity Entry Strategy (JV or WOS) and 
Partnering Strategy (Home or Host) 
 
We theorize that in the case of its private sector transactions within a host 
country, the firm’s context or, the availability of alternatives within the host country, is 
likely to be a more prominent source of bargaining power than it is in the case of its 
public sector transactions. While it is possible that an MNE might encounter private 
sector monopolies when executing some of its private sector transactions, a host market’s 
private sector tends to offer a broad range of counterparties with whom a firm may 
transact, including suppliers, customers, employees and other private sector stakeholders 
(Calhoun, 2002). Expanded bargaining alternatives provide the MNE with an important 
source of context-based bargaining power in host markets characterized by more 
pervasive private corruption. While we have proposed that partnering can enhance the 
MNE’s efforts to reduce information asymmetries under conditions of more pervasive 
public corruption, we theorize that the MNE will not be compelled to engage a partner 
when private corruption is more pervasive. This is because the MNE’s ability to 
negotiate with multiple private sector counterparts in the host market will provide the 
MNE with an opportunity to reduce information asymmetries on its own, without having 
to share ownership or profits. Seeking information and generating alternatives can 
improve a party’s bargaining position and the outcome of its transactions by reducing 
information asymmetries (Kim, Pinkley, & Fragale, 2005). When information 
asymmetries are lower, the MNE’s transactions will be more open and competitive such 
that special safeguards, including partnering, are less useful or necessary (Husted, 1994).  
Furthermore, since corruption fosters information asymmetries, it also positions 
local partners to take advantage of foreign partners (Doh et al., 2003). In fact, weak legal 
institutions in emerging markets have been found to stimulate partner opportunism (Luo, 
2007). Partners that are more embedded in local networks tend to be approached more 
frequently by corrupt agents and are more inclined to comply with their demands 
(Meschi, 2009) which would effectively undermine an MNE’s context-based bargaining 
power in its private sector transactions. As such, the MNE would have less control over 
corrupt negotiations and thus, the MNE may continue to be exposed to the risks and costs 
of information asymmetries as it is pressured by local partners to comply outright with 
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corrupt overtures in the private sector (Bray, 2005). As such, given that the MNE can 
expect that its context-based bargaining power in the private sector will provide it with an 
opportunity to attenuate more pronounced information asymmetries that exist under 
conditions of more pervasive private corruption, there may be fewer benefits for the 
MNE to gain in exposing itself to the potential risks and costs that may result from 
partnering. As such, we hypothesize that, 
 
Hypothesis 2: A foreign-investing MNE is more likely to invest through a 
WOS under conditions of heightened private corruption pervasiveness. 
  
 
The Interaction Between Public Corruption Pervasiveness and Private Corruption 
Pervasiveness  
 
Public and private corruption are not mutually exclusive in host country 
environments (Husted, 1994). In fact, Rodriguez et al. (2006: 739) maintain that “it is 
clear that government corruption and private corruption often go hand in hand.” Our 
conceptual disaggregation of the host market corruption construct into its public and 
private components, in addition to our theory regarding the distinct impact of each upon 
MNE entry strategy, implicitly suggests the possibility that an interaction effect between 
the two types of corruption may influence the entry decisions of MNEs that invest in 
more corrupt host emerging markets. 
Doh et al. (2003) has argued that heightened government corruption in emerging 
markets should motivate an MNE to engage a local JV partner rather than investing 
through a WOS because local partners can help MNEs to learn how to mitigate the risks 
of host market corruption. Subsequent conceptual work has proposed the opposite 
outcome, namely, that more pronounced government corruption would increase the 
likelihood that an MNE would enter into an emerging market via a WOS rather than with 
a local JV partner (Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). The authors 
suggested that, not only do partners not reduce the costs of confronting corruption but, 
local partners might take advantage of foreign firms by exploiting the local firm’s more 
extensive experience with weak institutions. Collectively, this research highlights a 
tension in the literature with respect to perceptions regarding the utility versus the 
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riskiness of local partners in emerging markets under conditions of heightened public 
sector corruption.  
We suggest that host market corruption is more nuanced than previously 
recognized. We have hypothesized that more pervasive public corruption in the host 
market will increase the likelihood that MNEs will invest via JVs with local partners, 
while more pervasive private corruption will prompt MNEs to invest through WOSs. 
Paradox theorists have noted that when a firm engages in decisions with respect to how to 
structure its operations, contradictory pressures on the firm become increasingly salient 
(Smith & Lewis, 2011). The conflicting demands of public corruption and private 
corruption in the host market complicate an MNE’s efforts to devise its foreign entry 
strategy and illuminate competing concerns with respect to the utility and the riskiness of 
local partners in more corrupt host markets.  
Ultimately, we believe that an MNE will resolve these opposing pressures 
associated with its foreign entry strategy by considering the implications for its 
bargaining power in the host market and its ability to reduce information asymmetries. 
While transaction cost theorists have traditionally assumed that firms are risk neutral 
(Williamson, 1985), scholars have subsequently proposed that a firm’s decisions with 
respect to its governance are based upon variable risk preferences and the firm’s 
perceptions pertaining to the trustworthiness of a prospective partner (Chiles & 
McMackin, 1996). While we have theorized that a local JV partner may improve the 
MNE’s noncapital resource-based bargaining power under conditions of heightened 
public corruption, we have not theorized that the decision to retain full ownership (WOS) 
under heighted public corruption would further undermine the MNE’s resource-based 
bargaining power in its public sector transactions. Conversely, under conditions of 
heightened private corruption, we have explicitly theorized that the decision to take on a 
local partner does risk undermining the MNE’s context-based bargaining power and, as 
such, the MNE will be more likely to retain full ownership (WOS) upon entering into the 
host emerging market. Our theory is consistent with both Rodriguez et al.’s (2005) and 
Uhlenbruck et al.’s (2006) base contention that local partners threaten to exploit the 
MNE’s foreignness in more corrupt host market environments. These concerns are well-
founded in light of recent findings that JV partners in emerging markets are more 
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opportunistic when legal institutions are weaker (Luo, 2007). As such, an increase in the 
pervasiveness of private corruption is expected to negatively moderate the likelihood that 
an MNE will engage in a JV with a local partner under conditions of more pervasive 
public corruption. Accordingly, we hypothesize that, 
 
Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between public corruption 
pervasiveness and the likelihood that a foreign-investing MNE will invest 
through a JV with a host country (local) partner is weakened as private 
corruption pervasiveness increases. 
 
 
Public Corruption, Private Corruption and Foreign Market Entry Strategy 
(Nonequity or Equity Entry) 
 
 While firms may consider deferring entry into foreign markets characterized by 
more pervasive corruption, an MNE is not always willing or able to defer investment in 
these countries, particularly when its competitors are not deferring entry (Bray, 2005; 
Doh et al., 2003). The unprecedented growth in the prominence of emerging markets as a 
global destination for FDI provides anecdotal evidence in support of this position 
(UNCTAD, 2013). Consequently, firms may choose to implement alternative measures to 
manage the risks and costs associated with investments in more corrupt foreign markets. 
Among the most prominent alternative measures, firms have been found to adjust their 
entry mode, implement anti-corruption corporate codes of conduct, provide anti-
corruption training to both expatriate employees and local market employees, as well as 
engaging in social contributions or public donations in the host country that are designed 
to forestall corrupt overtures from public officials (Doh et al., 2003).  
 Although our research focuses on the equity-based entry strategies of foreign-
investing MNEs, we recognize that some MNEs may choose to engage in nonequity 
modes of entry into more corrupt emerging market countries. Indeed, extant theory has 
proposed that under conditions of more pervasive host market corruption, foreign-
investing MNEs from a home country with anti-corruption laws will be more likely to 
engage in nonequity modes of entry which involve a local agent producing or distributing 
the MNE’s good or services in the host country (Rodriguez et al., 2005). Subsequent 
efforts to empirically validate this proposition found that an increase in the pervasiveness 
of government corruption in host emerging markets heightens the likelihood that MNEs 
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will choose nonequity modes (arm’s-length or contract-based modes of 
internationalization such as management contracts and turnkey projects) over equity 
modes of entry (JV and WOS) (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Further, when government 
corruption was disaggregated into grand corruption and petty corruption, although the 
main effects associated with each type of corruption did not exert a statistically 
significant impact on the choice between nonequity- and equity-based entry, the 
interaction between more pervasive grand and petty corruption did precipitate an 
increased likelihood that MNEs would choose nonequity- over equity-based (JV) entry 
(Sartor, 2014). By extension, although public and private corruption are distinct 
dimensions constituting the host market corruption phenomenon, the interaction between 
both types of corruption could also be expected to prompt MNEs to prefer nonequity 
entry over equity entry. Accordingly, we hypothesize that,  
 
Hypothesis 4: The interaction of public corruption pervasiveness and 
private corruption pervasiveness increases the likelihood that a foreign 
entrant will engage in nonequity entry. 
 
 
METHODS 
Data Sources and Key Variables 
Our work endeavors to explain how the structure of equity-based foreign 
subsidiary investments is impacted by the pervasiveness of public corruption and private 
corruption in host emerging markets. As such, our hypotheses were tested with a sample 
of 665 subsidiaries established in 16 emerging market countries.1 This sample of market 
entries was taken from the 1998-2005 editions of the Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran 
which reports on the worldwide investment activity of Japanese MNEs. To ensure that 
our observations with respect to the dependent variable were lagged by one year relative 
to the observations with respect to our measures of public and private corruption in the 
host markets, the starting date for our study period was 1998 because 1997 was the first 
                                                 
1
 The number of subsidiary investments in each host country is indicated in brackets: Argentina (2), Brazil 
(11), China (424), Czech Republic (12), Hungary (6), India (17), Indonesia (19), Korea (53), Malaysia (15), 
Mexico (8), Philippines (15), Poland (7), Russia (4), South Africa (5), Thailand (65), Turkey (2). Host 
countries were identified as “emerging markets” based upon the definition utilized by Michigan State 
University’s Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER) which has published an 
annual Market Potential Index for Emerging Markets covering the period 1996-2013.  
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year for which some of the indicators were available to measure the private corruption 
construct using the data sources that we describe below. The end date for our study 
period (2005) was determined by similar limitations on the availability of data. 
Motivated by Rodriguez et al.’s (2005) conceptualization of corruption in terms of 
its pervasiveness, our measures for the focal independent variables in our study (public 
corruption and private corruption pervasiveness) were derived from data which provide 
an indication of the degree to which public and private sector corruption are a “regular 
and meaningful part of commercial activity in a given country” (Rodriguez et al., 2005: 
385). Researchers have acknowledged that levels of corruption vary significantly among 
emerging market countries (Gray & Kaufmann, 1998; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). The 
development of our independent variables is informed, in part, by extant studies that have 
been conducted to test the foundational conceptual framework within the realm of 
corruption-oriented international business research (Rodriguez et al., 2005), 
notwithstanding the fact that these prior studies have yielded mixed results. More 
specifically, Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) did not find a statistically significant relationship 
between host market corruption and the equity-based entry strategies (JV versus WOS) of 
developed market MNEs that entered into emerging markets. However, disaggregating 
“government corruption” into grand corruption and petty corruption, Sartor (2014) 
hypothesized that MNEs would be more likely to engage in JVs under conditions of more 
pervasive grand corruption, and WOSs when petty corruption was more pervasive in 
both developed and emerging host markets. Subjecting these hypotheses to empirical 
scrutiny, they found that an increase in the pervasiveness of petty corruption attenuated 
the hypothesized increased likelihood that MNEs would invest in JVs under conditions of 
more pronounced grand corruption pervasiveness. The mixed results generated by these 
two studies are surprising in light of Spencer and Gomez’s (2011) recent emerging 
market-based findings which revealed the existence of a positive relationship between the 
level of host country corruption and the pressure that foreign subsidiaries face to engage 
in corruption in emerging markets.  
We speculate that there may be at least two possible reasons why Sartor (2014) 
finds that government corruption (or, the interaction between grand and petty corruption) 
exerts a statistically significant impact on an MNE’s choice between JV and WOS, while 
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Uhlenbruck et al.’s (2006) finds a non-significant relationship. First, consistent with the 
recommendation of Uhlenbruck et al. (2006: 411), Sartor (2014) theoretically 
decomposes government corruption (which has traditionally been conceptualized as a 
discrete institution) into two distinct dimensions (grand and petty corruption). Second, 
each study employs a different data source to measure government corruption. While 
Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) operationalize government corruption pervasiveness using data 
from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES), Sartor’s (2014) dual measures of 
pervasiveness employ data from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness 
Reports (GCR).  
Accordingly, consistent with the work of Spencer and Gomez (2011), we employ 
a broader-based measure of host market public corruption which is based upon multiple 
data sources (including the GCR) and has been found to be very highly correlated with 
the WBES (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). More precisely, we measured public corruption 
pervasiveness using Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). 
The CPI provides a comprehensive measure of the perceived level of public corruption in 
countries around the world. Collected since the mid-1990’s, the Index is arguably the 
most widely used indicator of host market public sector corruption by industry executives 
and government officials (Svensson, 2005), as well as by academics who have regularly 
employed the CPI to measure public corruption in international business and strategic 
management research (see, as examples, Brouthers, Gao, & McNicol, 2008; Chen, Ding, 
& Kim, 2010; Steensma, Tihanyi, Lyles, & Dhanaraj, 2005).   
Although aggregate data with respect to the perceived level of private corruption 
in host countries does not currently exist in the form of a comprehensive index similar to 
the CPI (Faria et al., 2012), Transparency International (2009b) has recommended that 
the measurement of private corruption should incorporate a consideration of activities 
such as insider trading, tax evasion, corporate embezzlement and commercial bribery 
(‘kickbacks’). Insider trading has been explicitly recognized as an act of private 
corruption in which corporate insiders with preferential access to corporate information 
through their position of authority act on this information to the detriment of other 
stakeholders (Aldrighi, 2009; Argandoña, 2003; Mills & Weisberg, 2007). Tax evasion 
generally involves the under-reporting of income, or the over-reporting of expenses, and 
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has been affiliated with other instances of private sector corruption such as corporate 
fraud and embezzlement (Argandona, 1999). This is because tax offences are 
“intrinsically linked with other (private sector) financial crimes…such as…investment 
fraud, extortion...(and) embezzlement” (OECD, 2013: 7). In fact, high levels of tax 
evasion have been associated with more pronounced levels of corruption (Uslaner, 2007). 
Racketeering is a legal term that subsumes a wide range of corrupt activities found to 
occur in the private sector, including the payment of bribes to the employees of potential 
customers to secure contracts (‘kickbacks’), extortion and the embezzlement of property 
in the private sector (Beare, 2007). These activities have been highlighted as some of the 
most prevalent forms of private sector corruption by the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption (2004). Historically, countries have enacted anti-racketeering laws to 
combat the existence of organized crime. However, beginning in the 1980s (Bratton & 
Levitin, 2012), the purview of anti-racketeering laws has been extended to encompass a 
wider range of corrupt activities occurring in the private sector, including the 
manipulation of interest rates (Scheiner & Broda, 2012) and misleading investors 
(Coppola & DeMarco, 2012), to name a few.  
Accordingly, in order to develop a measure of private sector corruption, our 
research leverages perceptual data pertaining to the prevalence of insider trading, 
racketeering and tax evasion in host markets. We operationalized private corruption 
utilizing data from IMD’s World Competitiveness Yearbooks (WCY) pertaining to insider 
trading and tax evasion, in addition to using data from the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Reports pertaining to racketeering / organized crime. A principal 
components analysis was conducted with an orthogonal (varimax) rotation and an 
eigenvalue cutoff equal to 1, using a holdout sample of subsidiaries that were established 
in the same emerging market countries during the period 1998-2005. This analysis 
suggested a one factor solution which was theoretically expected. Table 8 presents the 
factor loadings for each indicator on the private corruption pervasiveness construct. We 
also conducted a reliability analysis and concluded that the Cronbach’s alpha for these 
three indicators (0.71) was sufficient to establish internal consistency (Nunnally & 
Bernstein, 1994).  
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Given that both our public and private corruption constructs were based upon raw 
data in which high scores indicate lower levels of corruption, for ease of interpretation 
with respect to our results, we reverse-coded the raw data so that more pervasive public 
corruption and private corruption for the host emerging market countries in our study 
would be indicated by higher scores. Consistent with leading conceptual and empirical 
strategy research pertaining to corruption (Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck et al., 
2006), our measures of public corruption pervasiveness and private corruption 
pervasiveness provide an indication of the absolute level of each type of corruption in the 
host market. 
TABLE 8 
 
Factor Analysis Results 
 
Factor loading
Private corruption pervasiveness a: 
a
 Cronbach's alpha = 0.71 
Prevalence of racketeering & extortion
Tax evasion is (1 = a common practice, 
10 = not a common practice) in your 
country.
(Racketeering & extortion) in your 
country (1 = imposes significant costs on 
business, 7 = does not impose significant 
costs on business).
0.81
Latent construct and associated items
Insider trading is (1 = common in the 
stock market, 10 = not common in the 
stock market).
Insider trading 0.77
0.81Tax evasion
 
 
Dependent Variables, Control Variables and Estimation Methods 
We investigate the impact of heightened host market corruption upon three 
strategic foreign entry decisions that MNEs consider – foreign entry strategy (nonequity 
entry versus equity entry), equity entry strategy (JV versus WOS) and partnering strategy 
(host country partner versus home country partner). Foreign entry strategy captures the 
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MNE’s choice between nonequity-based foreign market entry and equity-based foreign 
market entry (JV or WOS). Notably, the measurement of nonequity entry has traditionally 
been complicated by the fact that “…the web of directly-owned, partially-owned, 
contract-based and arm’s-length forms of international operation…is tangled and some of 
the distinctions between the different modes are blurred” (UNCTAD, 2011: 130). 
Therefore, consistent with  both  Uhlenbruck et al.’s (2006) and Pan and Tse’s (2000) 
conceptualization of equity entry as including foreign investments characterized by a 
degree of ownership, control and resource deployment that indicates a long-term 
commitment to the host country, we utilize the measure of nonequity entry employed by 
Sartor (2014) who operationalized nonequity entry as including those foreign entries in 
which the focal MNE owned less than 5% of the equity and fewer than twenty employees 
were enlisted to staff the office associated with the investment. Based on this 
operationalization, 65 (10%) of the 665 entry events in our sample were categorized as 
nonequity entries, while 600 (90%) were equity entries.  
Equity entry strategy captures the MNE’s choice between JV and WOS modes of 
entry. Models were estimated using both the 80 percent equity ownership cutoff 
convention and the 95 percent cutoff to distinguish between JVs and WOSs (Yiu & 
Makino, 2002). While 373 (62%) of the 600 subsidiary investments were categorized as 
WOSs and 227 (38%) as JVs using the 80 percent cutoff, pursuant to the 95 percent 
cutoff, 335 (56%) and 265 (44%) were categorized as WOSs and JVs respectively. 
Partnering strategy is based on the taxonomy of JV partnerships developed by Makino 
and Beamish (1998). Each JV arrangement was categorized as either a traditional JV (a 
JV in which the MNE engages a host country (local) equity partner in the subsidiary 
investment) or a cross-national JV (in which the MNE engages a home country partner). 
While Makino and Beamish’s taxonomy also includes tri-national JVs (in which the 
MNE engages a third country partner), these JVs constituted only 2% (14 investments) of 
the subsidiaries in our study and were not included in our empirical analyses. 
Accordingly, using the 80 percent cutoff, 187 (88%) of the remaining 213 JVs were 
categorized as traditional JVs and 26 (12%) were categorized as cross-national JVs. 
Using the 95 percent cutoff, 206 (82%) and 45 (18%) were categorized as traditional JVs 
and cross-national JVs respectively.  
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To investigate the effects of public corruption pervasiveness and private 
corruption pervasiveness on the three strategic foreign entry decisions in our study, two 
estimation techniques were utilized. Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 pertaining to an MNE’s equity 
entry strategy and partnering strategy were tested in Models 1A-1F. We integrated the 
measurement of both the equity entry and partnering strategic decisions by employing a 
trichotomous dependent variable that included WOS, traditional JV and cross-national JV 
as the possible outcomes. As such, these models were estimated using multinomial 
logistic regression in which WOS was designated as the comparison group. Hypothesis 4 
pertaining to an MNE’s foreign entry strategy (nonequity entry versus equity entry) was 
tested in Models 2A-2C using binary logistic regression. 
Variables were included to control for country, regional, temporal, industry, 
parent MNE and subsidiary effects, all which have been found to influence a firm’s 
decisions with respect to its foreign market entry strategies. These control variables are 
summarized in Appendix B.  
 
 
RESULTS 
Table 9 provides descriptive statistics for the sample. Table 10 presents the results 
of the multinomial logistic regression estimations conducted in order to test Hypotheses 
1, 2 and 3, while Table 11 presents the results of our test of Hypothesis 4. We concluded 
that multicollinearity was not a concern in our models for two reasons. First, the highest 
variance inflation factor (VIF) score reported for our models (3.27) in Tables 10 and 11 is 
substantially less than the maximum VIF (10) that is routinely prescribed for multivariate 
regression analyses in strategy research (Reuer & Leiblein, 2000). Second, none of the 
correlations presented in Table 9 between variables that are included in the same 
regression models exceed the recommended 0.70 cutoff (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
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TABLE 9 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Foreign entry strategy a - -
2 Equity entry strategy b - - 0.55
3 Subsidiary size (log) 1.30 0.68 0.25 0.34
4 Subsidiary capitalization (log) 2.17 1.06 0.03 0.08 0.04
5 Parent size (log) 5.40 0.83 -0.02 0.12 0.20 0.10
6 Parent profitability (ROA) 0.04 0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04
7 Parent leverage 0.80 0.12 -0.01 -0.10 -0.06 -0.11 -0.46 0.32
8 Parent experience 11.18 23.70 -0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.55 -0.13 -0.37
9 Industry dummy - - -0.06 -0.01 -0.17 -0.02 0.09 -0.05 -0.21 0.09
10 Exchange rate 0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.01
11 Region dummy - - 0.10 0.09 0.09 -0.07 -0.14 -0.04 0.04 -0.17
12 Host market size (log) 2.85 0.46 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.08 -0.10 0.02 -0.01 -0.10
13 Infrastructure development 4.70 0.86 0.04 0.00 -0.07 -0.10 -0.10 -0.06 0.07 -0.09
14 FDI restrictions 4.95 1.25 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.09 0.14 0.00 -0.03 0.11
15 Cultural distance 2.63 0.55 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.09 -0.07 -0.03 0.01 -0.12
16 Public corruption 6.53 0.54 0.02 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.06
17 Private corruption 5.03 0.50 -0.05 -0.03 0.03 0.08 -0.01 0.09 -0.04 0.03
18 Public corruption x private corruption 0.13 0.38 0.03 0.01 -0.09 -0.06 0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.03
Variable 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
10 Exchange rate 0.05
11 Region dummy 0.04 0.01
12 Host market size (log) 0.03 0.08 0.38
13 Infrastructure development -0.05 0.04 0.35 0.00
14 FDI restrictions -0.06 -0.15 -0.59 -0.67 -0.09
15 Cultural distance 0.04 0.03 0.43 -0.01 0.18 -0.34
16 Public corruption 0.05 0.03 0.25 0.14 -0.48 -0.29 0.28
17 Private corruption 0.01 -0.11 -0.12 0.29 -0.62 -0.19 -0.04 0.48
18 Public corruption x private corruption 0.02 0.09 0.04 -0.32 0.22 0.15 0.34 -0.43 -0.39
a Dichotomous dependent variable: Nonequity entry  or equity entry .
b Trichotomous dependent variable: Wholly-owned subsidiary , traditional JV  or cross-national JV .
N = 665.
Correlations with an absolute value equal to or greater than 0.08 are statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level. All are two-tailed tests.
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TABLE 10 
 
Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of 
Public Corruption and Private Corruption on Equity Entry Strategy a 
Variables
Intercept
-2.83 (2.84) -8.85 (5.67) -2.91 (4.04) -11.98 (7.91) -1.37 (2.99) -9.05 (6.03)
Subsidiary effects
Subsidiary size (log) 1.03 (0.17) *** 0.45 (0.33) 1.01 (0.17) *** 0.44 (0.33) 1.06 (0.17) *** 0.42 (0.33)
Subsidiary capitalization (log) 0.27 (0.09) ** 0.20 (0.21) 0.27 (0.09) ** 0.21 (0.21) 0.28 (0.09) ** 0.19 (0.21)
Parent effects
Parent size (log) 0.30 (0.16) t 0.27 (0.35) 0.27 (0.16) t 0.24 (0.35) 0.25 (0.17) 0.26 (0.36)
Parent profitability (ROA)
-1.79 (1.74) 2.67 (4.75) -1.44 (1.77) 2.57 (4.72) -1.71 (1.77) 2.66 (4.78)
Parent leverage
-1.50 (1.07) -0.18 (2.45) -1.61 (1.08) -0.25 (2.45) -1.74 (1.09) -0.09 (2.47)
Parent experience 0.00 (0.01) -0.02 (0.03) 0.00 (0.01) -0.02 (0.03) 0.00 (0.01) -0.02 (0.03)
Industry effects
Industry dummy -0.61 (0.26) * 1.44 (1.05) -0.57 (0.27) * 1.47 (1.05) -0.56 (0.27) * 1.47 (1.05)
Temporal effects
Exchange rate -366.99 (197.82) t 366.14 (417.96) -474.41 (203.53) * 320.86 (424.82) -589.75 (210.42) ** 353.48 (429.85)
Region effects
Region dummy -1.87 (0.64) ** 0.91 (0.88) -1.27 (0.68) t 1.20 (0.94) -0.96 (0.68) 1.04 (0.99)
Country effects
Host market size (log) 0.14 (0.34) -0.24 (0.61) 0.33 (0.35) -0.20 (0.62) 0.55 (0.36) -0.35 (0.64)
Infrastructure development 0.14 (0.13) -0.03 (0.27) 0.17 (0.19) 0.15 (0.39) 0.37 (0.21) t 0.04 (0.42)
FDI restrictions 0.31 (0.15) * -0.14 (0.26) 0.29 (0.15) * -0.11 (0.27) 0.26 (0.15) t -0.14 (0.27)
Cultural distance 0.31 (0.23) 0.32 (0.39) 0.24 (0.23) 0.23 (0.44) -0.22 (0.31) 0.46 (0.52)
Main effects
Public corruption 0.57 (0.27) * 0.49 (0.56) 1.20 (0.39) ** 0.28 (0.59)
Private corruption
-0.58 (0.31) t -0.09 (0.59) -0.53 (0.31) t -0.14 (0.63)
Interaction effect
Public corruption x private corruption 1.06 (0.46) * -0.78 (0.83)
Variance inflation factor range
χ2
R2 (∆R2)
a
 The reference group in the multinomial logistic regression models is wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) which is compared to two other possible outcomes in the equity entry strategy
dependent variable: traditional joint venture (with a host country / local partner) and crossnational joint venture (with a home country partner).
n  = 586.
t
 p  < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
All are two-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses.
0.23 0.25 (0.02) 0.26 (0.03)
1.07 - 2.79 1.08 - 2.85 1.08 - 3.27
120.07 *** 127.42 *** 134.68 ***
Crossnational JV
Equity Entry Strategy and Partnering Strategy a
Base Model Main Effects Interaction Effect
Model 1A Model 1B Model 1C Model 1D Model 1E Model 1F
Traditional JV Crossnational JV Traditional JV Crossnational JV Traditional JV
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TABLE 11 
 
Results of Binary Logistic Regression Analyses of 
Public Corruption and Private Corruption on Foreign Entry Strategy a  
 
 
Variables
Intercept
-6.59 (3.92) t -1.25 (5.41) -5.38 (4.02)
Subsidiary effects
Subsidiary size (log) 1.82 (0.29) *** 1.85 (0.29) *** 1.85 (0.29) ***
Subsidiary capitalization (log) 0.11 (0.14) 0.11 (0.14) 0.12 (0.14)
Parent effects
Parent size (log)
-0.41 (0.25) t -0.43 (0.25) t -0.44 (0.25) t
Parent profitability (ROA)
-8.82 (3.28) ** -8.55 (3.27) ** -8.72 (3.29) **
Parent leverage 0.77 (1.44) 0.75 (1.44) 0.75 (1.44)
Parent experience 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Industry effects
Industry dummy -0.17 (0.35) -0.18 (0.35) -0.19 (0.35)
Temporal effects
Exchange rate 328.28 (268.78) 275.34 (272.61) 254.46 (276.58)
Region effects
Region dummy 0.59 (0.64) 0.59 (0.68) 0.50 (0.69)
Country effects
Host market size (log) 0.72 (0.41) t 0.84 (0.43) * 0.88 (0.44) *
Infrastructure development 0.05 (0.19) -0.20 (0.26) -0.15 (0.28)
FDI restrictions 0.39 (0.19) * 0.36 (0.19) t 0.34 (0.19) t
Cultural distance 0.45 (0.32) 0.66 (0.39) t 0.57 (0.44)
Main effects
Public corruption
-0.29 (0.45) -0.16 (0.52)
Private corruption
-0.48 (0.41) -0.45 (0.42)
Interaction effect
Public corruption x private corruption 0.29 (0.64)
Variance inflation factor range
χ2
R2 (∆R2)
a
 The dependent variable foreign entry strategy is coded as follows:  0: nonequity-based entry , 1: equity-based entry .
n  = 665.
t
 p  < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
All are two-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses.
0.22 0.23 (0.01) 0.23 (0.01)
Model 2CModel 2BModel 2A
1.06 - 2.76 1.07 - 2.81 1.08 - 3.18
Foreign Entry Strategy a
72.19 *** 74.62 *** 74.84 ***
Interaction EffectMain EffectsBase Model
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In both Tables 10 and 11, we present a base model which excludes the effects of 
the two focal corruption variables, along with models that include the main effects and 
interaction effect associated with the two dimensions of corruption that we studied. The 
estimates reported in Table 10 are based upon the 80 percent equity ownership 
convention used to distinguish between a JV and a WOS.2 Consistent with our theory, the 
results with respect to Models 1C and 1D (which tests Hypothesis 1) reveal that the 
public corruption pervasiveness construct was a significant predictor of an MNE’s 
equity-based entry strategy and partner choice (2 = 127.42, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.25). The 
results suggest that firms are more likely to invest in a JV with a local partner than they 
are to invest through a WOS (Model 1C:  = 0.57, p < 0.05) when entering into host 
emerging markets under conditions of heightened public corruption pervasiveness. The 
results for Hypothesis 2, which was also tested in Models 1C and 1D, were also 
consistent with our theory. More specifically, heightened private corruption 
pervasiveness was found to predict an increased likelihood that an MNE would invest 
through a WOS (Model 1C:  = -0.58, p < 0.10) rather than through a traditional JV 
partnership. Notably, the analyses presented in Model 1D which tested the likelihood of 
an MNE choosing to invest through a crossnational JV rather than a WOS under 
conditions of more pervasive public corruption and more pervasive private corruption 
did not yield statistically significant results. This result is consistent with Roy & Oliver 
(2009) who found that host country corruption does not influence partnering. 
Before investigating the effect of the interaction term, the focal independent 
variables (public corruption pervasiveness and private corruption pervasiveness) were 
centered about the mean (Aiken & West, 1991). The results associated with Models 1E 
and 1F (2 = 134.68, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.26) which tests Hypothesis 3 reveal that the 
interaction effect between public corruption pervasiveness and private corruption 
pervasiveness does have a significant impact upon the equity-based foreign strategies of 
MNEs (Model 1E:  = 1.06, p < 0.05). The coefficients reported for the main effects in 
Model 1E continue to indicate that more pervasive public corruption (Model 1E:  = 
1.20, p < 0.01) and private corruption (Model 1E:  = -0.53, p < 0.10) will increase the  
                                                 
2
 The results using the 95 percent equity ownership cutoff (Yiu & Makino, 2002) were substantially 
similar. 
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likelihood that an MNE will invest through a JV with local partners and through a WOS, 
respectively. In order to explore the nature of the moderation effect more fully, Figure 5 
plots the interaction estimated in Model 1E. The Figure indicates that although MNEs are 
more likely to invest via a JV with a local partner under conditions of more pronounced 
public corruption pervasiveness in the host market, an increase in the pervasiveness of 
private corruption negatively moderates this relationship. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is 
supported. As such, for any given level of public corruption pervasiveness, an increase in 
the pervasiveness of private corruption reduces the likelihood that the MNE will enter 
via a JV with a local partner.  
 FIGURE 5  
 
Interaction Effect of Public Corruption Pervasiveness and  
Private Corruption Pervasiveness on Equity Entry Strategy  
(the Choice Between Wholly-Owned Subsidiary and Traditional Joint Venture) a b 
 
 
 
a
 High Private and Low Private refer to private corruption pervasiveness one standard 
deviation above and below the mean for private corruption pervasiveness. Likewise, High 
Public and Low Public refer to public corruption pervasiveness one standard deviation 
above and below the mean for public corruption pervasiveness. 
 
b The dependent variable is the probability of a traditional joint venture (with a host 
country / local partner) when the reference group is WOS. 
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Finally, the results associated with Model 2C in Table 11 reveal that Hypothesis 4 
was not supported. The interaction between more pervasive public corruption and private 
corruption did not exert a statistically significant impact upon an MNE’s choice between 
nonequity-based entry and equity-based entry. While the interaction coefficient was not 
statistically significant, the results are insightful nonetheless because they introduce an  
important boundary condition with respect to the relationship between the pervasiveness 
of corruption in the host market and the foreign entry strategy (nonequity versus equity 
entry) of MNEs. Extant research has found that “government corruption” increases the 
likelihood that an MNE will engaged in nonequity entry (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). 
Further, the interaction between grand and petty corruption has been found to have the 
same effect (Sartor, 2014). However, the results presented in Table 11 suggest that the 
main effects of more pervasive public corruption and private corruption, as well as the 
interaction effect between the two dimensions of corruption, do not impact upon a 
MNE’s foreign entry strategy when entering into emerging markets. 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
While emerging markets have grown dramatically in prominence as a global 
destination for FDI (UNCTAD, 2013), our limited understanding of the strategic impact 
of corruption in these host markets has precipitated the need for more extensive academic 
scrutiny (Rodriguez et al., 2006). When an MNE enters into a foreign market, it can be 
expected to structure its investment in a manner that is designed to minimize the costs of 
its ongoing operations (Brouthers, 2002) which will be constituted by a combination of 
public sector transactions and private sector transactions (Teegen et al., 2004). Our 
research has been designed to investigate how the structure of equity-based foreign 
subsidiary investments is impacted by the pervasiveness of public corruption and private 
corruption in host emerging markets. In doing so, our work makes several contributions. 
First, our theory and findings broaden the corruption-oriented international business 
strategy literature by bridging the work of strategy scholars and business ethicists whose 
work has increasingly emphasized two distinct corruption domains – public sector 
corruption and private sector corruption (Argandoña, 2003; Montiel, Husted, & 
Christmann, 2012; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). A number of studies support our contention 
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that expanding the scope of corruption-based strategy research to incorporate private 
sector corruption bears merit. Private corruption has been argued to engender a wide 
range of organizational consequences including, among others, inefficient resource 
allocation (Gopinath, 2008) and the deterrence of capability-building (Luo, 2005). In 
addition to amplifying the negative social, political and distributional effects of public 
corruption (Gopinath, 2008), private corruption has also been implicated for undermining 
shareholder value both indirectly, as a consequence of fines and penalties (Bishara & 
Schipani, 2009) and, directly through a depreciation in the market capitalization of firms 
(Narayanan, Schipani, & Seyhun, 2007). 
Second, this study both supports and extends Rodriguez et al.’s (2005) 
foundational theory on the relationship between corruption and firm strategy. With 
respect to the issue of entry mode strategy, they proposed that an increase in the 
pervasiveness of government corruption would motivate MNEs to choose WOS over JV 
entry. Subsequent efforts to test this theory did not find a significant relationship between 
the pervasiveness of host market corruption and an MNE’s choice between JV and WOS 
entry (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). However, motivated by the notion of institutional 
pluralism, Sartor (2014), determined that each of the distinct dimensions (grand 
corruption and petty corruption) constituting the government corruption construct 
exerted a differential impact on an MNE’s market entry strategy. We apply Sartor’s 
(2014) theory to support not only our conceptual disaggregation of the host market 
corruption phenomenon (public versus private), but also our propositions with respect to 
the distinct mechanisms that undergird the relationship between each dimension of 
corruption and the equity-based entry strategies of foreign-investing MNEs. Our efforts 
to parse the corruption construct into its public and private components have generated 
more nuanced and unequivocal results pertaining to equity entry strategy, while also 
extending insights into the realm of partner choice when MNEs enter into more corrupt 
host market environments. An increase in public corruption pervasiveness was found to 
increase the likelihood that MNEs will invest through JV ownership with a host country 
(local) partner, while an increase in private corruption pervasiveness was found to 
increase the likelihood that MNEs will invest via WOS ownership when entering foreign 
emerging markets. Further, an increase in the pervasiveness of private corruption was 
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found to negatively moderate the likelihood that MNEs would invest in a JV with a local 
partner under conditions of more pervasive public corruption. 
Third, we leveraged theoretical insights from the JV and alliance literature 
pertaining to the multifaceted nature of an MNE’s bargaining power (Ren et al., 2009; 
Yan & Gray, 2001). Juxtaposing this theoretical lens against Rodriguez et al.’s (2005) 
general proposition that a relationship exists between the pervasiveness of host market 
corruption and an MNE’s equity-based entry strategy, we have introduced a finer-grained 
perspective which contends that an MNE’s reliance on different sources of bargaining 
power (context-based versus resource-based) in its public and private transactions 
functions as the mechanism through which public corruption and private corruption 
impact upon the foreign entry strategy of the MNE. In doing so, we have built on the 
work of strategy scholars who have advocated the integration of institutionally-oriented 
and resource-oriented perspectives in order to advance both the nonmarket strategy 
research agenda, and our understanding of contemporary nonmarket phenomena such as 
corruption (Doh et al., 2012). Our work contributes to these objectives by elaborating 
how bargaining power could be employed as a theoretical mechanism to link the 
institutional and resource perspectives. As we hypothesized, the two dimensions of the 
informal institution that we studied exerted a disparate impact upon the resource-oriented 
foreign market entry strategy of the firms in our study.   
Fourth, our research also offers important insights for policy makers. Two key 
assumptions have traditionally underpinned the policy recommendations of anti-
corruption scholars. First, corruption is primarily conceptualized as occurring within 
firm-government transactions. Second, engaging a partner is assumed to be a key strategy 
employed by firms to manage the increased uncertainty, information asymmetries and 
transaction costs precipitated by heightened government corruption. Building on these 
assumptions, scholars have formulated policy recommendations that are designed to 
reduce the efficacy of the transaction cost-reducing strategies employed by firms to 
facilitate corrupt transactions (Lambsdorff, 2002b; Svensson, 2003). However, our 
research suggests that policy prescriptions designed to curb MNE engagement in foreign 
market corruption must consider the multidimensional nature of the construct in order to 
ensure that policy efforts are not misguided. Our findings that public corruption and 
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private corruption each exert a distinct impact upon the foreign-investment decisions of 
MNEs, coupled with our findings pertaining to the interaction effect between both types 
of corruption upon these foreign entry strategies, suggests the need for more nuanced 
anti-corruption initiatives. 
Despite the increasing recognition that public sector and private sector 
manifestations of corruption are distinct (Transparency International, 2011), an important 
limitation in our study has been the absence of a comprehensive index to operationalize 
the private corruption pervasiveness construct, akin to the Corruption Perceptions Index 
that is available to measure public corruption. We hope that our work will stimulate 
efforts to collect the data needed to develop and maintain such an index in the longer run. 
A second limitation in our study is the use of a sample of firms from a single home 
country. While scholars have argued that this approach can be beneficial because it 
minimizes the impact of differences between multiple home countries upon the 
dependent variables (Coeurderoy & Murray, 2008), future research should consider 
opportunities to verify our results with a sample of non-Japanese MNEs. Notwithstanding 
these limitations, the patterns that emerge from our work provide additional opportunities 
for future research. Corruption clearly exerts a nuanced impact on the structure and 
strategic entry decisions of foreign-investing MNEs. Researchers should explore the 
subsidiary survival implications associated with adopting different strategic 
configurations in more corrupt host market environments, with particular attention being 
given to the multiple dimensions of corruption which have been explicated to date 
(public, private, grand and petty). In addition to equity entry strategy and partnering 
strategy, future work should also consider the implications associated with expatriate 
deployment strategies that are formulated to facilitate entry into and ongoing operations 
within more corrupt host market environments. Finally, our theory-building efforts have 
focused upon prior scholarship related to the pervasiveness of host market corruption 
(Rodriguez et al., 2005). While a consideration of the arbitrariness of corruption 
(Rodriguez et al., 2005) was beyond the limits of available data and the theoretical scope 
of our work, future research should examine the arbitrariness of both public sector and 
private sector corruption, particularly in relation to the three elements of foreign market 
entry strategy that we have studied. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Description of Measures for Control Variables  
 
 
Variable Description of measure Rationale for inclusion Data source 
 
Subsidiary size 
Subsidiary capital 
 
Total subsidiary employees (log) 
Subsidiary capitalization (log) 
 
Parent and subsidiary 
characteristics that have been 
found to predict foreign entry 
strategies (Delios & Beamish, 
1999) 
 
 
Company data 
Company data 
Company data 
Company data 
 
Parent size Total sales (log) 
Parent profitability Return on assets 
Parent experience Prior number of entries by parent 
MNE into host market 
 
Parent leverage (Total assets-total debt) / total 
assets 
Parent’s slack financial resources 
(Reuer & Ragozzino, 2006) 
 
Company data 
 
Service industry Dummy variable (1: service 
industry constituent; 0: not) 
Industry effects (Brouthers & 
Brouthers, 2003)  
 
Company data 
 
Exchange rate Annual exchange rates for 
Japanese currency  (JPY/USD) 
Temporal effects (Klein & 
Rosengren, 1994) 
 
Bank of Japan 
Region  Dummy variable (1: subsidiary 
established in Asia; 0: not) 
Regional effects (Arregle et al., 
2013) 
 
United Nations 
Statistics Division 
Host market size Total gross domestic product (log) Country effects: Host market’s 
economic, institutional and 
cultural environment (Henisz & 
Delios, 2001; Kogut & Singh, 
1988; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006) 
 
World 
Competitiveness 
Yearbooks and 
Hofstede, 2001 
data 
FDI restrictions 
 
 
Infrastructure 
development 
 
Cultural distance 
Managerial perceptions with 
respect to restrictiveness of 
foreign ownership laws 
Managerial perceptions with 
respect to the degree of 
infrastructure development 
Cultural distance values between 
the home and host markets 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Corruption Pervasiveness, Subsidiary Localization Strategy and Host Market Exit 
  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A foreign subsidiary’s ability to secure legitimacy in host markets that are 
characterized by more pronounced levels of corruption is assumed to be vital to the 
subsidiary’s continued existence in these environments (Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 
2005). A growing body of theoretical and empirical work has examined the relationship 
between host market corruption and multinational enterprise (MNE) strategy (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2008a; Doh, Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, Collins, & Eden, 2003; Sartor, 2014a, 
2014b; Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh, & Eden, 2006). However, this research has 
provided MNEs with limited insights into the relative efficacy of various strategies 
(Mezias & Mezias, 2010) that have been implemented to bolster the continued existence 
of subsidiary investments in foreign markets plagued by heightened corruption. 
Institutional theorists maintain that weak formal institutions in the form of written 
rules, laws and regulations in a host market (North, 1990) precipitate institutional voids 
which may be filled by informal institutions (or, norms of behavior, values, practices and 
standards of conduct) such as corruption (Puffer, McCarthy, & Boisot, 2010). Goodrick 
and Salancik (1996: 4) suggest that informal institutions generate uncertainty when these 
norms of behavior or standards of practice are “ambiguous, unknown or inconsistent.” 
Given that corrupt transactions are most frequently “sealed in secrecy” and unenforceable 
in courts of law (Lambsdorff, 2005: 142), the norms and standards of conduct 
surrounding these extralegal transactions in foreign markets can be highly indeterminate 
and opaque from the foreign-investing MNE’s perspective. Consistent with this, Fisman 
and Gatti (2006: 137) found “that there is substantial variation across countries in the 
extent to which firms know the amount of illicit payments necessary to do business.” In 
part, this uncertainty can be traced to the wide-ranging variability in attitudes and values 
towards corruption both within countries and between countries (Bailey & Spicer, 2007; 
Sartor, 2014a; Spicer, 2009). Since organizations may seek legitimacy by conforming to 
institutional norms in foreign markets (Eden & Miller, 2004; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), 
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any uncertainty surrounding informal institutions such as corruption threatens to 
undermine the firm’s ability to navigate the standards of practice or conduct that are 
required to secure legitimacy in the host market. Consequently, a central premise of our 
work is that regardless of the MNE’s willingness or reluctance to engage in corrupt 
transactions in the host market, and regardless of whether corrupt transactions are 
sanctioned or prohibited in the MNE’s home market, corruption encountered in foreign 
markets functions as a source of considerable uncertainty for internationalizing MNEs, 
particularly in markets characterized by more pervasive corruption. In turn, this poses a 
threat to the firm’s legitimacy in these host markets and heightens the likelihood of 
market exit.  
 We investigate the relationship between host market corruption pervasiveness, 
MNE strategy and host market exit. Given that foreign expansion offers the MNE a wide 
range of benefits including, among others, experience, risk reduction through geographic 
diversification, foreign knowledge acquisition, augmented market power and 
international scale (Contractor, 2007), our theory conceptualizes market exit as a negative 
outcome. This assumption is thematically-consistent with the large body of literature that 
has explored the adverse effects of host market corruption on foreign direct investment 
flows (Brouthers, Gao, & McNicol, 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008b; Habib & Zurawicki, 
2002).  
As such, our research is motivated by two closely-related research questions. 
First, does the pervasiveness of host market corruption impact the likelihood of market 
exit? Second, do strategies implemented by the MNE moderate the impact of host market 
corruption on the likelihood of market exit? We anticipate that the answers to these 
questions will be made more complex by recent research that suggests that host market 
corruption is not a one-dimensional phenomenon. Instead, informal institutions that have 
been traditionally recognized as discrete institutions within a host market (such as 
“corruption”) have been found to be constituted by distinct dimensions (Sartor, 2014a). 
We leverage Sartor’s (2014a) notion of informal institutional pluralism and adopt the 
conceptualization of host market corruption which distinguishes between public 
corruption pervasiveness and private corruption pervasiveness. In doing so, our work 
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endeavors to facilitate a more nuanced understanding of the role of MNE strategy in 
moderating the impact of host market corruption pervasiveness on host market exit.  
Just as the focal phenomenon in our study has been characterized as pluralistic, 
the theoretical foundation that informs our conceptual work can also be regarded as 
pluralistic. More specifically, as Hillman, Shropshire and Cannella (2007: 943) have 
noted, “resource dependence theory mirrors institutional theory in that legitimacy and 
conformity to societal expectations are considered key components to organizational 
survival in both theories.” However, the core precepts of resource dependence theory 
(RDT) and institutional theory (IT) cast divergent predictions with respect to the strategic 
responses that can be expected from an MNE that is endeavoring to secure legitimacy in 
more corrupt host markets. While RDT would suggest that an MNE will pursue 
legitimacy by undertaking strategic actions to control the subsidiary’s dependence upon 
other firms for legitimacy (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), IT 
proposes that an MNE can secure legitimacy through strategic efforts to conform to the 
institutional environment (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Juxtaposing these two theoretical 
prisms against one another to study the relationship between corruption pervasiveness, 
MNE strategy and host market exit reveals that the two perspectives are characterized by 
distinct spatial orientations. More specifically, RDT suggests that subsidiaries will 
implement proximal localization strategies (or, host market-oriented localization 
strategies) in which host country employees and equity partners (Belderbos & Heijltjes, 
2005; Hannon, Huang, & Jaw, 1995; Shan, 1991) are regarded as best-suited to efforts to 
enhance the subsidiary’s legitimacy, thereby reducing the likelihood of exit from the host 
country market. Conversely, IT predicts that distal localization strategies (or, home 
market-oriented localization strategies) in which the MNE engages home country 
employees and equity partners (Doh et al., 2003; Mezias & Mezias, 2010) in the 
subsidiary investment are better-suited to reducing the likelihood of market exit from 
increasingly corrupt host countries.  Leveraging this theoretical tension, we develop a set 
of competing hypotheses in order to investigate the comparative impact upon market exit 
that results from the implementation of proximal versus distal localization strategies in 
increasingly corrupt host market environments. Our efforts are consistent with the work 
of Van de Ven & Johnson (2006: 816) who remind scholars that “important knowledge 
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advances to theory and practice” are more likely to occur “if the study is designed so that 
it juxtaposes and compares competing plausible explanations of the phenomenon being 
investigated.” 
While the MNE’s pursuit of legitimacy in the host market underpins the 
mechanisms that we describe, our empirical work does not focus on measuring 
legitimacy, nor does it focus on ascertaining whether or not the MNEs in our study 
actually secure legitimacy. Instead, we assume that the pervasiveness of corruption in the 
host market threatens to undermine the legitimacy of foreign-investing firms in the host 
market environment. Consequently, we investigate the efficacy of strategies implemented 
by the MNE to attenuate this assumed legitimacy deficiency by investigating how MNE 
strategies moderate the relationship between corruption pervasiveness in the host market 
and the MNE’s likelihood of host market exit. 
We test our hypotheses using a sample of subsidiary investments in 31 countries 
during the period between 1998 and 2005 using event history analysis. More specifically, 
we test the moderating effect of an MNE’s partnering strategy and expatriate staffing 
strategy upon the relationship between host market corruption and host market exit. Our 
results reveal an interesting dichotomy. Whereas a proximally-oriented partnering 
strategy (i.e., engaging a host country partner rather than a home country partner in the 
subsidiary investment) was found to heighten the likelihood of market exit under 
conditions of more pervasive host market public corruption, the opposite outcome was 
observed in the case of expatriate strategy. More specifically, a distally-oriented 
expatriate strategy (i.e., employing a greater proportion of home country nationals in the 
subsidiary investment) was found to increase the likelihood of market exit under 
conditions of more pervasive public corruption and private corruption. Our research 
advances theory by making two principal contributions. First, we explicate two distinct 
approaches towards facilitating a subsidiary’s localization into the host country market 
(proximal versus distal). Second, we enhance understanding of the veiled relationship 
between corruption pervasiveness, MNE strategy and host market exit. In doing so, our 
work provides theoretically-grounded and empirically-supported guidance to MNEs that 
seek insights with respect to the relative efficacy of various localization strategies that 
can be implemented in host markets characterized by heightened corruption. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Subsidiary Localization Strategies: Proximal Versus Distal Orientation 
The concept of localization has been researched extensively in the human 
resource management realm of the international business strategy field in an effort to 
describe the extent to which expatriate managers are replaced by competent host country 
employees (Law, Song, Wong, & Chen, 2009). Prior work in this area has focused on the 
identification of conditions under which localization efforts can be predicted to succeed 
(Fryxell, Butler, & Choi, 2004). More recently, scholars have endeavored to link 
successful localization initiatives to enhanced financial performance. In addition to 
proposing that localization facilitates reductions in operating costs, it also augments the 
transfer of expertise between expatriates and local employees. Moreover, scholars have 
maintained that the social ties and networks of local managers foster better 
communication with employees, customers and government officials, all of which 
contribute to improved financial performance (Law et al., 2009).      
We build on this work and extend the notion of localization to conceptualize 
subsidiary localization strategies as the portfolio of strategic decisions implemented by 
an MNE in order to facilitate its efforts to integrate a subsidiary within the host country 
market environment. Our theory with respect to subsidiary localization builds upon extant 
scholarship pertaining to an MNE’s embeddedness (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2002) 
which has been identified as an important antecedent of firm survival (Uzzi, 1996). 
However, whereas human resource scholars have assumed that successful localization is 
contingent upon sourcing human capital from within the host country market, we contend 
that a MNE’s portfolio of localization strategies should be evaluated from a broader 
spatial orientation. Foreign-investing MNEs make innumerable decisions with respect to 
the geographic origin of the equity capital and human capital that they need to establish 
and sustain foreign subsidiary operations. As such, scholars have advocated giving more 
attention to the spatial orientation of a subsidiary’s strategies (Dunning, 2009; McCann & 
Mudambi, 2005) because “aspects of the strategy of MNEs can…be enhanced by a 
deeper understanding of spatial issues” (Buckley & Ghauri, 2004: 91). Accordingly, we 
define proximal localization strategies as strategies which employ host market equity 
capital and human capital to facilitate a subsidiary’s integration within the host country 
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market. Conversely, distal localization strategies include strategies which facilitate 
integration within the host country market by employing equity capital and human capital 
sourced outside of the host country market. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Host Market Corruption Pervasiveness and Host Market Exit 
Extant theory has conceptualized host market corruption in terms of its 
pervasiveness (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008a; Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). 
The concept of informal institutional pluralism suggests that discrete informal institutions 
such as “corruption” can be conceptualized as being constituted by distinct dimensions. 
Leveraging this theory, scholars have disaggregated the concept of host market 
corruption into public corruption pervasiveness or, “the average firm’s likelihood of 
encountering corruption in its normal interactions with public officials” (Rodriguez et al., 
2005: 385), and private corruption pervasiveness (“the average firm’s likelihood of 
encountering corruption in its normal interactions with private entities, companies and 
individuals”) (Sartor, 2014b).  
Corruption scholars have defined legitimacy as the “perception…that an 
organization’s actions are appropriate within a socially constructed system of norms and 
values” (Pfarrer, Decelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008: 731). Notwithstanding RDT and IT’s 
shared conceptualization of “legitimacy” (Hillman et al., 2007), we propose that a distinct 
spatial orientation characterizes each theory’s predictions with respect to MNE strategies 
that may be implemented in order to secure legitimacy in more corrupt host market 
environments. Nevertheless, we do not believe that there is any basis upon which to 
propose that either theoretical lens would predict different outcomes with respect to the 
direct relationship between corruption pervasiveness and the likelihood of host market 
exit. Instead, we expect that as the pervasiveness of both public corruption and private 
corruption in the host market increases, the uncertainty that MNEs experience with 
respect to the prevailing norms and standards of conduct in the host market will become 
more pronounced. In turn, this poses a more pronounced threat to their legitimacy in the 
host market and increases the likelihood of market exit. Further, consistent with Husted’s 
(1994) observations that host market public corruption and private corruption are not 
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mutually exclusive, Rodriguez et al. (2006: 739) concluded that “it is clear that 
government corruption and private corruption often go hand in hand.” Accordingly, we 
also expect that the interaction between both dimensions of host market corruption will 
also increase the likelihood of market exit. As such, we hypothesize that 
 
Hypothesis 1: An MNE is more likely to exit a host market when public 
corruption is more pervasive in the market.  
 
Hypothesis 2: An MNE is more likely to exit a host market when private 
corruption is more pervasive in the market. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between the pervasiveness of 
public corruption in a host market and an MNE’s likelihood of market exit 
becomes stronger as the pervasiveness of private corruption increases. 
  
 
Beyond these general relationships between these two distinct dimensions of 
corruption and the likelihood of market exit, we are most interested in exploring the 
impact of MNE strategies which might moderate the link between corruption 
pervasiveness (both public and private) and market exit. More specifically, we propose 
that, under conditions of more pervasive corruption in the host country market, the spatial 
orientation of a subsidiary’s strategic decisions will exert a distinct impact upon the 
likelihood of market exit. In this regard, we compare the relative efficacy of the proximal 
localization strategies that are advocated by RDT with the distal localization strategies 
suggested by IT, giving particular attention to an MNE’s expatriate strategy  (Hypotheses 
4 and 6) and partnering strategy (Hypotheses 5 and 7). In doing so, we propose that the 
proximal orientation of an MNE’s localization strategies will be manifest in the firm’s 
preference for joint venture (JV) partnership arrangements that engage a host country 
equity partner, as well as its preference for a smaller proportion of expatriate employees 
in the subsidiary investment. Conversely, the distal orientation of an MNE’s localization 
strategies will be evidenced by a preference for JV partnerships that engage a home 
country equity partner and a greater proportion of expatriate employees.  
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Corruption Pervasiveness, Proximal Localization Strategies and Market Exit 
Resource dependence theorists contend that organizations require resources from 
their environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) when they are unable to generate these 
resources internally (Pfeffer, 1982). Consequently, organizations experience resource 
deficiencies and become interdependent with organizations or entities that control or 
influence the supply of the required resource (Pfeffer, 1982). Interdependent 
organizations attempt to manage their resource dependencies by engaging in inter-
organizational efforts to reduce these dependencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). More 
recently, RDT scholars have extended Pfeffer & Salancik’s (2003) conceptualization of 
the interdependency dynamic to suggest that, more precisely, a power imbalance 
characterizes the relationship between the resource dependent organization and the entity 
controlling the required resources (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). In this regard, the 
resource deficiency operates as a constraint on the organization. As such, when a firm 
encounters a resource deficiency, it will engage in actions that are intended to absorb this 
constraint (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005).  
Legitimacy has been characterized by RDT theorists as a resource that is critical 
to firm survival  (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). RDT specifies a number of options that are 
available to a firm in its effort to absorb its external constraints (Scott & Davis, 2007), 
including among others, the maintenance of alternative suppliers of the resource, 
engaging in alliances, JVs or other associations to secure access to the resource or, 
managing the dependence through a merger or acquisition of the organization controlling 
the resource (Scott & Davis, 2007). Each of these strategies provides the firm with an 
opportunity “to have its operations redefined as legitimate by associating…with other 
generally accepted legitimate….institutions or individuals” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: 
196). We focus on the role of partnering and staffing strategies in an MNE’s efforts to 
secure legitimacy in increasingly corrupt host country markets.  
RDT suggests that JV partnering arrangements can have the effect of reducing 
environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Similarly, international business 
scholars maintain that the opportunity to secure legitimacy under conditions of 
heightened environmental uncertainty is one motivation for an MNE’s decision to engage 
in an international JV (IJV) (Schuler, 2001) with a foreign partner (i.e., a non-home 
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country partner). In IJV partnering arrangements, foreign-investing MNEs have been 
found to trade ownership for the opportunity to reduce their resource dependence on the 
broader population of firms in the host market (Shan, 1991). Each parent’s share of 
control over the IJV is dependent, in part, upon their ability to supply resources that the 
IJV requires to survive and thrive in the local environment (Child & Yan, 1999). In an 
examination of the resource antecedents of parent control in IJVs, Chen, Park and 
Newburry (2009) determined that the contribution of tacit resources predicts each 
parent’s degree of control over the IJV. 
RDT also suggests that an organization’s human resource practices can bolster the 
organization’s ability to manage its dependencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). In the 
context of foreign subsidiary investments, heightened local resource dependence has been 
found to predict an increased use of host market employees by foreign-investing MNEs 
(Hannon et al., 1995). Consequently, expatriate deployment to the subsidiary investment 
is less likely (Belderbos & Heijltjes, 2005). Similarly, while Boyacigiller (1990) found 
that heightened dependence between a subsidiary and its headquarters predicted increased 
utilization of expatriates in the foreign subsidiary, she speculated that if the main sources 
of dependence were situated within the host country market, then it could be expected 
that fewer expatriates would be utilized because host market employees would be better 
suited to managing the uncertainty associated with dependencies that arise in the host 
country. 
We have proposed that both public corruption and private corruption exacerbate 
uncertainty with respect to norms and standards of conduct in more corrupt host market 
environments, which threatens to undermine the legitimacy of foreign-investing MNEs 
and heightens the likelihood of market exit. Under conditions of more pronounced host 
market corruption, RDT theorists have suggested that foreign firms suffer from a 
legitimacy deficiency (Su, Mitchell, & Sirgy, 2007). Notwithstanding the existence of 
this deficiency, firms are able to access resources, including legitimacy, “through illegal, 
unethical and / or unconventional actions” (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002: 417). In fact, 
previous research has revealed that engaging in corruption may help firms to overcome 
uncertainties associated with the political, legal and financial systems in corrupt host 
market environments (Zhou & Peng, 2012). Consequently, the foreign firm can be 
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expected to engage in coordinated behaviors (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) designed to 
access and secure legitimacy from presumably more powerful firms (prospective host 
market equity partners) and individuals (prospective host country employees) that already 
possess the legitimacy resource (Steidlmeier, 1999). This is because when a venture 
becomes networked with established organizations and host country employees, the 
venture becomes identified with these partners and employees in a manner that confers 
legitimacy on the new venture (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002).  
As such, the strategic prescriptions advanced by the RDT perspective are 
characterized by a spatial orientation that envisions the integration of host country (local) 
partners and employees into the subsidiary investment in order to bolster the MNE’s 
efforts to secure legitimacy and reduce the likelihood of market exit. Accordingly, we 
hypothesize that 
 
Hypothesis 4: The positive relationship between the pervasiveness of host 
market corruption (public or private) and an MNE’s likelihood of market 
exit is weakened by a decrease in subsidiary expatriate intensity. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The positive relationship between the pervasiveness of host 
market corruption (public or private) and an MNE’s likelihood of market 
exit is weakened when a host country (local) partner is engaged in the JV 
subsidiary investment. 
 
 
Corruption Pervasiveness, Distal Localization Strategies and Market Exit 
IT suggests that the strategic actions of firms can be interpreted as being 
structured by the institutional environment within which the firm is situated. In this 
context, institutions impose restrictions on activity, as well as providing guidelines for 
taking action (Scott, 2001). IT suggests that environments characterized by institutional 
uncertainty create risk for firms. According to this perspective, the survival of the firm is 
contingent upon its ability to respond to the demands and expectations emanating from 
the institutional environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and, the ability of the firm to 
secure external legitimacy from the environment’s constituents (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). IT focuses on the efforts of firms to respond to institutional pressures by 
acquiescing to local values and norms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Legitimacy has been 
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characterized by IT theorists as the degree of cultural support for an organization 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Meyer & Rowan (1977) maintain that legitimacy is 
intertwined with access to resources, stability and enhanced prospects for firm survival. 
In this regard, foreign-investing MNEs are able to secure legitimacy through efforts to 
conform to the demands of the institutional environment in the host country market 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999).  
 Corruption can become so intrinsically embedded in a host market that it becomes 
a fundamental component of a country’s institutional environment (Spencer & Gomez, 
2011). When firms face uncertainty that is attributable to the institutionalization of 
corruption, they tend to conform to the pressures emanating from the institutional 
environment (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Spencer & Gomez (2011) found that more 
pronounced host market corruption will heighten a subsidiary’s need to engage in 
bribery. Prior conceptual work has proposed that an MNE is more likely to enter foreign 
markets via a wholly owned subsidiary when host market corruption is more pervasive 
(Rodriguez et al., 2005). Under these circumstances, it has been suggested that MNEs can 
secure legitimacy by directly complying with corrupt agents, thereby reducing the need to 
integrate into local networks (Rodriguez et al., 2005).   
Despite the fact that MNEs might prefer to enter into increasingly corrupt host 
market environments via a wholly-owned subsidiary, firms have empirically 
demonstrated a preference for partnering when host market corruption is highly arbitrary 
(Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Further, when cultural distance between the home and host 
country market is greater, JVs between home country partners have been found to enjoy 
heightened survivability when compared to JVs constituted by both home and host 
country partners (Makino & Beamish, 1998). Given that local partners are more 
embedded in local networks, they tend to be approached more frequently than foreign 
partners by corrupt agents (Meschi, 2009). Under these circumstances, foreign partners 
are exposed to heightened costs because the foreign partners rarely have input into the 
corrupt negotiations and the local partners are more inclined to comply with the demands 
of the corrupt agent in a less restricted manner (Rodriguez et al., 2005). A firm lacking 
social legitimacy in a host country market will likely select a partner that has proven its 
ability to conform to the expectations of institutional constituents with respect to 
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appropriate business behavior (Dacin, Oliver, & Roy, 2007). We contend that under 
conditions of heightened host market corruption, the MNE is more likely to choose a 
partner from the MNE’s home country. A partner from the MNE’s home country is 
equally capable of sharing risk and oversight with the foreign-investing MNE (Roy, 
2012), as well as providing the MNE with local knowledge and learning (Parkhe, 1993) 
with respect to how the MNE can interface most efficiently with corrupt agents.   
 Given the hypothesized preference for either wholly-owned governance or home 
market-oriented JV partnerships in foreign markets under conditions of heightened 
corruption pervasiveness, a foreign-investing MNE will require resources from its 
headquarters in order to support the subsidiary’s efforts to directly conform to the 
institutional environment. Resource support from parent MNEs is often contingent upon 
the subsidiary’s efforts to conform to norms dictated by the headquarters (Hillman & 
Wan, 2005; Kostova, 1999). Accordingly, we expect that the tension between local 
adaptation and global standardization in the subsidiary’s management practices 
(Björkman, 2006) will be resolved in favor of global standardization. An increase in the 
number of expatriates in a subsidiary has been found to predict heightened 
standardization (Rosenzweig & Nohria, 1994). In fact, the presence of expatriates 
activates the diffusion of an MNE’s standardized practices within a foreign subsidiary 
(Lu & Bjorkman, 1997). 
Taken together, the strategic prescriptions advanced by the IT perspective are 
characterized by a spatial orientation that envisions the integration of home country 
employees and partners into the subsidiary investment in order to bolster the MNE’s 
efforts to secure legitimacy and reduce the likelihood of market exit under conditions of 
more pervasive host market corruption. Accordingly, we hypothesize that 
 
Hypothesis 6: The positive relationship between the pervasiveness of host 
market corruption (public or private) and an MNE’s likelihood of market 
exit is weakened by an increase in subsidiary expatriate intensity. 
 
Hypothesis 7: The positive relationship between the pervasiveness of host 
market corruption (public or private) and an MNE’s likelihood of market 
exit is weakened when a home country partner is engaged in the JV 
subsidiary investment. 
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METHODS 
Data Sources and Key Variables 
 We tested our hypotheses using a sample of subsidiary investments established in 
31 countries1 during the period 1998 through 2005. The sample was taken from annual 
editions of the Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran covering this time period (Toyo Keizai). 
This data source reports on the worldwide foreign direct investment (FDI) activity of 
Japanese multinational enterprises (MNEs). To avoid left truncation problems, any 
subsidiaries for which a founding date was not reported were precluded from the sample. 
Japanese MNE parents established 4,399 subsidiaries in these 31 foreign markets 
between 1998 and 2005. The number of subsidiaries included in each of the regression 
models reported in Tables 14-16 was reduced due to missing values (unreported data), 
primarily with respect to parent and subsidiary covariates employed in our study. After 
removing subsidiaries that lacked sufficient data to conduct our regression analyses, our 
study’s sample was constituted by 5,099 observations for 1,239 subsidiary investments 
situated in the 31 countries during the study period. We lagged our observations of the 
dependent variable by one year relative to the observations with respect to the measures 
of public corruption and private corruption in the host markets. Given that 1997 was the 
first year for which some of the indicators were available to measure private corruption 
and 2004 was the last year for which data pertaining to one of these indicators was 
available, our study period was determined by the availability of country-level data.  
 
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable in our study was a binary measure in which subsidiaries 
still in existence at the end of the study period were coded with the value of 0, while 
subsidiaries that exited the market before the end of the study period were coded with the 
value of 1. Market exit was defined as the disappearance of a subsidiary listed in a 
previous edition of the Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran from the subsequent edition of 
                                                 
1 The number of subsidiary investments in each country is in brackets: Argentina (2), Australia (17), 
Austria (1), Belgium (18), Brazil (9), Canada (8), China (371), Czech Republic (8), France (31), Germany 
(39), Hong Kong (63), Hungary (5), India (15), Indonesia (18), Korea (47), Malaysia (11), Mexico (6), 
Netherlands (22), New Zealand (6), Philippines (14), Poland (7), Russia (4),  Singapore (67), South Africa 
(4), Spain (9), Switzerland (6), Taiwan (80), Thailand (56), Turkey (2), United Kingdom (52), United 
States (241). 
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the data source  (Chung & Beamish, 2005). In this regard, subsidiaries that were delisted 
from the sample were treated as exits because our data source (Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou 
Souran) has previously been recognized as closely approximating the population of 
Japanese FDI (Delios & Makino, 2003; Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004). Further, prior 
research has also confirmed that the instances of exit reported in our data source were 
authentic instances of exit by comparing exits reported in the data source with externally 
reported accounts of exit (Delios & Beamish, 2004). Further, following prior research, we 
also treated all instances in which full Japanese ownership of the subsidiary investment 
was sold off as an instance of market exit by the parent firm (Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 
2013). Subsidiaries that continued in existence at the end of the study period were treated 
as right-censored (Cleves, Gould, Gutierrez, & Marchenko, 2008). As such, our data set 
provided empirical data indicating the status of each subsidiary at the end of the 
observation period (2005), as well as the longevity of those subsidiaries that exited prior 
to the end of the observation period, both of which are required to model the likelihood of 
market exit (Cleves et al., 2008). In total, we observed 180 exits associated with the 
subsidiary investments in our sample during the study period.      
 
Focal Independent Variables 
Proximal and distal localization strategies. We elaborated our theory pertaining 
to proximal localization strategies and distal localization strategies by focusing on two 
different strategies – expatriate strategy and partnering strategy. An MNE’s expatriate 
strategy captures the degree to which the MNE deploys expatriate employees to the 
subsidiary investment and has routinely been measured in terms of the subsidiary’s 
expatriate intensity (or, the ratio of expatriate employees working in the subsidiary to 
total employees in the subsidiary). Prior research has found that Japanese MNEs have 
demonstrated a tendency to either not use third country employees in subsidiary 
investments (Gong, 2003; Tung, 1982) or, to use them very sparingly (Peterson, Napier, 
& Shul-Shim, 2000). As such, an increase or decrease in Japanese subsidiary expatriate 
intensity implicitly conveys an indication of the MNE’s choice between a greater 
proportion of either home country employees (expatriates) or host country employees.  
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Partnering strategy focuses on the MNE’s choice of partner. Makino and Beamish 
(1998) developed a taxonomy of JV partnership arrangements which distinguishes 
between three different JV configurations - traditional JV (a JV in which the MNE 
engages a host country (local) equity partner in the subsidiary investment), crossnational 
JV (in which the MNE engages a home country partner) and trinational JV (in which the 
MNE engages an equity partner from a third country other than the home or host 
countries). We estimated models using two different cutoff  conventions that have been 
used in the literature to distinguish JV investments from wholly-owned subsidiaries (Yiu 
& Makino, 2002). Using the 80 percent cutoff, 316 of the subsidiaries in our sample were 
JV investments, of which 252 (79.7%) were traditional JVs, 46 (14.6%) were 
crossnational JVs and 18 (5.6%) were trinational JVs. The 95 percent cutoff convention 
resulted in 367 of the subsidiaries being categorized as JV investments, 280 (76.2%) of 
which were traditional JVs, 69 (18.8%) were crossnational JVs and 18 (4.9%) were 
trinational JVs. Consistent with Makino and Beamish’s (1998) finding that trinational 
JVs constituted close to 3% of the JV investments in their sample, we also found that 
trinational JVs constituted  a relatively nominal proportion of our sample of JVs. As 
such, given the small proportion of trinational JVs in our sample and given that the 
decision to choose a third country partner does not constitute one of the strategies 
contemplated by our theory, these JVs were not included in our empirical analyses 
pertaining to an MNE’s partnering strategy. 
To summarize, based on our dichotomized conceptualization of a subsidiary’s 
localization strategies as being either proximal or distal, a subsidiary executing proximal 
localization strategies could be expected to prefer a traditional JV ownership structure 
(with a home country (local) partner) and to employ a smaller proportion of expatriates in 
the foreign subsidiary. Conversely, a subsidiary that chooses to implement distal 
localization strategies would be expected to invest through a crossnational ownership 
structure (with a home country partner), as well as an increased preference for expatriate 
employees. 
Public corruption pervasiveness and private corruption pervasiveness. Prior 
work that has conceptualized host market corruption in terms of two distinct dimensions 
(public versus private) has operationalized public corruption pervasiveness using 
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Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) scores (Sartor, 2014b). 
Similarly, we employed the measure of private corruption pervasiveness developed by 
Sartor (2014b), utilizing data from IMD’s Word Competitiveness Yearbooks (WCY) 
pertaining to insider trading and tax evasion, as well as indicators from the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Reports (GCR) with respect to racketeering / 
organized crime. We conducted a principal components analysis with an orthogonal 
(varimax) rotation and an eigenvalue cutoff equal to 1 using a holdout sample of 
subsidiaries that were established in the same host markets during the period 1998-2005. 
The results supported the theoretically-expected one factor solution. Table 12 presents the 
factor loadings for each indicator on the private corruption pervasiveness construct. A 
reliability analysis was also conducted and we concluded that the Cronbach’s alpha for 
these three indicators (0.88) was sufficient to establish internal consistency (Nunnally & 
Bernstein, 1994). Given that the CPI, WCY and GCR data are reported such that low 
scores indicate high corruption and high scores indicate low corruption, in order to 
enhance the ease of interpretation of our regression estimations, we reverse-coded all 
three data sources so that higher scores were indicative of more pronounced corruption 
pervasiveness in our regression models. 
 
Control Variables 
 Our study incorporated subsidiary, parent, industry, regional and country-
level control variables that have been found to be significant predictors of the likelihood 
of an MNE exiting a host market. Subsidiary size was measured as the log of the 
subsidiary’s capitalization (Chung & Beamish, 2010) and included as a covariate because 
a positive relationship has been shown to exist between subsidiary size and subsidiary 
survival (Li, 1995). The focal MNE’s proportionate share of equity in the subsidiary 
investment (parent ownership level) has also been found to exert a positive impact on the 
likelihood of the subsidiary continuing to operate in the host market (Dai et al., 2013). 
We controlled for parent size using the log of the parent MNE’s total worldwide sales 
because larger size provides inertia against instability (Delacroix, 1993). Further, 
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TABLE 12 
Factor Analysis Results 
Factor loading
Private corruption pervasiveness a: 
a Cronbach's alpha = 0.88
Latent construct and associated items
Tax evasion
Tax evasion is (1 = a common practice, 
10 = not a common practice) in your 
country.
0.85
Insider trading
Insider trading is (1 = common in the 
stock market, 10 = not common in the 
stock market).
0.91
Prevalence of racketeering & extortion
(Racketeering & extortion) in your 
country (1 = imposes significant costs on 
business, 7 = does not impose significant 
costs on business).
0.83
 
 
corruption has been found to impair the growth of small firms but not larger firms (Zhou 
& Peng, 2012). We also controlled for parent profitability using the parent MNE’s return 
on assets (the log ratio of income to total assets), as well as parent leverage (the 
difference between total assets and total debt as a percentage of total assets), reasoning 
that stronger profitability and a greater availability of slack financial resources (Reuer & 
Ragozzino, 2006) would provide greater stability for the parents’ subsidiaries. We 
controlled for parent experience using the ratio of an MNE’s foreign sales (exports) to 
total sales (Chang & Rosenzweig, 2001) because experience has been found to exert a 
negative impact on subsidiary survival (Gaur & Lu, 2007). Industry effects were 
controlled for using a dummy variable that categorized firms as either manufacturing or 
non-manufacturing entities. Given that more than 55% of the subsidiary investments in 
our study were situated in Asia, we employed a dummy variable (region) to distinguish 
between subsidiaries hosted in Asian countries and subsidiaries established in other 
regions. Host market size has also been found to exert a negative impact on the likelihood 
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of market exit (Dai et al., 2013). We operationalized host market size using the log of 
each host country’s total gross domestic product (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Further, our 
research focuses on the impact of host market corruption pervasiveness (an informal 
institution) on the likelihood of market exit. Accordingly, we also controlled for the 
effects of formal institutions on the persistence of these subsidiary investments by 
operationalizing formal institutions in terms of FDI restrictions which we measured 
using the Heritage Foundation’s score for each country pertaining to the restrictiveness of 
the foreign investment regime in the host market. In doing so, we reasoned that more 
restrictive formal institutions would provide an indication of the challenges to subsidiary 
survival posed by the formal institutional environment. Finally, we controlled for cultural 
distance. Among other uses (Robertson & Watson, 2004), the cultural distance construct 
has been employed in research to explain differences in firm success (Shenkar, 2001). 
Cultural distance was computed as the difference between Japan and the host countries 
using Hofstede’s scores (2001) and Kogut and Singh’s (1988) measure of cultural 
distance.  
 
Estimation Method 
 Event history analysis or, survival analysis, involves substituting the assumption 
of normally distributed residuals that characterizes OLS regression (Cleves et al., 2008). 
Even though linear regression is robust to non-normality, it is not robust to the non-
symmetrical distributional features that characterize the survival variable in most data 
sets employed in event history analysis (Cleves et al., 2008). While the Cox proportional 
hazards model provides a convenient alternative to linear regression in the context of 
event history analysis, the technique assumes that at any point in time, the ratio of the 
hazards for any two subsidiaries will be constant (Allison, 1984). However, if this 
assumption regarding the proportionality of hazards is wrong, misleading coefficients 
will be generated (Cleves et al., 2008). As such, analysis based on the Cox proportional 
hazards model should be accompanied by a test of the proportional hazards assumption to 
confirm the veracity of the assumption (Allison, 1984). Unfortunately, scholars routinely 
neglect to test the proportional hazards assumption in studies that use the Cox 
proportional hazards model (Baba & Goko, 2009). Following the proportional hazards 
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assumption tests specified in Cleves et al. (2008), we determined that the assumption of 
proportional hazards could not be verified for our sample. As such, we needed to 
ascertain a more appropriate distributional assumption with respect to the residuals. 
Fortunately, parametric event history analysis contemplates the substitution of a more 
appropriate distributional assumption with respect to the residuals (Cleves et al., 2008). 
Parametric models offer the advantage of more precise estimates of the coefficients for 
the variables that predict survival. When the shape of the hazard function is unknown, the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC) provides a statistically-based approach to determine 
the most appropriate parametric model (Cleves et al., 2008). The results of our AIC 
analysis suggested that the lognormal and loglogistic models were the most appropriate 
parametric models for our sample. 
 While Model 1 (which is presented in Table 14) was employed to test Hypotheses 
1, 2 and 3, Model 2 (presented in Table 15) reports the results associated with our tests of 
Hypotheses 4 and 6 with respect to expatriate strategy. Finally, Table 16 presents Model 
3 which tests Hypotheses 5 and 7 pertaining to partnering strategy. Robust standard 
errors were estimated to account for heteroskedasticity (Chung & Beamish, 2010; Dai et 
al., 2013). Before investigating the effects of any of the interaction terms in our models, 
the continuous focal independent variables (public corruption, private corruption and  
expatriate intensity) were centered about their means (Aiken & West, 1991) 
 
 
RESULTS 
Table 13 presents descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for our sample. 
The results of our estimations are presented in Tables 14, 15 and 16. Our regression 
tables present a base model which excludes the focal corruption variables and the MNE 
strategy variables (expatriate strategy and partnering strategy), along with models that 
introduce the interaction effects predicted in our hypotheses and the associated main 
effects.  
Notably, the correlation between public corruption pervasiveness and private 
corruption pervasiveness was found to be 0.95 for our sample. Prior research that focused  
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TABLE 13 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Exit - -
2 Expatriate strategy (log) -0.75 0.58 -0.03
3 Partnering strategy a - - -0.05 -0.23
4 Subsidiary size (log) 2.17 1.01 -0.02 -0.07 0.08
5 Parent ownership level 75.82 35.14 -0.05 0.17 0.06 -0.02
6 Parent size (log) 5.22 0.79 0.10 -0.18 -0.01 0.04 -0.15
7 Parent profitability 0.01 0.06 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.06
8 Parent experience 0.16 0.19 -0.02 -0.14 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.13 -0.03
9 Parent leverage 0.99 0.03 0.01 -0.08 0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.20 0.26 0.08
10 Industry dummy - - 0.09 0.09 -0.07 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.02 -0.12 -0.01
11 Region dummy - - -0.12 -0.21 0.12 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.08
12 Host market size (log) 3.01 0.66 0.00 0.10 -0.08 0.03 -0.02 -0.09 -0.02 -0.07 -0.09
13 FDI restrictions 5.96 2.07 0.06 0.16 -0.04 -0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.06
14 Cultural distance 2.88 0.87 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.07 0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.03
15 Public corruption pervasiveness 4.28 2.29 -0.13 -0.28 0.10 0.08 -0.13 0.08 -0.05 0.05 0.06
16 Private corruption pervasiveness 4.94 1.20 -0.13 -0.24 0.09 0.09 -0.10 0.07 -0.05 0.04 0.06
17 Public corruption x expatriate strategy (log) - - -0.04 0.38 -0.06 0.09 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.03
18 Private corruption x expatriate strategy (log) - - -0.04 0.35 -0.05 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.02
19 Public corruption x partnering strategy - - 0.09 0.14 0.30 -0.04 0.07 -0.06 0.03 -0.01 -0.04
20 Private corruption x partnering strategy - - 0.10 0.12 0.25 -0.05 0.05 -0.07 0.04 -0.01 -0.04
Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
11 Region dummy -0.14
12 Host market size (log) 0.16 -0.50
13 FDI restrictions 0.01 -0.37 -0.15
14 Cultural distance 0.10 0.32 -0.23 -0.11
15 Public corruption pervasiveness -0.15 0.61 -0.10 -0.58 -0.21
16 Private corruption pervasiveness -0.14 0.51 -0.03 -0.59 -0.32 0.95
17 Public corruption x expatriate strategy (log) 0.03 0.05 0.04 -0.10 -0.10 0.13 0.15
18 Private corruption x expatriate strategy (log) 0.02 0.02 0.07 -0.08 -0.16 0.15 0.18 0.95
19 Public corruption x partnering strategy 0.08 -0.40 0.08 0.39 0.18 -0.68 -0.66 -0.24 -0.25
20 Private corruption x partnering strategy 0.08 -0.34 0.04 0.41 0.26 -0.66 -0.71 -0.24 -0.27 0.96
a Dichotomous dependent variable: Traditional joint venture (with a host country (local) partner) or crossnational joint venture  (with
a home country partner).
Correlations with an absolute value greater than 0.08 are statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level. All are two-tailed tests.
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TABLE 14 
 
Results of Event History Analyses of Public Corruption Pervasiveness and  
Private Corruption Pervasiveness on the Likelihood of Market Exit  
Main Effects
Variables
Intercept 1.96 (1.13) t 1.59 (1.14) 0.69 (1.17) 1.58 (1.07) 1.65 (1.08)
Subsidiary effects
Subsidiary size (log) -0.06 (0.04) -0.06 (0.04) -0.06 (0.04) -0.05 (0.04) -0.05 (0.04)
Parent effects
Parent ownership level b 0.04 (0.01) ** 0.04 (0.01) ** 0.04 (0.01) ** 0.04 (0.01) ** 0.04 (0.01) **
Parent size (log) -0.16 (0.07) * -0.16 (0.07) * -0.17 (0.07) * -0.16 (0.07) * -0.16 (0.07) *
Parent profitability 2.49 (0.79) ** 2.46 (0.79) ** 2.42 (0.79) ** 2.42 (0.78) ** 2.44 (0.78) **
Parent experience -0.16 (0.25) -0.18 (0.25) -0.19 (0.25) -0.18 (0.24) -0.18 (0.24)
Parent leverage 2.06 (0.94) * 2.09 (0.94) * 2.10 (0.92) * 2.07 (0.89) * 2.06 (0.89) *
Industry effect
Industry dummy -0.54 (0.11) *** -0.54 (0.11) *** -0.53 (0.10) *** -0.52 (0.10) *** -0.53 (0.10) ***
Region effects
Region dummy 0.54 (0.12) *** 0.38 (0.16) * 0.30 (0.16) t 0.43 (0.17) * 0.43 (0.17) *
Country effects
Host market size (log) 0.22 (0.08) ** 0.20 (0.08) * 0.16 (0.09) t 0.15 (0.09) t 0.13 (0.09)
FDI restrictions -0.05 (0.02) t -0.03 (0.02) 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03)
Cultural distance -0.10 (0.05) t -0.03 (0.06) 0.03 (0.06) 0.03 (0.06) 0.04 (0.07)
Main effects
Public corruption pervasiveness 0.06 (0.03) t -0.17 (0.09) * -0.17 (0.09) t
Private corruption pervasiveness 0.20 (0.08) ** 0.50 (0.18) ** 0.49 (0.18) **
Interaction effect
Public corruption x private corruption -0.02 (0.03)
Variance inflation factor range
Number of observations
Number of exits
2
AIC
Log likelihood
∆ log likelihood c
a The dependent variable is coded as follows:  0: survived; 1: exited.
b Rescaled by a factor of 10-1.
c When compared to the base model.
n  = 1,239 subsidiary investments.
t p  < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
All are two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Model 1B
1.02 - 3.42
5,099
180
Model 1C
1.02 - 3.13
5,099
180
1497.61 1488.08 1489.81
6.77 6.91
-735.81 -729.04 -728.90
1490.95
-731.47
4.34
1496.93
-734.46
1.35
180
108.60 *** 110.98 *** 114.05 ***108.52 ***108.15 ***
Public and Private Corruption Pervasiveness a
1.02 - 2.00 1.02 - 13.78 1.02 - 13.89
Base Model Interaction Effect
Model 1A Model 1D Model 1E
5,099 5,099 5,099
180 180
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TABLE 15 
 
Results of Event History Analyses of Public Corruption Pervasiveness, 
Private Corruption Pervasiveness and Expatriate Strategy 
on the Likelihood of Market Exit 
 
Variables
Intercept 1.92 (0.99) t 2.68 (1.81) 2.60 (1.83) 2.64 (1.84) 2.63 (1.84)
Subsidiary effects
Subsidiary size (log) -0.05 (0.04) -0.08 (0.07) -0.08 (0.07) -0.08 (0.07) -0.08 (0.07)
Parent effects
Parent ownership level b 0.04 (0.01) ** 0.10 (0.02) ** 0.10 (0.02) ** 0.10 (0.02) ** 0.10 (0.02) **
Parent size (log) -0.14 (0.07) * -0.23 (0.11) * -0.23 (0.11) * -0.23 (0.11) * -0.23 (0.11) *
Parent profitability 2.24 (0.73) ** 2.33 (0.90) ** 2.32 (0.90) * 2.33 (0.89) ** 2.35 (0.89) **
Parent experience -0.21 (0.25) 0.04 (0.44) 0.03 (0.45) 0.06 (0.44) 0.05 (0.45)
Parent leverage 1.78 (0.80) * 1.64 (1.64) 1.64 (1.66) 1.67 (1.67) 1.65 (1.67)
Industry effect
Industry dummy -0.52 (0.10) *** -0.47 (0.16) ** -0.46 (0.16) ** -0.47 (0.16) ** -0.46 (0.16) **
Region effects
Region dummy 0.44 (0.12) *** 0.32 (0.26) 0.34 (0.26) 0.32 (0.24) 0.37 (0.26)
Country effects
Host market size (log) 0.17 (0.08) * 0.18 (0.12) 0.16 (0.14) 0.16 (0.13) 0.15 (0.13)
FDI restrictions -0.04 (0.02) t -0.06 (0.03) t -0.05 (0.04) -0.06 (0.04) -0.05 (0.04)
Cultural distance -0.09 (0.05) t -0.08 (0.09) -0.06 (0.10) -0.05 (0.10) -0.05 (0.10)
Subsidiary localization strategy
Expatriate strategy (log) -0.27 (0.16) t -0.26 (0.16) t -0.26 (0.16) -0.26 (0.16)
Main effects
Public corruption pervasiveness 0.01 (0.05) -0.05 (0.14) -0.06 (0.14)
Private corruption pervasiveness 0.15 (0.33) 0.05 (0.13) 0.16 (0.31)
Interaction effects
Public corruption x expatriate strategy (log) 0.11 (0.07) t 0.11 (0.07) t
Private corruption x expatriate strategy (log) 0.33 (0.15) * 0.32 (0.15) *
Variance inflation factor range
Number of observations
Number of exits
2
AIC
Log likelihood
∆ log likelihood c
a The dependent variable is coded as follows:  0: survived;  1: exited.
b Rescaled by a factor of 10-1.
c When compared to the base model.
n  = 665 subsidiary investments.
t p  < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
All are two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
404.45 406.34404.66 406.48
1508.99 706.09 706.09707.66 707.66
-741.49 -337.04 -335.15-336.83 -335.01
89.97 *** 52.00 *** 53.36 ***52.18 *** 53.98 ***
180 77 7777 77
5,099 3,176 3,1763,176 3,176
Expatriate Strategy a
Interaction Effect: Interaction Effect:
Base Model Public Corruption x Expatriate Strategy Private Corruption x Expatriate Strategy
1.02 - 2.00 1.04 - 3.35 1.04 - 3.431.04 - 13.89 1.04 - 13.86
Model 2A Model 2B Model 2DModel 2C Model 2E
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TABLE 16 
 
Results of Event History Analyses of Public Corruption Pervasiveness,  
Private Corruption Pervasiveness and Partnering Strategy on the Likelihood of Market Exit  
 
Private Corruption x Partnering Strategy
Variables
Intercept -0.96 (6.53) -1.34 (6.51) -1.35 (6.54) -1.35 (6.52) -1.37 (6.55)
Subsidiary effects
Subsidiary size (log) -0.01 (0.06) -0.01 (0.07) -0.02 (0.07) -0.01 (0.07) -0.01 (0.07)
Parent effects
Parent ownership level 0.01 (0.00) * 0.01 (0.00) * 0.01 (0.00) * 0.01 (0.00) * 0.01 (0.00) *
Parent size (log) -0.21 (0.11) t -0.22 (0.11) * -0.22 (0.11) * -0.22 (0.11) * -0.22 (0.11) *
Parent profitability 2.37 (1.83) 2.31 (1.85) 2.31 (1.86) 2.35 (1.84) 2.36 (1.85)
Parent experience -0.55 (0.42) -0.45 (0.40) -0.45 (0.40) -0.44 (0.41) -0.45 (0.40)
Parent leverage 5.93 (6.56) 6.47 (6.56) 6.57 (6.59) 6.47 (6.57) 6.56 (6.59)
Industry effect
Industry dummy -0.70 (0.15) *** -0.71 (0.16) *** -0.73 (0.16) *** -0.72 (0.16) *** -0.72 (0.16) ***
Region effects
Region dummy 0.05 (0.21) -0.03 (0.26) -0.02 (0.25) 0.02 (0.25) -0.01 (0.26)
Country effects
Host market size (log) -0.02 (0.16) -0.04 (0.15) -0.03 (0.16) -0.04 (0.15) -0.02 (0.16)
FDI restrictions -0.09 (0.03) ** -0.09 (0.03) ** -0.10 (0.03) ** -0.10 (0.03) ** -0.10 (0.03) **
Cultural distance -0.13 (0.08) -0.12 (0.09) -0.15 (0.09) -0.14 (0.09) -0.16 (0.08) t
Subsidiary localization strategy
Partnering strategy -0.26 (0.23) -0.26 (0.23) -0.27 (0.23) -0.26 (0.23)
Main effects
Public corruption pervasiveness 0.03 (0.05) 0.10 (0.11) 0.08 (0.11)
Private corruption pervasiveness -0.16 (0.22) 0.02 (0.10) -0.13 (0.22)
Interaction effects
Public corruption x partnering strategy -0.19 (0.11) t -0.19 (0.11) t
Private corruption x partnering strategy -0.33 (0.22) -0.34 (0.21)
Variance inflation factor range
Number of observations
Number of exits
2
AIC
Log likelihood
∆ log likelihood c
a The dependent variable is coded as follows:  0: survived;  1: exited.
b The partnering strategy  independent variable is coded as follows: 0: traditional JV (with a host country (local) partner; 1: crossnational JV (with 
a home country partner).
c When compared to the base model.
n  = 298 subsidiary investments.
t p  < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
All are two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
387.40
1,302
52
53.23 ***
387.39
1,302
52
50.73 ***
387.39
1,302
52
53.60 ***
1,302
52
51.82 ***
385.90
1,302
52
46.53 ***
384.01
Partnering Strategy a b
Interaction Effect: Interaction Effect:
Model 3A
Public Corruption x Partnering StrategyBase Model
Model 3B Model 3C Model 3D Model 3E
1.04 - 1.81 1.05 - 2.76 1.06 - 10.36 1.05 - 2.88 1.05 - 10.54
2.06 2.31 1.63 1.91
-179.01 -176.95 -176.70 -177.38 -177.10
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on emerging markets as a research context used the same indicators of public corruption 
and private corruption that we employed in this study and found a 0.48 correlation 
between the two constructs (Sartor, 2014b). When we isolated the emerging market-
based subsidiaries in our sample, we found a correlation of 0.53 between the two 
constructs, whereas the correlation was 0.90 for developed market-based subsidiaries. 
Given Rodriguez et al.’s (2006: 739) proposition that “it is clear that government 
corruption and private corruption often go hand in hand”, we believe that there are both 
theoretical and practical reasons for which it can be expected that public corruption and 
private corruption exist simultaneously in host markets. Consequently, it seems 
theoretically imperative that both variables should be included in the same regression 
estimations. However, in light of the high correlation between the public corruption and 
private corruption variables in our study, we recognize that this would pose an increased 
risk of multicollinearity in our regression estimates. An increase in collinearity is 
important for at least two reasons. First, the regression equation’s standard errors can 
become inflated and, second, its estimated parameters can become increasingly uncertain 
or unreliable (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). This is manifest in an increased variance 
inflation factor score (VIF) for the regression model. The normally recommended 
maximum VIF score in international business strategy research is 10 (Stephan & Uhlaner, 
2010). Beyond the high correlation between the public corruption and private corruption 
variables, none of the correlations for variables included in the same models in our study 
exceed the recommended cutoff of 0.70 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Given this, we 
implemented two strategies to ensure that the results that we present in Tables 15-16 are 
robust and unencumbered by concerns regarding multicollinearity. 
First, in Tables 15 and 16, we present a model which includes both the interaction 
effect and one of the corruption main effects, along with a corresponding model which 
includes the interaction effect and both of the corruption main effects. For example, in 
Table 15, Model 2B presents a regression estimation which includes the interaction effect 
between public corruption and expatriate intensity, along with the main effect of public 
corruption and the main effect of expatriate intensity. Our expectation that 
multicollinearity would not be a concern in this model was supported by the Model’s  
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relatively low maximum VIF score (3.35). Model 2C includes these same three effects 
and adds the private corruption main effect to the model as a covariate. We were not 
surprised to find that the addition of this highly correlated main effect as a covariate 
would result in a high maximum VIF score (13.89) for the model. However, our approach 
allows for a comparison of the focal coefficient (the interaction effect) under conditions 
of both low multicollinearity and high multicollinearity. We reasoned that if the focal 
interaction coefficient was relatively similar under both conditions, then this would 
support our position that multicollinearity was not driving our results.  
Second, we re-executed Models 1-3 as two additional sets of estimations by 
segregating our study’s full sample (1,239 subsidiaries) into two sub-samples. One sub-
sample was constituted by subsidiaries hosted in developed markets (660 subsidiaries) 
and the other by subsidiaries hosted in emerging markets (579 subsidiaries). The results 
associated with these sub-sample robustness checks are presented in Appendix C. 
Public corruption, private corruption and market exit. Table 14 presents the 
results pertaining to the hypotheses that were developed to test the direct relationship 
between host market corruption and the likelihood of market exit. Both Hypothesis 1 
(public corruption) and Hypothesis 2 (private corruption) predicted that an MNE is more 
likely to exit a market when corruption is more pervasive in the host market. The 
significant main effect for public corruption (β = 0.06, p < 0.10) in Model 1B (χ2 = 
108.15, p < 0.001) provided support for Hypothesis 1. Similarly, the significant main 
effect for private corruption (β = 0.20, p < 0.01) in Model 1C (χ2 = 108.52, p < 0.001) 
provided support for Hypothesis 2. The maximum VIF was 3.42. 
Consistent with Husted’s (1994) observations that host market public corruption 
and private corruption are not mutually exclusive, Model 1D (χ2 = 110.98, p < 0.001) 
tests the main effects associated with both dimensions of host market corruption 
simultaneously. The results reveal that both public corruption (β = -0.17, p < 0.05) and 
private corruption (β = 0.50, p < 0.01) significantly predict the likelihood of market exit. 
However, the results suggest that whereas an increase in the pervasiveness of private 
corruption increases the likelihood of market exit, an increase in public corruption 
reduces the likelihood of exit. As such, while the results support Hypothesis 2, the sign of  
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the coefficient for public corruption is in the opposite direction of the sign predicted by 
Hypothesis 1. In order to test the interaction effect in Hypothesis 3, Model 1E (χ2 = 
114.05, p < 0.001) was estimated to include the main effects for each dimension of 
corruption, along with the interaction effect between public and private corruption. The 
main effects of public corruption (β = -0.17, p < 0.10) and private corruption (β = 0.49, p 
< 0.01) both continued to be significant and the signs of the coefficients were unchanged. 
However, the interaction effect between the two dimensions of corruption was not 
significant. As such, Hypothesis 3 was not supported. While Models 1D and 1E exhibited 
high maximum VIF scores (13.78 and 13.89, respectively), when we re-executed these 
models using the two sub-samples (developed market-based subsidiaries and emerging 
market-based subsidiaries), the maximum VIF score dropped below the recommended 
upper limit of 10 (Stephan & Uhlaner, 2010). Further, the interaction effect became 
significant when we used the emerging market-based sample of subsidiaries. We discuss 
these results in more detail in the Appendix. 
Expatriate strategy and public corruption. Table 15 presents the results with 
respect to Hypotheses 4 and 6 pertaining to the moderating effect of expatriate strategy 
on the relationship between host market corruption and market exit. Given that some of 
the MNEs in our full sample did not report the number of expatriates employed in the 
subsidiary investment, it was not possible to calculate some subsidiaries’ expatriate 
intensity for our analyses pertaining to an MNE’s expatriate strategy. As such, our 
sample of 1,239 subsidiaries was reduced due to this missing data and our estimations in 
Table 15 were based on 3,176 observations pertaining to 665 subsidiaries. A total of 77 
exits occurred within this sample during the study period. Model 2B (χ2 = 52.00, p < 
0.001) was used to test the competition between Hypothesis 4 (which predicted that a 
decrease in expatriate intensity would reduce the likelihood of market exit under 
conditions of heightened public corruption), and Hypothesis 6 which predicted the 
opposite outcome (an increase in expatriate intensity would reduce the likelihood of 
market exit under conditions of heightened public corruption). As discussed above, 
Model 2B (maximum VIF is 3.35) tests this interaction effect between public corruption 
and expatriate intensity without controlling for the main effect of private corruption, in 
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order to allay concerns regarding multicollinearity. Model 2C (χ2 = 52.18, p < 0.001) 
tests the same interaction effect while also controlling for private corruption. Testing this 
interaction between public corruption and expatriate intensity revealed a significant 
effect (β = 0.11, p < 0.10) in both Models 2B and 2C. Figure 6 plots the interaction 
(Dawson, 2014). The Figure reveals an interesting dichotomy. When the pervasiveness of 
public corruption is low, a decrease in expatriate intensity appears to increase the 
likelihood of market exit. However, as public corruption becomes more pervasive in the 
host market, a decrease in the subsidiary’s expatriate intensity decreases the likelihood of 
market exit. As such, we concluded that while the results of Model 2B and 2C are 
generally supportive of Hypothesis 4 at higher levels of public corruption, Hypothesis 6 
is supported only at low levels of public corruption.   
Expatriate strategy and private corruption. Models 2D (χ2 = 53.36, p < 0.001) 
and 2E (χ2 = 53.98, p < 0.001) in Table 15 were also used to test the comparison between 
Hypothesis 4 (a decrease in expatriate intensity will reduce the likelihood of market exit 
under conditions of heightened private corruption) and Hypothesis 6 which predicted the 
opposite result (an increase in expatriate intensity would reduce the likelihood of market 
exit under conditions of heightened private corruption). These estimations revealed a 
significant interaction effect (Model 2D: β = 0.33, p < 0.05; Model 2E: β = 0.32, p < 
0.05). Notably, the results for the interaction effect coefficient in the model that 
controlled for public corruption (Model 2E) were very similar to the results in the model 
that did not control for public corruption (Model 2D: maximum VIF = 3.43), which 
supports our position that multicollinearity was not responsible for the focal results. We 
plotted this interaction in Figure 7 and found that as private corruption becomes more 
pervasive in the host market, a decrease in expatriate intensity reduces the likelihood of 
market exit. As such, we concluded that Hypothesis 4 was supported in the case of 
private corruption, but Hypothesis 6 was not supported. 
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FIGURE 6 
 
Interaction Effect of Public Corruption Pervasiveness and  
Expatriate Strategy on the Likelihood of Market Exit a b c   
 
 
 
 
 
 
a High Public and Low Public refer to public corruption pervasiveness one standard 
deviation above and below the mean for public corruption pervasiveness.  
 
b High Expat and Low Expat refer to expatriate intensity one standard deviation above 
and below the mean for expatriate intensity. 
 
c The dependent variable is the probability of subsidiary exit from the host country (the 
variable is coded as follows: 0: survived; 1: exited). 
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FIGURE 7 
 
Interaction Effect of Private Corruption Pervasiveness and  
Expatriate Strategy on the Likelihood of Market Exit a b c 
 
 
 
 
a High Private and Low Private refer to private corruption pervasiveness one standard 
deviation above and below the mean for private corruption pervasiveness.  
 
b High Expat and Low Expat refer to expatriate intensity one standard deviation above 
and below the mean for expatriate intensity. 
 
b The dependent variable is the probability of subsidiary exit from the host country (the 
variable is coded as follows: 0: survived; 1: exited). 
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Partnering strategy and public corruption. Table 16 presents the results with 
respect to Hypotheses 5 and 7 pertaining to the moderating effect of partnering strategy 
on the relationship between host market corruption and market exit. This Table is based 
upon the 80 percent cutoff convention used to distinguish between JVs and wholly-
owned subsidiaries (Makino & Beamish, 1998). The results associated with using the 95 
percent convention were substantially similar. Model 3B (χ2 = 51.82, p < 0.001) and 
Model 3C (χ2 = 53.60, p < 0.001) were used to test the competition between Hypothesis 5 
(which predicted that engaging a host country partner in the subsidiary investment would 
reduce the likelihood of market exit under conditions of heightened public corruption), 
and Hypothesis 7 which predicted the opposite outcome (engaging a home country 
partner in the subsidiary investment would reduce the likelihood of market exit under 
conditions of heightened public corruption). While Model 3C controls for private 
corruption, Model 3B (maximum VIF = 2.76) does not include this main effect. Testing 
the interaction between public corruption and partnering strategy produced a significant 
effect (β = -0.19, p < 0.10) in both Models 3B and 3C. We plotted the interaction in 
Figure 8 and found that as public corruption increases, the decision to engage a home 
country partner rather than a host country partner in the JV investment reduces the 
likelihood of market exit. As such, in the case of more pervasive public corruption we 
concluded that Hypothesis 7 was supported, but Hypothesis 5 was not supported. 
Partnering strategy and private corruption. Models 3D (χ2 = 50.73, p < 0.001) 
and 3E (χ2 = 53.23, p < 0.001) both produced a non-significant interaction effect between 
private corruption pervasiveness and partnering strategy. As such, we concluded that 
neither Hypothesis 5, nor Hypothesis 7 was supported in the case of private corruption. 
However, we note that the signs of the focal coefficients in these two models were 
consistent with the predictions developed in Hypothesis 7. Further, the coefficients for 
the interaction effects were only marginally non-significant in both Model 3D (p = 0.12) 
and Model 3E (p = 0.10). 
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FIGURE 8 
 
Interaction Effect of Public Corruption Pervasiveness and  
Partnering Strategy on the Likelihood of Market Exit a b c 
 
 
 
 
 
a High Public and Low Public refer to public corruption pervasiveness one standard 
deviation above and below the mean for public corruption pervasiveness. 
 
b Trad JV (traditional JV) refers to a JV with a host country (local) partner. Cross JV 
(crossnational JV) refers to a JV with a home country partner. 
 
c The dependent variable is the probability of subsidiary exit from the host country (the 
variable is coded as follows: 0: survived; 1: exited). 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
While corruption has become an increasingly important challenge facing MNEs, 
the phenomenon has been under-researched to date (Rodriguez et al., 2006) and scholars 
have provided little guidance to MNEs with respect to the relative efficacy of various 
strategies (Mezias & Mezias, 2010) that could reduce the likelihood of market exit. Our 
study has investigated the relationship between host market corruption pervasiveness, the 
subsidiary localization strategies implemented by MNEs and the likelihood of host 
market exit. We have conceptualized host market corruption as an informal institution 
that precipitates uncertainty for foreign-investing MNEs because the norms or standards 
of practice pertaining to these extralegal transactions are frequently ambiguous and 
indeterminate (Fisman & Gatti, 2006; Lambsdorff, 2005) from the perspective of the 
foreign-investing MNE. Given that organizations may seek legitimacy in foreign markets 
by attempting to conform to the prevailing institutional norms in these markets, the 
uncertainty surrounding informal institutions such as corruption can pose a threat to the 
firm’s ability to navigate the standards of practice or conduct that are required to secure 
legitimacy. As such, regardless of the MNE’s willingness or reluctance to engage in 
corrupt transactions in the host market, host market corruption functions as a source of 
uncertainty for foreign-investing MNEs, particularly in markets characterized by more 
pervasive corruption. In turn, this poses a threat to the firm’s legitimacy in the host 
market and heightens the likelihood of market exit. Given the range of benefits associated 
with internationalization (Contractor, 2007), our theory has been based on the assumption 
that market exit is a negative outcome.  
In light of the foregoing, our research questions were developed to advance two 
broad propositions. First, more pervasive host market corruption can be expected to 
increase the likelihood that MNEs will choose to exit the market. Second, MNEs can 
implement strategies that reduce the increased likelihood of market exit in countries 
characterized by more pervasive corruption. To elaborate our theory, we expanded the 
conceptualization of localization strategies and specified two broad categories of 
strategies that we believe are pertinent to an MNE’s efforts to localize its subsidiary 
operations and secure legitimacy within a host market environment. While proximal 
localization strategies were defined to include strategies which employ host market 
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equity capital and human capital to facilitate a subsidiary’s integration within the host 
country market, distal localization strategies include those which facilitate integration 
within the host country market by employing equity capital and human capital sourced 
outside of the host country market. To test our hypotheses pertaining to the efficacy of 
proximal (host market-oriented) localization strategies, we investigated the effects of an 
MNE’s increased reliance on host country employees and equity partners to enhance the 
subsidiary’s legitimacy and reduce the likelihood of host market exit. Conversely, the 
efficacy of distal (home market-oriented) localization strategies was assessed in terms of 
an MNE’s preference for home country employees and equity partners.  
The nuanced results that emerged from our empirical analyses were highly 
consistent with recent theory pertaining to informal institutional pluralism (Sartor, 
2014a). More specifically, the results reveal that the answers to our research questions 
pertaining to the direct effects of corruption on market exit, as well as the moderating 
impact of an MNE’s subsidiary localization strategies, are dependent upon both the 
dimension of corruption being considered (public or private) and the host market context 
(developed market or, emerging market). Although our theory was not developed to 
elaborate the market context distinction, our results suggested its inclusion through our 
robustness analyses. Our findings reveal that while the interaction effect between public 
corruption and private corruption significantly increases the likelihood of market exit 
from emerging markets (as reported in Appendix C), this effect was not significant when 
we conducted the same estimations using our full sample of subsidiaries (both developed 
market-based and emerging market-based) or, when we tested the developed market 
sample alone. Taken together, these results could be interpreted as suggesting that the 
adverse effects of corruption are more pertinent to an MNE’s decisions regarding market 
exit when the subsidiary investment is situated in an emerging market, rather than in a 
developed market. 
Table 17 summarizes our findings from Tables 15-16 and broadly suggests that 
with respect to a foreign-investing MNE’s expatriate strategy, an increasingly proximal 
(host market-oriented) approach can be expected to reduce the likelihood of market exit 
under conditions of more pervasive private corruption and public corruption (except at 
very low levels of public corruption). However, in considering its partnering strategy, a 
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more distal (home market-oriented) approach can enhance an MNE’s efforts to reduce 
the likelihood of market exit under conditions of more pervasive public corruption, but 
not private corruption. Furthermore, while we did not find that expatriate strategy 
exerted a statistically significant moderating effect in the sub-sample estimations 
 
TABLE 17 
 
Summary of Findings Pertaining to Moderating Effects 
Strategy Localization Strategy Corruption Dimension
Market Context 
(Location of 
Subsidiaries) a
Likelihood of 
Host Market Exit
Both DM & EM Mixed results b
DM N/S c
EM N/S
Both DM & EM Decreased
DM N/S
EM N/S
Both DM & EM Mixed results d
DM N/S
EM N/S
Both DM & EM Increased
DM N/S
EM N/S
Both DM & EM Increased
DM N/S
EM Increased
Both DM & EM N/S
DM N/S
EM N/S
Both DM & EM Decreased
DM N/S
EM Decreased
Both DM & EM N/S
DM N/S
EM N/S
a DM = developed markets; EM = emerging markets.
b Increased likelihood of market exit at low levels of public corruption and decreased likelihood of market exit
as public corruption increases (see Figure 1).
c N/S = no significant moderating effect found.
d Decreased likelihood of market exit at low levels of public corruption and increased likelihood of market exit
as public corruption increases (see Figure 1).
Expatriate
Proximal (lower expatriate intensity)
Distal (higher expatriate intensity)
Public
Private
Public
Private
Partnering
Public
Private
Public
Private
Proximal (host country (local) JV partner)
Distal (home country JV partner)
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pertaining to the developed market- and emerging market-based subsidiaries, our re-
estimations with respect to the emerging market sample did reveal that a more distal 
(home market-oriented) partnering strategy continued to weaken the positive relationship 
between public corruption pervasiveness and host market exit. 
We acknowledge that our interpretation of the empirical results is contingent upon 
an assumption that underpins our theory, namely, that market exit is a negative outcome. 
For example, in finding that an increase in expatriate intensity increases the likelihood of 
market exit under conditions of more pervasive host market corruption, our theory would 
attribute this relationship to the inability of expatriate employees to facilitate the MNE’s 
efforts to secure legitimacy in increasingly corrupt host markets. Based on this 
assumption, market exit is conceptualized as a reactive decision. Reversing our 
assumption regarding market exit reveals an alternative interpretation with respect to our 
results. Market exit can also be assumed to be a positive outcome because it facilitates an 
MNE’s efforts to minimize the sunk costs associated with languishing foreign 
investments (Hill, Hwang, & Kim, 1990). From this perspective, the fact that an increase 
in expatriate intensity increases the likelihood of market exit under conditions of more 
pervasive host market corruption could be interpreted as evidencing an MNE’s 
heightened visibility into the current state of its subsidiary operations. An MNE’s more 
nuanced comprehension of the challenges (i.e., corruption) encountered by the subsidiary 
in the host market environment may result from deploying a greater proportion of 
expatriates to the foreign investment (Boyacigiller, 1990) and lead to a proactive decision 
to exit the market.  
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Either way, the results of our empirical analyses provide general support for our 
theory pertaining to the spatial orientation (Buckley & Ghauri, 2004; Dunning, 2009) of 
an MNE’s localization strategies (distal versus proximal). Nevertheless, we also 
acknowledge several limitations in our work. First, our study was conducted using a 
sample of firms from a single home country (Japan). Future work should seek to confirm 
our findings and test our theory using a sample of subsidiary investments that originate in 
a home market other than Japan or, from multiple home markets. Second, while our study 
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endeavored to investigate the relationship between corruption, MNE strategy and market 
exit, we are not yet able to explain how these firm strategies interact in practice with the 
phenomenon of corruption to either heighten or diminish the likelihood of market exit. 
This dilemma is not surprising given the elusive nature of the norms surrounding 
informal institutions such as corruption (Lambsdorff, 2005). We believe that intensive, 
case study-driven qualitative research might be the most productive approach towards 
fostering a richer comprehension of these mechanisms. Nevertheless, we are cognizant 
that corruption is inherently difficult to study because “…the parties involved have every 
reason to keep the data hidden” (Klitgaard, 1991: 30). Third, while the MNE’s quest for 
external legitimacy (within the host country market) in more corrupt host countries 
underpins the mechanisms in our theory, a consideration of the relevance of internal 
legitimacy (within the MNE network) (Lu & Xu, 2006) was beyond the scope of our 
work. However, we contend that, using appropriate data, future research with respect to 
efforts to secure internal legitimacy could be conducted in an effort to advance our 
spatially-oriented theory pertaining to subsidiary localization strategies. In this regard, 
our theory is useful to institutional theorists because the tension that emerges from a 
subsidiary’s efforts to secure both external legitimacy and internal legitimacy frequently 
manifests itself in a decision between proximally- and distally-oriented localization 
strategies. Consequently, our dichotomization of subsidiary localization strategies could 
be employed by IT scholars to study the strategic localization efforts of foreign 
subsidiaries confronted by a diverse array of institutional stimuli in the host country 
market. Finally, our research also reveals that in addition to studying the phenomenon of 
corruption broadly across the MNE’s global network of subsidiary investments, 
corruption-oriented research should also consider partitioning the MNE’s investments 
into developed market-based and emerging market-based investments in order to secure a 
more nuanced understanding of the relationships being investigated.   
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APPENDIX C 
 
Results of the Robustness Checks Using Two Separate Sub-Samples  
(Developed Market-Based Subsidiaries and Emerging Market-Based Subsidiaries) 
 
In order to ensure that the results presented in Tables 14-16 are robust and 
unencumbered by concerns regarding multicollinearity, we re-executed Models 1-3 as 
two additional sets of estimations by segregating our study’s full sample of 1,239 
subsidiaries into two sub-samples. While one sample was constituted by subsidiaries 
hosted in developed markets (660 subsidiaries), the other included only subsidiaries 
hosted in emerging markets (579 subsidiaries). Although these robustness analyses are 
not presented in tables, the results can be made available upon request. 
 
Model 1 (Table 14): Corruption and Market Exit 
Developed market-based subsidiaries. Re-executing Model 1 using the sample of 
developed market-based subsidiaries, Model 1D (χ2 = 102.87, p < 0.001) revealed that the 
signs of the coefficients remained unchanged and the level of significance improved 
(Public corruption: β = -0.89, p < 0.001; Private corruption: β = 1.06, p < 0.001). While 
these results continued to support Hypothesis 2, they did not support Hypothesis 1. 
Model 1E (χ2 = 104.14, p < 0.001) yielded results which were also consistent with the 
results for the full sample that are presented in Table 14. More specifically, both the main 
effects of public corruption (β = -0.86, p < 0.001) and private corruption (β = 1.10, p < 
0.001) continued to be significant, the signs of the coefficients were unchanged from 
those presented in Table 14, and the interaction effect between the two dimensions of 
corruption continued to be not significant. As such, Hypothesis 3 was not supported. 
Notably, the maximum VIF (8.71) in these re-executed models dropped below the 
commonly accepted upper limit of 10 (Stephan & Uhlaner, 2010) 
   Emerging market-based subsidiaries. Re-executing Model 1D (χ2 = 58.76, p < 
0.001) yielded results which supported neither Hypotheses 1 nor 2. However, Model 1E 
(χ2 = 69.36, p < 0.001) did produce results which supported Hypothesis 1 with respect to 
the main effect of public corruption (β = 0.25, p < 0.10). While private corruption (β = -
0.47, p < 0.05) was found to be significant, the sign of the coefficient was opposite of the 
predicted sign and, as such, Hypothesis 2 was not supported. However, most interesting 
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was our finding that the interaction effect (β = 0.75, p < 0.01) in Model 1E was 
significant, suggesting that the combined effect of an increase in the pervasiveness of 
public corruption and private corruption in a host emerging market heightens the 
likelihood that an MNE will exit the market. As such, Hypothesis 3 was supported when 
Model 1E was re-executed using the sample of emerging market-based subsidiaries. 
Given the considerably lower correlation between public corruption and private 
corruption for the sample of emerging market-based subsidiaries (0.53), when compared 
to the same correlation for the developed market-based subsidiaries (0.90), we were not 
surprised to find that using the sample of emerging market-based firms to re-estimate 
Models 1D and 1E resulted in a maximum VIF score (3.89) which was substantially 
lower than the maximum VIF (13.89) presented in Table 14. 
 
Model 2 (Table 15): Corruption, Expatriate Strategy and Market Exit 
Using the sample of developed market-based subsidiaries and the emerging 
market-based subsidiaries, we re-executed the Model 2 estimations in Table 15 that were 
developed to test Hypotheses 4 and 6 pertaining to expatriate strategy. In each of these 
re-executed models, the interaction effect was rendered not significant. However, when 
re-executing the models in Table 15 using the sample of developed market-based 
subsidiaries, the signs of the interaction effect coefficients in each of these models were 
entirely consistent with the results presented in Table 15 using the full sample which 
supported Hypothesis 4.   
 
Model 3 (Table 16): Corruption, Partnering Strategy and Market Exit 
Using the sample of developed market-based subsidiaries and the emerging 
market-based subsidiaries, we re-executed the Model 3 estimations in Table 16 that were 
developed to test Hypotheses 5 and 7 pertaining to partnering strategy. Interestingly, we 
found much more nuanced results than we did in re-executing the expatriate strategy 
models. 
Developed market-based subsidiaries. Re-executing Models 3B and 3C rendered 
the interaction effect between public corruption and partnering strategy non-significant 
for the developed market-based subsidiaries. Consistent with our findings for the full 
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sample in Models 3D and 3E of Table 16, the interaction between private corruption and 
partnering strategy continued to be not significant. 
Emerging market-based subsidiaries. Re-executing Models 3B (χ2 = 46.54, p < 
0.001) and 3C (χ2 = 61.44, p < 0.001) using the sample of emerging market-based 
subsidiaries yielded results in which the focal coefficients for both the main and 
interaction effects were highly consistent with the results using the full sample. Both 
models produced a significant interaction effect (Model 3B: β = -0.63, p < 0.05; Model 
3C: β = -0.64, p < 0.01) which revealed that, under conditions of more pronounced public 
corruption, engaging a home country partner in the JV reduced the likelihood of market 
exit. As such, these models were supportive of Hypothesis 7. The maximum VIF in these 
models was 3.50. 
The interaction effect between private corruption and partnering strategy was not 
significant when Models 3D and 3E were re-executed using the sample of emerging 
market-based subsidiaries. However, just as the coefficients were consistent with 
Hypothesis 7 and only marginally non-significant when Models 3D and 3E were 
executed using the full sample, the same was also true for the coefficients in these re-
executed Models 3D (p = 0.11) and 3E (p = 0.10). The maximum VIF in these models 
was 3.52. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 Institutional scholars and international business strategy researchers have 
recognized the need to develop theory, frameworks and constructs to facilitate 
corruption-based inquiry (Lambsdorff, Taube, & Schramm, 2005; Rodriguez, 
Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005). Nevertheless, we have continued to lack a comprehensive, 
theoretically-based and empirically-validated understanding of how host market 
corruption affects the subsidiary-level strategic behavior of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) in foreign markets.  This is problematic because it undermines scholar’s ability 
to formulate theoretically-grounded predictions with respect to the strategic behavior of 
MNEs under conditions of heightened host market corruption, as well as their ability to 
recommend strategies that will enhance the likelihood of achieving positive investment 
outcomes. As such, this dissertation has been developed to address two broad research 
questions. First, how does host market corruption impact the equity-based market entry 
strategies implemented by MNEs with respect to their foreign subsidiary investments? 
Second, how do subsidiary-level strategies moderate the influence of host market 
corruption upon the continued existence of these subsidiary investments? 
 Essay 1 (Chapter 2) synthesized insights from institutional theory and integrative 
social contracts theory to disaggregate the concept of  “government corruption” 
(Rodriguez et al., 2005) into two dimensions – grand corruption and petty corruption. 
While extant theory has used the terms government corruption and public sector 
corruption  interchangeably (Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh, & 
Eden, 2006), in the interest of consistency, I adopted the term government corruption in 
Essay 1. Although prior research found that more pervasive host market government 
corruption precipitates an MNE’s preference for nonequity-based entry over equity-based 
entry into foreign markets (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006), less was known about MNEs that 
choose equity-based strategies. Rodriguez et al. (2005) suggested that the pervasiveness 
of host market corruption would influence the equity ownership decisions of these 
MNEs. However, subsequent research never found a statistically significant relationship 
that empirically validated this proposition. Essay 1 built upon Uhlenbruck et al.’s (2006) 
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observation that the phenomenon of corruption might be more nuanced than had been 
previously expected. As such, the theory developed in Essay 1 extended the concept of 
institutional pluralism (Kraatz & Block, 2008) and introduced the notion of informal 
institution pluralism. In doing so, it proposed that discrete informal institutions (such as 
government corruption) within a host market could be conceptualized as pluralistic 
phenomena constituted by distinct dimensions which are disparate both in their origin and 
their impact on the foreign entry strategy of MNEs. Leveraging integrative social contract 
theory’s hierarchy of norms concept, I suggested that the distinct origins of the norms 
pertaining to grand corruption and petty corruption effectively precipitate different types 
of uncertainty (environmental and behavioral) for foreign-investing MNEs which, in 
turn, motivate MNEs to vary their equity-based entry strategies. More precisely, under 
conditions of more pervasive grand corruption, I theorized that the primary source of 
uncertainty will be environmental (response) uncertainty, while behavioral uncertainty 
will predominate under conditions of heighted petty corruption pervasiveness. My 
empirical analyses revealed that more pervasive grand corruption increases the 
likelihood that foreign-investing MNEs engage in joint venture (JV) investments with 
host country partners. Second, an increase in the pervasiveness of petty corruption was 
found to precipitate the opposite outcome. Namely, under conditions of more pervasive 
petty corruption, firms that chose to invest through a JV are more likely to engage a 
partner from the foreign-investing MNE’s home country. Finally, an increase in the 
pervasiveness of petty corruption was found to weaken the hypothesized positive 
relationship between grand corruption pervasiveness and the likelihood that MNEs 
would invest in JVs. 
 Essay 2 (Chapter 3) employed the theory pertaining to informal institutional 
pluralism to investigate the structure of equity-based foreign subsidiary investments in 
emerging markets, focusing specifically upon the public and private dimensions of 
corruption pervasiveness in foreign host markets. I theorized that an MNE’s choice of 
structure and entry strategy is contingent upon the pervasiveness of each dimension of 
corruption in the host market. Further, I proposed that the primary mechanism driving the 
distinct approaches to foreign entry was the firm’s anticipated reliance on different 
sources of bargaining power to reduce information asymmetries that it expects to 
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encounter in its public sector transactions and private sector transactions in the host 
market. More specifically, I hypothesized that under conditions of more pervasive public 
corruption, the firm’s resources are likely to be a more prominent source of bargaining 
power in its public sector transactions, when compared to the bargaining power that the 
firm derives from its context (or, its other alternatives). Conversely, under conditions of 
more pervasive private corruption, I expected that the firm’s context or, the availability 
of alternatives within the host country, is likely to be a more prominent source of 
bargaining power than it is in the case of its public sector transactions. In this study, an 
increase in public corruption pervasiveness was found to increase the likelihood that 
MNEs will invest via JV ownership with a host country (local) partner, while an increase 
in private corruption pervasiveness was found to increase the likelihood that MNEs will 
invest through a wholly-owned structure when entering foreign emerging markets. 
Further, an increase in the pervasiveness of private corruption was found to negatively 
moderate the likelihood that MNEs would invest in a JV with a local partner under 
conditions of more pervasive public corruption. 
 Essay 3 (Chapter 4) focused on the relationship between host market corruption 
pervasiveness, the subsidiary localization strategies implemented by MNEs and the 
likelihood of host market exit. I assumed that the pervasiveness of corruption in the host 
market threatens to undermine the legitimacy of foreign-investing firms in the host 
market environment. Despite the fact that the tenets of resource dependence theory and 
institutional theory converge on the conceptualization of “legitimacy”, the theories are 
also characterized by a degree of divergence, particularly when the theories are employed 
to study the phenomenon of corruption. Leveraging this theoretical tension, I extended 
the prior literature on localization to introduce the concept of subsidiary localization 
strategies which I disaggregated into proximal localization strategies (strategies which 
employ host market equity capital and human capital to facilitate a subsidiary’s 
integration within the host country market) and distal localization strategies (those 
strategies which facilitate integration within the host country market by employing equity 
capital and human capital sourced outside of the host country market). I investigated the 
relative efficacy of these strategies by developing hypotheses that posed divergent 
predictions with respect to the moderating impact of proximal and distal localization 
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strategies upon the likelihood of market exit in increasingly corrupt host market 
environments. First, I hypothesized that proximal (or, host market-oriented) localization 
strategies, in which subsidiaries prefer to engage host country partners and employees in 
the subsidiary investment, would be better-suited to reducing the likelihood of exit from 
increasingly corrupt host market environments. Next, I predicted that distal (or, home 
market-oriented) localization strategies, in which home country partners and employees 
are engaged in the subsidiary investment, would be best-suited to efforts to enhance the 
subsidiary’s legitimacy and reduce the likelihood of host market exit. My empirical 
analyses revealed that a proximally-oriented partnering strategy heightened the 
likelihood of market exit under conditions of more pervasive host market public 
corruption, but not more pervasive private corruption. Conversely, a distally-oriented 
expatriate strategy increased the likelihood of market exit under conditions of both more 
pervasive public corruption and private corruption. 
 
Contributions 
 This dissertation makes a number of conceptual and empirical contributions. To 
broadly summarize, I have presented empirical and theoretical support for the 
foundational theory of host market corruption in international business strategy research 
(Rodriguez et al., 2005). Moreover, I have extended the conceptualization of host market 
corruption in terms of its ethical origins (grand versus petty), in terms of its sectoral 
origin (public versus private), and in terms of its impact upon the strategy and structure 
of MNEs’ foreign subsidiary investments. I have also contributed new tenets to 
institutional theory by introducing the concepts of informal institutional pluralism 
(conceptualizing informal institutions as pluralistic phenomena), proximal (host market-
oriented) localization and distal (home market-oriented) localization strategies. 
 More precisely, in Essay 1, I extended the conceptual domain of institutional 
pluralism (Kraatz & Block, 2008). While prior work has focused on the strategic 
relevance of institutional pluralism created by geographic space, my theory suggests that 
discrete institutions within a host market can themselves be characterized as pluralistic 
institutional phenomena, constituted by distinct dimensions that exert different impacts 
upon the strategies of foreign-investing MNEs. Empirically, I independently replicated an 
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important component of Uhlenbruck et al.’s (2006) findings, providing further support 
for the theory which proposed that MNEs would be more likely to favor nonequity-based 
entry over equity-based entry under conditions of more pervasive host market 
government corruption. However, I also presented new theory that disaggregates the 
concept of government corruption pervasiveness into two distinct dimensions (grand 
corruption pervasiveness and petty corruption pervasiveness). Employing this refined 
conceptualization, I shed new light on the relationship between the equity-based foreign 
entry strategy of MNEs and the pervasiveness of government corruption.  
In Essay 2, I synthesized the research of international business strategy scholars 
and business ethicists by refining the conceptualization of “host market corruption” to 
incorporate a consideration of both its public and private sector dimensions. By focusing 
on the role of a firm’s bargaining power in shaping its strategic foreign entry decisions 
under conditions of more pervasive host market corruption, my work contributes to 
efforts to more closely integrate market and nonmarket strategy research. More 
specifically, I have drawn attention to an important theoretical mechanism that could be 
used to bridge the institutionally-oriented and resource-oriented perspectives that have 
been advocated by strategy theorists as a means to enhance our understanding of the 
strategic relevance of contemporary nonmarket phenomena such as corruption (Doh, 
Lawton, & Rajwani, 2012). This research also offered important insights for policy 
makers. Two key assumptions have traditionally underpinned the policy 
recommendations of anti-corruption scholars (first, corruption primarily occurs within 
firm-government transactions; second, engaging a partner is a key strategy employed by 
firms to manage the increased uncertainty precipitated by public corruption). My research 
suggests that policy prescriptions designed to curb MNE engagement in foreign market 
corruption must consider the multidimensional nature of the construct in order to ensure 
that policy efforts are not misguided. To date, scholars have focused on formulating 
policy recommendations that are designed to reduce the efficacy of the transaction cost-
reducing strategies employed by firms to facilitate corrupt transactions (Lambsdorff, 
2002; Svensson, 2003). My findings that public corruption and private corruption each 
exert a distinct impact upon the foreign-investment decisions of MNEs, coupled with my 
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findings pertaining to the interaction effect between both types of corruption upon these 
foreign entry strategies, suggests the need for more nuanced anti-corruption initiatives. 
Finally, in Essay 3, by elaborating two distinct approaches towards facilitating a 
subsidiary’s localization into the host country market (proximal versus distal), I have 
enhanced our comprehension of the veiled relationship between corruption pervasiveness, 
MNE strategy and host market exit. In doing so, my work provides theoretically-
grounded and empirically-validated guidance to MNEs that seek insights with respect to 
the relative efficacy of various localization strategies that can be implemented in host 
markets characterized by heightened corruption. Testing this theory revealed that the 
direct effects of corruption on market exit, as well as the moderating impact of an MNE’s 
subsidiary localization strategies, are dependent upon both the dimension of corruption 
being considered (public or private) and the host market context (developed market or, 
emerging market). 
 
Limitations 
 As is often true of most research endeavors, my work is not without limitations. 
The most significant limitation to my work has been the challenge associated with 
engaging in qualitative analysis that could either confirm or contradict my theory and 
quantitative analysis. In this regard, my research experience indirectly provides support 
for Klitgaard’s (1991: 30) seemingly timeless observation that corruption is so difficult to 
study because “…the parties involved have every reason to keep the data hidden.” 
Closely related to this challenge has been the limitation posed by the availability of 
quantitative data. While non-governmental agencies such as Transparency International 
(TI) have made significant advances in developing and collecting data (such as TI’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index) that help us to broadly understand public sector- or, 
government-oriented corruption over time in foreign markets, longitudinal data with 
respect to the multiple, more fine-grained dimensions of host market corruption that I 
theorize in this dissertation is lacking. As one example, an important limitation in my 
research has been the absence of a comprehensive index to operationalize the private 
corruption pervasiveness construct (Faria, Morales, Pineda, & Montesinos, 2012), akin to 
the Corruption Perceptions Index that is available to measure public corruption. I hope 
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that my research will either stimulate an agency’s efforts to collect the data needed to 
develop and maintain such an index or, provide me with an opportunity to pursue the 
development and maintenance of such as index. 
 
Future Research 
 This dissertation enhances our understanding of how host market corruption 
affects the subsidiary-level strategic behavior of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in 
foreign markets.  Further, it equips scholars and managers to formulate theoretically-
grounded predictions with respect to the strategic behavior of MNEs under conditions of 
heightened host market corruption. However, the theory and constructs that I have 
developed also open up new lines of inquiry that promise to further extend our 
comprehension with respect to the phenomenon of corruption and its relationship with 
MNE strategy, as well as exposing new research opportunities outside the domain of 
corruption-oriented international business strategy research. 
 At the very least, my dissertation provides a point of departure for what I believe 
are two important areas for future research inquiry. First, my research collectively 
suggests that in the context of corruption-oriented research, the distinction between 
developed market-based and emerging market-based investments may be highly pertinent 
to efforts to secure a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between host 
market corruption and MNE activity. Second, while my work has sought to build upon 
and extend prior work in economics that has focused extensively on the country as the 
unit of analysis (i.e., the relationship between corruption and dependent variables such as 
foreign direct investments flows, economic growth, etc.), my research has concentrated 
on firm-level strategic analysis. An opportunity exists for behavioral scholars to leverage 
my theory and empirical findings to explore unanswered research questions pertaining to 
increasingly more micro levels of analysis and to better comprehend how decisions 
pertaining to the strategy and structure of subsidiary investments unfold under conditions 
of more pervasive host market corruption. Just as my research promises to inform the 
work of scholars whose research focuses on these more micro levels of analysis, I expect 
that their findings will reverberate back and generate insights that are relevant to scholars 
working at the firm-level. 
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 Both of these research undertakings are imperative. As I noted in Chapter 1 of this 
dissertation, without a theoretically-based understanding of the interrelationship between 
host market corruption and subsidiary-level strategy in foreign markets, it becomes more 
difficult to prescribe how MNEs can effectively integrate the Global Compact’s tenth 
principle (Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion 
and bribery) into the business strategies, operations and structures of their foreign 
subsidiaries. In developing a framework designed to secure corporate commitment to the 
Global Compact’s principles, the United Nations has suggested that the engagement of 
worldwide subsidiary operations is one of the most important avenues through which 
MNEs can scale-up corporate responsibility efforts (Kell, 2012). It’s my sincere hope that 
this dissertation makes a contribution to this timely and important endeavor. 
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